



**UNITED NATIONS**



**GOVERNMENT OF SAMOA**

# **Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Workshop for Humanitarian Assistance in Samoa**

**Level 5, Development Bank of Samoa  
Apia, Samoa, 15<sup>th</sup> -17<sup>th</sup> April 2009**

# 1 Executive Summary

The achievements of Samoa's disaster management community were clearly highlighted during the April 2009 Inter Agency Contingency Planning Workshop. In recent years, much has been done to raise disaster related awareness, to build capacity in disaster response at all levels of the Samoan Community, and to develop and test disaster preparedness and response structures and plans. This work was successfully put to the test as part of the response to the September 2008 bushfires which affected two villages in Savai'i.

Similarly, at the regional level, Pacific humanitarian organizations and partners have made important steps to jointly strengthen disaster preparedness for response capabilities in support of Pacific Island Countries that request international assistance. Examples include increased pre-positioning of emergency relief stocks, training of rapid response personnel, agreed coordination structures and improved information management.

However, it would be risky to assume that the considerable combined progress to date leaves no work left to do. If, for instance, a disaster were to occur of the scale which workshop participants agreed was a "reasonable worst case scenario", where 70% of the population or over 100,000 people were affected, it is likely that Samoa's disaster response systems would be placed under great stress. No country has ever been "completely prepared" for a major disaster. Consequently, it is important to grasp every opportunity that arises to build further on disaster preparedness and response capabilities in Samoa.

The simulation and discussions which took place during the workshop unearthed some avenues for continued improvement of Samoa's disaster response capability. For instance, the diversity of response plans that could potentially be enacted during a response, and the number of actors who were unfamiliar with counterpart plans or even their own, was evidenced. This highlighted the shared responsibility that all humanitarian actors take in disaster preparedness, and indicated that Samoa would be well served if each and every actor associated with disaster response took the time to revisit the contents of their own and their counterpart's plans. The most productive way to do this would be to go beyond merely reading the document, but to critically examine it to ensure that it continues to offer an optimal blueprint to guide that actor's role in disaster response.

The flow of information is critical to the success of any disaster response, and there is always room to improve in this area. In Samoa, the current process through which information flows from the village, is analysed to provide recommendations for action by the DAC, and passed to the NDC, remains complex. Information appears to be able to flow along multiple routes including: through response personnel, through the ministry of women, and directly to the Disaster Management Office. Further, no-one appears to have ultimate responsibility for ensuring that this information does reach its destination in a format which will enhance the decision making capability of the NDC. In the "reasonable worst case scenario" referred to above, information would be flowing from well over 200 villages. Perhaps defining a clear and definite pathway through which this information should flow, assigning responsibility and resources for ensuring that this information does flow, defining a clear destination for the information to arrive at, and describing the systems which will be used to turn that raw information into a decision making tool, would enhance the capacity of the NDC to make informed recommendations during the response to a major disaster.

Similar opportunities may also exist with regard to (rapid) needs assessments. Workshop participants recognized that slow or one-way information flow and a lack of information sharing across clusters can hamper decision-making. The need for carefully planned and phased assessments and gender balance in an assessment team was also discussed and generally recognized as preferable. When assessments

are complete, the quantity of information collected can be overwhelming. Strong processes must be in place for data entry, cleaning, management, analysis, and publication of information. In short, the information management capacity with the NEOC and clusters is an essential element of a successful disaster response. Perhaps learnings from the workshop can be used to further improve information management systems in Samoa.

Samoa may also be able to take advantage of the considerable work which has been done by the statistics department in collecting baseline data. Information such as that contained in the 2006 census, which is readily available, can support the development of village disaster plans as spearheaded by the DMO, and can also be combined with the work of other regional organizations such as SOPAC, the Ministry of Health, UNDP or WHO, to provide a detailed understanding of the nature and scale of vulnerabilities of communities in Samoa along with infrastructure and other assets which can aid response. Such information can be invaluable in the first hours and days of a disaster, but can be very hard to come by when everyone is under the intense pressure of responding.

There is no doubt that, when preparing for a disaster, there is always more work to do. The above observations are some examples of avenues which may provide easily accessible improvements. Hopefully, the more detailed report below will help workshop participants discover many more such avenues, and pursue them, to further strengthen the capacity of Samoa to respond in times of crisis.

## **2 Background**

In July 2008, OCHA Pacific facilitated a Regional Level Contingency Planning Workshop for Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific region. The key outcome of the workshop was the establishment of the Pacific Humanitarian Team and a Pacific cluster approach, in which key regional humanitarian response partners participate (including UN agencies, NGOs and donors). It is expected that this Pacific cluster approach will contribute to improved effectiveness, predictability and timeliness of international assistance to support PICs.

To ensure that the Pacific Regional Cluster Framework effectively compliments each Pacific Island Country's national disaster management arrangements and specific context, contingency planning workshops are being held in the most disaster prone countries, of which Samoa is one.

## **3 Workshop objectives**

The overall objective of the workshop was to bring together key disaster response actors from Government, Red Cross, Donor partners, UN organizations and NGOs to review jointly the existing disaster response mechanism both at national and Pacific level, test how effectively the regional cluster approach could support the national level disaster response structure through exercise and adjust/review regional cluster structure to the specific context in Solomon Islands. The workshop was also expected to enhance the linkages and coordination between regional clusters and corresponding governmental ministries/agencies.

## **4 Expected outcomes**

The outcomes expected of the workshop included:

- 1 Increased readiness for response
- 2 Identification of procedural and decision-making gaps as well as gaps in response actions
- 3 Identification of conflicts between departments and Ministries, amongst key stakeholders along with interpretation of procedures and roles
- 4 Confirmation of roles and responsibilities between actors
- 5 Resource needs are identified
- 6 Information and data needs for decision-making and action are identified
- 7 Effectiveness of existing emergency services is tested
- 8 All key stakeholders in disaster response will have common understandings on needs, gaps and steps forward to improve the response mechanism
- 9 Additional training needs are identified
- 10 Modifications and improvement to regional cluster approach as well as the contingency plan are identified following lessons learned from the Exercise, which could guide regional cluster lead agencies to further organize and plan their minimum preparedness actions

## **5 Participation**

In total 44 participants attended the workshop representing a mix of Samoan and international actors drawn from: the NDMO, various Government Ministries and DAC members, the Red Cross, International NGOs based in Apia and Australia, UN Agencies and NGOs with an office in Apia and regional UN Agencies and NGOs. For a participants list see Appendix 4.

## 6 Day One Workshop proceedings

### Opening

The workshop was led in Prayer and then the assistant CEO, Meteorology Division officially made the first address on behalf of the CEO and Minister of Natural Resources & Environment. The workshop was declared open.

Each participant briefly introduced themselves providing their name, organization and a short overview of what they do during a disaster.

### 6.1 Objectives

Peter Muller, UNOCHA Regional Disaster Response Advisor, explained the objectives of the workshop and explained that we undertake the planning process to improve the quality of humanitarian response.


Planning helps us to think through and identify potential gaps and problems around:

- What could happen?
- What would the impact be on people affected?
- What actions would be required to meet humanitarian needs?
- How would organisations work together?
- What resources will be required?
- What can organisations do to be better prepared?

Contingency planning was defined as a process that includes:

- Analysing potential emergencies
- Analysing potential humanitarian impacts and consequences
- Establishing clear objectives, strategies, policies and procedures and articulating critical actions that must be taken to respond to an emergency, and
- Ensuring that agreements are recorded and necessary actions are taken in order to enhance preparedness.

Inter-Agency Contingency Planning provides a common, overarching framework for collective action that is specified in cluster and agency planning.



Specific workshop objectives were to:

1. Set priorities and identify major tasks, functions and operations in response to a disaster
2. Examine how some of the key emergency services would function during an emergency
3. Test how national and international actors can effectively coordinate in order to provide a timely and appropriate response in each sector
4. Feed back concrete suggestions in order to agree upon a disaster response framework and minimum preparedness activities in Solomon Islands and plan for the next steps

The desired outcomes from the workshop are:

1. Readiness for response is increased in the event of an actual impact on routine operations
2. Procedural and decision-making gaps as well as gaps in response actions are identified
3. Conflicts - if any, within departments and Ministries, amongst key stakeholders along with interpretation of procedures and roles – are revealed
4. Role Clarity: Roles and responsibilities between actors are confirmed
5. Resource Requirements are identified
6. Information and data needs for decision-making and action are identified
7. Effectiveness of existing emergency services is tested
8. All key stakeholders in disaster response will have common understandings on needs, gaps and steps forward to improve response mechanism
9. Additional training needs are identified
10. Regional framework revision: Inform on potential modifications of, and improvements to, the regional cluster approach
11. National cluster approach: Inform on potential modifications of and improvement to the national cluster approach

## 6.2 Disasters in Samoa

Filomena Nelson, Director of the National Disaster Management Office, presented an overview of the factors which contribute to Samoa's vulnerability and ability to manage disasters as follows:

### **Contributing factors to Samoa's vulnerability and ability to manage disasters:**

#### Natural Environment:

Samoa consists of two large volcanic islands (Upolu and Savai'i) and several smaller islands. It lies in the southwest Pacific within an exclusive economic zone of 120,000 square kilometres. Samoa has a tropical climate with a rainy season from October to March, and a dry season from April to September. Agriculture and fisheries are the primary sources of revenue, followed by tourism.

**Climate change, sea-level rise, environmental degradation, pollution, coastal erosion, water quality and resource management are all factors which influence disaster risk and impact in Samoa.**

#### Social Environment:

The total population of Samoa is recorded in the 2006 census as 179,186. Upolu houses the capital city of Apia (population of around 37,000), Faleolo International Airport and a deep water harbour which is the entry point for international ships. Savai'i's population is approximately 35,000.

About 70% of the population live on low lying coastal areas including national and community infrastructure. There are a number of large and small resorts and accommodation complexes located on the two main islands.

Samoa is an independent state with its own Government and a Prime Minister as its leader. Samoa is part of the Commonwealth, has a Head of State, and members of Parliament are democratically elected for a period of 5 years. Traditional systems of community leadership prevail, whereby Matai plays a large role at the national, community and village levels.

The official language is Samoan, although English is spoken in most parts of the country, often for business. Strong religious ties and the Church play a major role in daily life. Diets primarily consist of tropical foods of fish, chicken, pig, coconut, taro, yams, vegetables and fruit. Communal society – immediate and extended family – are very important aspects of the Samoan Culture.

#### Built Environment

Most Samoans live in the traditional open fale (with no fixed walls). All buildings must meet government building standards and the National Building Code for Samoa. Mobile and land-line telecommunications services are provided on the major islands of Samoa. Electricity supply is primarily maintained by diesel generators, supported by hydroelectric generation. An electricity service covers most of the islands except for some remote areas. Water supply is primarily sourced from natural springs, with the city of Apia serviced by a dam and treatment facility. Septic tanks are the most common form of effluent removal, with Apia and some larger facilities being serviced by sewage treatment plants. Fuel and gas are supplied by ship from international markets

## Hazards and risks in Samoa

- A basic hazard assessment has been conducted using Australian New Zealand Risk Management Standard 4360 (AS/NZS 4360:1999)
  - To determine the likelihood of a significant disaster being caused by the hazard, and the consequences of the hazard if it did occur, and
  - To rank the level of risk from each hazard

The most significant risk events are listed below. A full table of risk events is listed in Appendix 1:

<b>Hazard</b>	<b>Level of Risk</b>
<b>Cyclone</b>	<b>Extreme</b>
<b>Volcanic Eruption</b>	<b>Extreme</b>
<b>Tsunami</b>	<b>Extreme</b>
<b>Fire (Urban Environment)</b>	<b>Extreme</b>
<b>Public Health Crisis</b>	<b>Extreme</b>
<b>Environmental Crisis</b>	<b>Extreme</b>
Flood	High
Earthquake	High
Landslides	High
Forest Fire	High
Aircraft emergency (airport)	High
Hazchem incidents (marine)	High

## Disaster history and impacts in Samoa

- 1917 - 8.3 earthquake at the Tongan Trench and tsunami. Damage to houses and crops but no loss of life recorded
- 1918 – Spanish flu, 7,542 deaths, about 22 – 25% of total population
- 1960 – 8.5 Chilean earthquake and tsunami. Damage to houses and crops but no deaths recorded
- 1983 - Bush Fire which affected about 5 villages in North West of Savai'i
- 1988 – Bush Fire which affected same area
- 1990 - TC Ofa, 8 deaths, damage to infrastructure, disruption to all social services
- 1991 - TC Val, damage to infrastructure, disruption to all social services
- 2003 - Bush Fire at Asau and Aopo
- 2004 - TC Heta, minimal damage to crops, electricity, water and telephones, roads
- 2008 - Bush Fire at Asau and Aopo

## Discussion

### Village education

In later discussion, the process of village disaster education and consultation which is currently being conducted was mentioned as an avenue for gathering information held by the elderly relating to previous disasters.

### Busfires

There was also discussion regarding bushfire events. It was explained that the cause of these usually related to prolonged dry spells during the dry season combined with people taking advantage of these conditions to clear land by burning.

A national fire plan has been developed and is currently with the ministry for approval. Proactive education on fire safe practices is part of the village disaster education project and other communications initiatives are also expected to be implemented in the near future.

### Volcanoes

Active volcanoes in Savai'i were also discussed. There are currently no monitoring systems in place for volcanoes and the NDMO is seeking to work with SOPAC to implement them. The volcano which most recently erupted is believed to still be active but there is no forecast for when it might next erupt.

There is also believed to be one underwater volcano which is located by the Tau island about 200km southeast of Samoa.

### Past experiences

The Secretary General of the Samoa Red Cross shared some of her experiences of Cyclone Ofa and Heta. The Secretary General said that work done during the 1990s had improved preparedness for cyclones. However, there were still issues relating to a lack of coordination and duplication relating to the distribution of food. There was also a lack of caution demonstrated by the general public in preparation for the most recent cyclone.

Samoa Red Cross preparedness measures include the prepositioning of relief supplies. When there is a declaration of emergency, plans are activated. The first action is to conduct assessments and identify the most devastated parts of the country along with the immediate needs of the affected populations. NDMO sitreps are also used to inform this analysis. Common needs include water supply, clothing and housing. Appropriate relief which meets these needs, such as tarpaulins for houses which have lost roofs, are distributed as soon as the assessments are completed.

The Bureau of Meteorology explained that, from their experience, during the 1990 and 91 cyclones the response was poorly structured. When aid arrived everything became very confused and often very senior people were having to work right down on the ground level to get things done. During 1990 the cyclone produced a lot of storm surges. There was no warning and the met office was wiped out. By 1991 the office was still not rebuilt and the met office was forced to receive their information from the Fiji Met Office by fax. The situation has now improved but the Fiji Met is still often used for meteorological information.

The Ministry of Women and Social Development reported that during the 1990 and 91 cyclones there was hardly any disaster management. Samoan Fale's were not strong so people took refuge in churches and school buildings. Some people were forced to take refuge in water tanks. There was a lot of damage resulting from the cyclones but not many casualties.

It was suggested that there was no meaningful document in place to guide response during the 1990 and 91 cyclones.

### Tsunami warnings

With regard to Tsunami warnings, there had been two drills and while the first had not been taken very seriously the second had been quite successful. There was widespread awareness within the community of what actions should be taken during a Tsunami alert.

## 6.3 Planning assumptions for disaster preparedness

Peter Muller introduced the concept of producing planning assumptions as follows:

We are preparing for a *realistic worst case scenario*. The focus should be on the most critical hazards which are judged by:

1. the likelihood of a hazard occurring combined with
2. the potential humanitarian impact.

The aim of the exercise is to focus on situations in which the scale and impact of the potential emergency requires the concerted action of a number of agencies/organizations both national and international.

In producing planning assumptions we need to:

- Agree upon anticipated numbers of affected, requiring assistance etc.
- Define the characteristics of the population (i.e. gender, age, socio-economic status)
- Provide a specific projection of humanitarian needs (e.g. Food, water, sanitation, shelter etc.)
- Identify any particular vulnerabilities
- Assess the capacity of the government and communities to respond
- Identify potential operational constraints

### **A planning assumption example**

Humanitarian assistance may be required to assist the Government in responding to the protection and assistance needs of 100,000-150,000 displaced households in the three districts .

### **Planning assumption created for the Pacific Humanitarian Team at the Inter Agency Contingency Planning workshop in July 2008**

“rapid on-set natural disaster (cyclone, floods, earthquake, tsunami) that would affect a population of 30,000 people in multiple (island/country) locations”

It was agreed that if regional humanitarian actors were well prepared to respond to such a scenario, this would also cover the humanitarian impact of smaller scale natural disasters (e.g. more localized effects of cyclones and floods, volcanic eruptions, etc.) and manmade disasters (fires, environmental disasters) and to an extent even complex emergencies.

### **Samoa Planning Assumptions**

After considering the information presented above, workshop participants developed the following planning assumptions for Samoa.

*Disaster events with a potential to overwhelm government capacity to respond include: Cyclones, Urban Fire, Bushfires, Tsunami, Flooding, Earthquakes, and Pandemic.*

*There is the potential for up to 70% of the population or approximately 100,000 people to be affected by a significant disaster.*

*Potential problems which need to be overcome during the response include: road, port and air access; lifelines such as food, water and electricity; temporary displacement; nutrition; communications; sanitation; strain on the education and health systems; and protection.*

## 6.4 Briefing on the Outcome of Regional Contingency Planning Workshop and Cluster Approach in the Pacific

Peter Muller provided a brief overview on the background of Humanitarian Reform, the regional inter-agency contingency planning for humanitarian assistance workshop held in Suva in July 2008, the agreed cluster framework in the Pacific including a description of the regional clusters and how they are expected to operate, and the role of the cluster lead agencies and expectations on cluster members, as follows:

### **Background**

Humanitarian Reform and the implementation of the Cluster Approach have taken place at the global level. In the local context, the Solomon Islands Tsunami/Earthquake in April 2007 highlighted the challenges face in responding to disasters in the Pacific and the importance of disaster preparedness. It has also highlighted the need for more effective & predictable humanitarian. Inter-agency coordination and collaboration and emergency preparedness are an important part of this effort.

### **Some Findings from the 2005 Humanitarian Response Review**

In 2005, in recognition of the still considerable gaps in the ability of the humanitarian system to respond adequately to all humanitarian crises, a review was initiated with the aim of finding ways to provide a more predictable humanitarian response to vulnerable populations around the globe. Key findings of the review included:

- Lessons learned from past disasters have highlighted well-known, long-standing gaps in response
- There were limited linkages between UN and non-UN actors
- Coordination of the response was erratic and dependent on personalities
- There was insufficient accountability (particularly for Internally Displace People (because there was not a clear organizational mandate and responsibility in the international community for displaced people))
- Donor policies were inconsistent

### **Lessons from Solomon Islands Earthquake/Tsunami**

- Data preparedness and collection for decision making was inadequate
- Sustained coordination at multiple levels (Honiara, Gizo, Choisal, Suva, Melbourne, Bangkok, Aukland) was difficult
- Information management for coordination and decision-making could be improved
- Logistics, transport and supply were challenging
- Roles and responsibilities of various actors needed to be clarified

### **Whose reform?**

As a result of the Humanitarian Response Review, reform was initiated. The Humanitarian Reform process was overseen by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), an international body composed of the following agencies:

**Full members:** Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Development Fund (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program (WFP), World Health Organisation (WHO).

**Standing invitees:** The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), American Council for Voluntary International Action (Inter-Action), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Office for the High Commission of Human Rights (UNHCR), Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (RSG on HR of IDPs), Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), World Bank (World Bank).

The reform process is built on “three pillars” which are all underpinned by a foundation of improved partnerships, as illustrated below.



### The cluster approach

The cluster approach is the first of the three pillars and a key element of humanitarian reform. It aims to organise a response according to sectors with a clearly identified leader and ensure a clear system of leadership and accountability. It clarifies the division of labour among organisations and better defines roles and responsibilities within the different sectors of the response.

The cluster approach addresses gaps and strengthens the effectiveness of humanitarian response through building partnerships. It is intended to strengthen rather than to replace sectoral coordination under the overall leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator. It is about making the international humanitarian community more structured, accountable and professional, so that it can be a better partner for host governments, local authorities and local civil society.

### Global Cluster/Sector Working Groups:

Clusters and their lead agency at the global level are listed below:

<b>Sector/Cluster</b>	<b>Lead Agency</b>
Agriculture	FAO
Camp Coordination & Camp Management	UNHCR & IOM
Early Recovery	UNDP
Education in Emergencies	UNICEF & Save the Children
Emergency Shelter	UNHCR & IFRC (Convenor)
Emergency Telecomms	OCHA (UNICEF & WFP)
Health	WHO
Logistics	WFP
Nutrition	UNICEF
Protection	UNHCR
Water, Sanitation & Hygiene	UNICEF

**Terms of Reference for cluster/sector leads include:**

Below is broad a list of outcomes which cluster lead agencies agree to assume responsibility for facilitating (the cluster lead does not necessarily have to produce the outcome themselves, rather they should ensure that somehow the cluster provides that outcome).

- Inclusion of key humanitarian partners
- Appropriate coordination mechanisms
- Coordination with national/local authorities, local civil society etc.
- Participatory and community-based approaches
- Attention to priority cross-cutting issues (age, environment, gender, HIV/AIDS etc)
- Needs assessment and analysis
- Emergency preparedness
- Planning and strategy development
- Application of standards
- Monitoring and reporting
- Advocacy and resource mobilization
- Training and capacity building
- Provider of last resort

**The Regional Inter Agency Contingency Planning Workshop**

In July 2008 a workshop was held in Suva to initiate the process of adopting the cluster approach and improve coordination for more effective disaster response in the Pacific. In total 65 participants from the UN, Red Cross, INGOs, Education/Training Institutes and Donor Partners attended the workshop. The specific objectives of the workshop were to agree on:

- Mechanisms for humanitarian assistance in the Pacific
- Priority areas/clusters
- Lead agencies
- Roll out strategy for country level inter agency contingency planning

Outcomes of the workshop included the formation of the Pacific Humanitarian Team, which comprises of all disaster response actors that have a regional capacity to deploy in Pacific Island Countries. The table below identifies the cluster lead agencies and the cluster partners who took part in the workshop.

Humanitarian Cluster	Global Cluster Lead	Pacific Cluster Lead	Pacific Cluster Partners
Health & Nutrition	WHO & UNICEF	WHO & (UNICEF)	WHO, UNICEF, USG, Red Cross (RC), UNFPA, WV, UNDP, UNEP, SCF, OXFAM, NZ, AUS, Fiji School of Medicine/Monash
Water, Sanitation & Hygiene (WASH)	UNICEF	UNICEF	UNICEF, RC, OXFAM, NZ, WV, SCF, USG, JP, WHO, AUS
Shelter & Camp Management	IFRC & IOM	IFRC (convener for Shelter) IOM (for Camp Management)	IFRC, SCF, HFH, WV, Oxfam, NZ, JP, AUS, IOM?
Logistics	WFP	WFP (to be determined)	WFP, Oxfam, Red Cross, USG, Church, FRANZ
Information Management	Cross-cutting issue	UNOCHA	UNOCHA, OXFAM, SCF, RC, USG, UNFPA, UNICEF, Monash/ FSM, UNESCO, FRANZ, SOPAC?, NZCID, ACFID? PIANGO?
Protection	UNHCR	UNHCR/UNICEF/ OHCHR	UNHCR, UNICEF, OHCHR, OXFAM, WV, SCF, OCHA, USG, UNFPA, NZ, RC, Churches, UNDSS, AUSAID

The Pacific Humanitarian Team (PHT) is open to all organizations and donor partners in and around the region that have a mandate and capacity to provide international assistance to Pacific island countries. As such, it integrates the (UN) Disaster Management Teams in Fiji and Samoa and includes also non-UN organizations. The PHT operates under the guidance and chair of the UN Resident Coordinators based in Fiji and Samoa and is supported by UNOCHA.

#### More info on Humanitarian Reform & Pacific Humanitarian Team

Key documents:

- Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response
- Specific cluster guidance, provided by global cluster leads
- Humanitarian Assistance & OCHA: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)
- Reform Website: [www.humanitarianreform.org](http://www.humanitarianreform.org)


## 6.5 Current disaster response structure in Samoa

Filomena Nelson provided an overview of governmental disaster response structures and its coordination mechanism with other stakeholders as follows:

A **disaster** is a situation which arises from any event, whether natural or otherwise, which involves threat to human life or health or to the environment and which might require response agencies to respond under the Act.

An **emergency** is a situation which is more serious than a disaster which could result in widespread human, property and environmental losses throughout Samoa. It will require substantial mobilization and utilization of Samoa's resources or exceed Samoa's capacity to cope using its own resources.

The national disaster management structure is mapped below.



### The Community

The Community, which is represented by a village mayor and women's representative, governed by a village council, and also features a church based response structure, is responsible for initiating the grass roots response to a disaster. This response involves, **information dissemination, shelter management, damage assessment and relief coordination**. The Ministry of Women, Community and Social Development (MWCSO) supports, monitor and liaises with Village Councils and organizations as they carry out their responsibilities under the plan and keeps DAC informed of the level of village preparedness. There are 329 villages in Samoa.

### The Disaster Advisory Committee (DAC)

The Disaster Advisory Committee (DAC) comprises the 48 operational government agencies in Samoa. The DAC makes **operational decisions** and coordinates and manages response activities. DAC members meet regularly to report to the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC), of which they are also a part, regarding progress within their agencies area of responsibility. DAC members also attend meetings with the NDC to provide further information or clarify information in the Sitreps.

### The Disaster Management Office (DMO)

The Disaster Management Office (DMO) is the focal point for coordination and implementation and provides **coordination, support and administration** during a disaster response.

### The National Disaster Council (NDC)

The National Disaster Council (NDC) is the key decision making and conflict resolution body during a disaster response. The NDC receives its information through reports from the DAC and provides **oversight and approval** as well as **strategic direction and governance**. The NDC is also responsible for providing advice to the Head of State regarding the proclamation of an emergency and facilitating international relations & communication.

### Proclamation of a state of emergency

The proclamation of a state of emergency is provided for under the Constitution of Samoa. The proclamation is made by the Head of State and may remain in force for a period of up to thirty days. The proclamation empowers the Head of State to make emergency orders to secure the public safety, essential supplies and services, safeguard interest and welfare of the community/country.

### Declaration of disaster

A declaration of disaster is made by the NDC Chair. It is only made when the Head of State is not available to make a proclamation of emergency or the extent of damage does not require a proclamation of emergency or response activities can be done within 48 hours.

### Emergency Powers

Any powers conferred on any response agency by their own legislation, mandates or agreements remains in place during a disaster or emergency. Any powers, responsibilities and functions exercised under the Act and National Disaster Management Plan (NDMP) must be discharged and exercised subject to any exercise of power under Part X of the Constitution. Any powers conferred on any agency under the NDMP shall be exercisable only during the period of emergency unless rescinded or altered by an Emergency Order.

### Information flows

Information flows from the community to emergency response personnel or the DAC via the MWCDs. The DMO also receives situation reports from the Village Mayors.

### National Emergency Operations Center

The NDC can appoint any facility to be the NEOC, based on advise of the DAC.

There are three stages of activation:

Stage 1: **Standby** – comes into effect when it has been established that a hazard exists or threatens to affect part of or the whole country

Stage 2: **Action** – becomes effective when the threat is imminent or has already occurred

Stage 3: **Stand-down** – occurs when the disaster is over. The NDC determines when stand-down from disaster should occur. NEOC will close down once the stand down is effective.

### Impact assessment

Impact assessments are required to determine the nature and scale of damage and the relief and recovery needs which result from that damage. The DAC oversees impact assessments and can form assessment teams. Each response agency conducts an impact assessment for its own mandated area of operation.

Types of assessment include:

- Aerial surveillance – to establish the extent of damage and identify the need for a proclamation or declaration
- Initial assessments – to determine immediate relief requirements
- Detailed assessments – to determine long term recovery activities

### **Recovery Arrangements**

The DAC is responsible for establishing appropriate structures to monitor and coordinate disaster recovery and providing regular reporting to NDC for strategic direction. The DAC will be responsible for implementation of any direction issued by NDC.

Recovery begins when any proclamation of emergency is lifted or when the operational disaster response role of the NDC, DAC and NEOC is complete.

Preparation for recovery begins during response.

The NEOC may continue to be used by recovery management personnel.

### **International Assistance for Response or Recovery**

International Assistance usually takes the form of direct participation in response operations or the provision of urgent relief supplies. Long term recovery is managed by the Aid Coordination Committee.

Requests for international assistance can only be submitted to aid agencies on the direction of NDC when it is clear that the situation is beyond the capabilities of national resources. The DAC collates requests for donor agencies for submission to NDC and advises on the need for international assistance. After approval by NDC, the Aid Coordination Committee will be responsible for liaising with aid agencies. The Aid Coordination Committee is accountable to aid agencies for ensuring that assistance is distributed in accordance with governing guidelines. The actual distribution of aid to communities (shelter, food and clothing) is to be coordinated by DAC in accordance with findings from detailed needs assessments.

The Aid Coordination Committee is responsible for providing information on donor assistance to MAF and Customs to facilitate necessary clearances. Goods purchased locally with disaster relief funding are exempt of duty.

### **Government Financial Support for Response or Recovery**

The NDC may allocate funds for disaster purposes from other areas of operational spending on the advice of the Minister of Finance. If approved the allocation is based on the sole direction of the NDC. To be considered for emergency funding, all agency expenditures committed to the disaster response must be approved by the CEO of the agency or the Chairperson of DAC if directed from the NEOC.

## **Principles for Government support**

The NDC may determine policies and principles to facilitate allocation of emergency funding or supplies. The DAC or individual DAC agencies may provide advice in developing these policies and principles.

Consideration should be given to making food relief a priority to a particular area if:

- Recommended by MWCSO or MAF
- Severe damage has occurred to greater than 60% of all crops and gardens
- The community does not have access to alternative supplies or markets
- The community does not have the financial capacity to assist itself

Consideration should be given to making the allocation of tarpaulins a priority for:

- Government buildings
- Hospitals
- Churches and major community buildings
- Lifeline utility facilities
- Private homes when no alternative facility is available

NDC may consider providing assistance to cover transportation and other associated costs with the delivery of food supplies from external sources/markets if the community obtains their own assistance.

## **Further discussion**

There are currently 48 members of the DAC and any agencies which are not a member are encouraged to join. The council seeks to spread the responsibility for humanitarian response across as wider group of actors as possible.

The DAC will provide a recommendation to the NDC and if this recommendation is approved then it must be carried out. Agencies are encouraged not to act outside of these directives or, if they do in exceptional circumstances, to inform the DAC of these activities to avoid duplication.

The role of the ministry of women is to support the village mayor in their preparation for disasters and in reporting back to the DAC on the extent of damage sustained by communities.

The government women representatives have been given the responsibility of warning dissemination. School teachers, village nurses, etc. receive early warnings through their mobile phones and it is their responsibility to disseminate this information within their communities.

## **6.6 Mapping of key disaster response actors in Samoa**

Peter Muller led an exercise of mapping key disaster response actors in Samoa. The exercise identified humanitarian needs, the necessary response to meet those needs, and who does what and where during the emergency response and early recovery phases in Samoa.

The full list of responses and agencies is contained in appendix 2. The main gaps identified were in: Vector Control, Gender Based Violence and Domestic Violence, Hygiene Promotion, Shelter, Internally Displaced Communities, and WatSan facilities.

## 7 Day Two Proceedings

### ALL DAY EXERCISE/SIMULATION

Peter Muller provided a brief summary of the day one program and then introduced the simulation. Participants were divided into one of four groups: Regional actors from outside of Apia, Government actors in Apia, Non Government actors in Apia, and community level actors.

#### 7.1 Phase 1

The first phase of the scenario was introduced as follows:

##### **PHASE 1**

**At 06:00 on 16 April** a USGS EQ ALERT stated that a magnitude 8.5 earthquake had struck 200km southwest of Samoa in Tongan Trench.

There were unconfirmed reports of damage both in Upolu and Savaii Islands, the extent of which is unknown.

**At 06:10 on 16 April** a GDAC TSUNAMI warning issued an alert that a Tsunami had been generated and hit the coast line of Savai'i and Upolu Islands, 10 minutes after the earthquake.

The exact areas affected are unknown, as is the extent of the damage

70% of Samoa's population and infrastructure are located on low lying coastal areas

##### **Information products**

Statistics relating to deaths and damage in selected villages were introduced at the village level.

Groups broke off to discuss their first actions in response to the scenario and reported back their actions as follows:

##### **Community Level**

When the mayors received the alert they called an informal council meeting to discuss their response to the tsunami.

They then called for an evacuation using a conch shell (not church bells as this could be confused as time for church).

They prepared an evacuation for people with special needs, the elderly and young children first – special transport was arranged using vehicles normally available in the village. It was recognized that using a vehicle is not the best method of evacuation because soil liquification makes driving during an earthquake potentially dangerous. Consequently, able bodied villagers walked to the evacuation sites. Faith based organizations were also involved in the above process.

At the evacuation sites, head counts were conducted and the results were communicated to the mayors. When people were discovered missing, a search party was initiated. For the elderly and children, the search party was despatched immediately, for fit and healthy people a delay was used on the assumption that these people can fend for themselves and that there is a risk to going back into the affected areas.

At the evacuation site committees were established to look after the distribution of food and water and treating injured people.

### **Government in Apia**

Government received the alert and activated their standard operating procedures. The early warning system was activated and the media and telecoms companies were contacted and a warning was issued. DAC members all received a text message warning. The NDMO began preparing to call a DAC meeting.

People began to head to higher ground.

All government agencies were asked to activate their response plans.

### **Non Government in Apia**

The UN issued an alert on the status of the Tsunami to allow staff to activate their evacuation plans. Individual UN agencies were instructed to activate their evacuation plans and check their stockpiles. A standby request for an UNDAC team was issued.

The Red Cross mobilized local community staff to do registrations of evacuees from affected areas. The higher ground which people are likely to go to has already been identified. They also mobilized to look for the injured and provide first aid.

The Red Cross reported back to the NDMO on what they had found and made contact with the IFRC. In practice, whether the National Society contacts the IFRC or vice versa depends on circumstance.

Local NGOs began to execute national plans.

AusAID activated their contingency plan and tried to keep in contact with Canberra and the NDMO.

### **Regional staff outside of Apia (The international group)**

The alert triggered emergency focal points within agencies who tried to make contact with their staff in the field through field offices and with satellite phones.

UNOCHA tried to make contact with the NDMO. Other agencies waited on OCHA and the Red Cross for feedback on the situation.

As feedback came in they started contacting each other at the international level to share information.

UNOCHA called a PHT meeting at which the intention is to look at the stockpiles which are already situated in the field, baseline data which is available, and generate a map of potentially affected areas.

After the meeting contact with the field was again attempted: Red Cross, NDMO, UNICEF were the main points where contact was sought.

Response teams were alerted because it was assumed that there will be an impact and simulations were requested to try and understand the potential impact.

### Other

Confusion arose within the NGOs in Apia over which committee to activate and whether to activate the UN DMT system independently.

The question of how it was decided when families got split up (in the case of young children being transported by vehicle) at the community level was raised. The response was that it is not part of the Disaster Action Plan for children to specifically be separated from their parents. Rather, children may be taken by vehicle when there is no other way to evacuate them quickly and safely.

It was pointed out that the village committee having a meeting after the alert left no time for action before the Tsunami hit.

## 7.2 Phase 2

**By 18:00 on 16 April** it was known that there had been 3 large aftershocks at the epicentre since the initial EQ:

- 1) 6.2 @ 09h30
- 2) 5.4 @ 11h55
- 3) 5.8 @ 14h48

Early figures on humanitarian impact were also beginning to drift in: Dead - 15, Injured – 25, Missing – 5, Displaced - around 2,000.

The main areas affected appeared to be villages on the Southern Coast line of Savai'i and the South West coast of Upolu.

**By 20:00 on 16 April** it was clear that the number of casualties and displaced was rapidly increasing: Dead – 25, Injured – 46, Missing – 18 and Displaced - around 3,500. Damage to houses had also been reported by police and village councils.

### Information products

The NDMO was provided with: baseline data gender disaggregated to the village level and p-coded, images from an overflight and maps which detailed villages which lay below 20 metres above sea level. The international community was provided with the same map.

The MoH was provided with an overview of the level of damage sustained by each hospital in Samoa and the Ports Authority was provided with an overview of damage sustained by each port and airport in the country.

The village community was provided with information on dead, missing, injured and displaced from a broader range of villages and also issued with images of damage in their community.

With this new information participants again split into their groups to continue their response.

## **Village Level**

The villagers created a sitrep to describe what their needs were and attempted to present it to the DAC via a sat phone. Unfortunately the DAC were unable to take the call.

The village received a welcome visit from the Electric Power Corporation (EPC) and they indicated that they needed a generator for the evacuation site.

The village district hospital had been destroyed. They again tried to contact the DAC to discuss this issue but the DAC was in a high level meeting and weren't able to respond. The village has recruited retired nurses and anyone else with medical experience to support those who are injured.

A second village head count was conducted. They had requested a search and rescue team but until such support arrives they are creating their own.

The evacuation centre has been partitioned to provide separate living areas for men, women, and dead bodies. A request has been placed for mortuary services and pastors are on standby to conduct emergency funerals if no help is provided.

The village still has not received relief.

## **Government Level**

The DAC members convened and were briefed on the situation.

The NDMO has received a large amount of data ranging from baseline data, a flight overview, and information relating to damage to hospitals, ports and roads which they are using to assess the severity of the situation.

They have decided to proclaim a disaster and will request international assistance so they are making a list of things that are needed.

Individual agencies were deployed to continue their work in the field.

## **Non Government Group in Apia**

NGOs are continuing to assess information as it comes in to try and gain an understanding of the severity of the situation. The UN has activated its internal cluster approach.

UNDAC remains on standby, stock piles have been assessed and the availability of further regional support is being scoped.

They are continuing to communicate with the NDMO and are awaiting an official request for assistance from the government. A request has been received, however, from the MoH for basic medical supplies and personnel.

The NGOs are working together in the field and are developing a database of information which can be shared with other agencies. They are also continuing to share information with the international community and producing a sitrep.

## **Internationals**

The internationals sought to identify what resources they had, both within their base countries and internationally, how they would coordinate them, and what the situation is on the ground.

The looked at available data and also made guesstimates from satellite images to try and get an understanding of the possible extent of damage.

No emergency had been declared yet so they were taking pre-emptive action. They initiated a meeting of the PHT and discussed activating regional clusters. They tried to make an estimation of which needs may exist and thought that: shelter, medical supplies, water purification/storage and protection might be issues.

They had started meeting with donors and began laying the ground work for a Flash Appeal. They also started producing sitreps and placing information on the Red Cross system DMIS (Disaster Management Information System).

They estimated that the extent of the disaster would be in the area of 10,000 people affected.

### **Other**

In later discussion, it was stated that assessments were to be done on a sectoral basis. Access would come through the inland/cross island roads and then walking. It was felt that there were adequate staff to undertake this process.

## **7.3 Phase 3**

**By 08:00 on 17 April** sketchy information on the current situation was beginning to emerge, including:

- Lack of access to clean water and sanitary facilities as an urgent issue
- Food shortages at evacuation centers
- Pre-arrangement not having been made for many of evacuation centers
- Overcrowding of evacuation centers meaning that some people cannot be accommodated
- Difficulty in acquiring information due to telecommunications problem and difficulty accessing the affected areas

**At 10:00** on 17 April the Government officially requested international assistance. The runway at the Faleolo airport is active.

More detail on humanitarian impact is coming out: Loss of Life – 35, Injured – 89, Missing – 45, population displaced - 3,683.

### **Information products**

The village community was provided with information on dead, missing, injured and displaced from a broader range of villages.

For the purposes of the exercise the international group is now allowed to sit in the same room as the government and Apia based NGOs. The groups reconvened and planned their next steps.

A coordination meeting was convened which quickly led to participants breaking off according to response sector. The general groups formed were: community, shelter, health, WASH, transport and logistics, and the DAC.

The Red Cross went to the community and conducted a needs assessment which largely related to injuries and specific family needs. The information which is identified during the assessment will be shared with the NDMO and the media. The community made a special request to the Red Cross to share the information with others to avoid duplicative assessments.

An issue brought up by the community related to dead bodies, of which 45 had been identified so far. Following on from this was the issue of whether the government will require further identification of the bodies for records or whether the families will be allowed to bury the bodies straight away. The Red Cross intends to advocate relating to this issue in advance to the health sector.

The Red Cross will deploy supplies in accordance with the assessment which has been made and have already begun deploying some supplies.

The transport and logistics group were given aid from UNICEF but were not supported in distribution. They liaised with the police for field agents to aid in the distribution and also the army to secure a large helicopter to distribute by air. They felt that distributing by sea was still a significant risk.

The Health Cluster found that they were confused by the number of international organizations offering to provide relief. It was hard for the national staff member, who was also a member of the DAC, to understand what aid should be accepted. A lack of clarity on needs, on how the aid offered could be used to meet as yet only vaguely identified needs, and the sheer volume of offers of assistance made coordination difficult.

WASH discussed the resources that were available. They wanted to discuss in smaller groups but the UNICEF representative and national counterpart were missing which delayed activity. They already had some idea of what is available and what might be needed but needed further detail to act decisively.

Further discussion centred on the importance of having some kind of coordination as soon as possible for the receipt of international aid. Specifically, it is important to know what is needed and to know what is being provided.

A system is also required for collecting and processing the above information.

## 7.4 Phase 4

Further information was introduced and participants broke off into sectors to produce more detailed plans for action. These plans were then costed and placed into a consolidated appeal. This approach required a joint approach to planning and budgeting.

The result is that donors can consider one fully researched and costed document rather than a disparate range of appeals across varying periods of time. By working together humanitarian actors can produce a comprehensive and consolidated appeal document which covers all gaps and eliminates duplication and mobilises resources very fast.

## 8 Day Three Proceedings

### EXERCISE DEBRIEF, NEXT STEP, FOLLOW UP ACTION

Peter Muller provided a presentation on the Flash Appeal Process which can be enacted during an emergency as follows:

#### 8.1 What is a Flash Appeal?

A Flash Appeal is part of the Consolidated Appeals Process, and is the humanitarian sector's main tool for coordination, strategic planning and programming. It is a tool that provides an overview of urgent life-saving needs within a week of the emergency's onset. A Flash Appeal contains rapid needs assessment information, a common humanitarian action plan, and specific sectoral response plans and projects. It addresses acute needs for up to six months (and can be developed into a consolidated appeal if the emergency continues beyond six months).

#### What is the Flash Appeal's rationale?

A Flash Appeal is designed to avoid competing and overlapping appeals. It should provide a framework for strategic, coordinated, and inclusive programming and serve as an inventory or catalogue of priority humanitarian project proposals and a barometer of funding response.

#### What warrants an Appeal?

Any crisis or disaster needing humanitarian response that (a) exceeds the capacity of the affected country government, and (b) exceeds the capacity and/or mandate of any one UN agency warrants a Flash Appeal.

#### GA Resolution 46/182

"For emergencies requiring a consolidated response, the Secretary-General should **ensure** that an initial Consolidated Appeal covering all concerned organisations of the system, prepared in consultation with the affected State, is issued within the shortest possible time..."

#### Who is involved?

- UN Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator (leading the process, with OCHA's support)
- UN Agencies
- Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement
- NGOs (international and local)
- Donors (field office reps)
- Affected country government (The appeal is done in consultation with the government)

#### Indicative Timeframe from disaster/crisis onset

##### Day 1

- UN HC/RC triggers Flash Appeal – consults IASC country team – Government consulted.

##### Day 2-3

- UN Country Team conducts rapid needs assessment and prepares Flash Appeal

##### Day 4

- CAP Section shares draft with IASC HQs for 24 hr review

#### Day 5

- CAP Section processes & electronically publishes the document
- Official launch of appeal

Because all this has to happen very fast with imperfect information, Flash Appeals are routinely revised a few weeks after the first edition.

#### 1st/2nd editions

No one expects the early first edition to be comprehensive. You're only expected to do the best you can with the fragmentary info available, plus good inference.

The second edition (or revision) is prepared when better information is available—usually 4-6 weeks later. It includes more information relating to early recovery.

#### Content of a Flash Appeal

- Executive Summary
- Context and Humanitarian Consequences / Needs
- Response Plans per sector (incl. project summaries)
- Roles and Responsibilities
- Tables of project funding requirements (per agency, per sector, etc.)

#### Is Flash Appeal funding channeled through OCHA?

No. But to ensure a system of accountability, funding must be channeled through a UN agency, even if that agency is not the end user of the funds. This is per instruction of the UN General Assembly.

#### Cluster leads have a crucial role:

- Leading rapid needs assessments
- Setting sectoral strategy and priorities
- Gathering project proposals inclusively (incl. NGOs), but also...
- Vetting projects 'ruthlessly.'

=> ALL VERY FAST

#### The job of a cluster lead regarding appeal projects:

- Get all actors to the table
- Identify highest-priority needs, and make sure projects are proposed that cover those. (These form the top-priority projects in the appeal.)
- Gather other proposals and filter them, applying criteria of relevance to need, feasibility (within timeframe, agency capacity, & operating environment), etc.
- Try to stimulate proposals to fill gaps. Call in more capacity if needed.

A Flash Appeal is a strategic response plan which includes a set ("catalogue") of projects and a request for funds.

#### Relationship between the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) Rapid Response Window and Flash Appeals


Situations requiring CERF funds should normally also generate a Flash Appeal. The Humanitarian Coordinator allocates available CERF funds to the highest-priority Flash Appeal projects. CERF provides the **initial injection of funds** for the most urgent life-saving projects in the Flash Appeal to **cover the time lag** between issuance of the Appeal and receipt of commitments and funds from donors. In the ideal

situation, the Flash Appeal will prioritize projects within it for CERF funding and show CERF allocations in summary financial tables within the Flash Appeal document (if they are already decided).

**Why do both a CERF request and a Flash Appeal?**

Major emergencies require a strategic plan, not a series of disconnected projects. Further, most emergencies need more funding than CERF can provide and require humanitarian actions that are more holistic than those meeting CERF’s strict life-saving criterion.

**Examples of disasters and the CERF and Flash Appeal Funding they received**



Further material: [www.humanitarianappeal.net](http://www.humanitarianappeal.net)

The screenshot shows the 'Humanitarian Appeal' website in Microsoft Internet Explorer. The browser's address bar displays the URL: [http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?Nav=\\_about\\_en&Site=\\_about&Lang=en](http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?Nav=_about_en&Site=_about&Lang=en). The website header includes the 'Humanitarian Appeal' logo and navigation links for 'CAP Home', 'OCHA Home', 'UN Home', 'Contact Us', 'Print', and 'Log In'. A secondary navigation bar contains 'The Appeal', 'Overview', 'By Emergency', 'News Room', 'Have Your Say', 'About CAP', and 'Archive'. The main content area is titled 'The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)' and contains introductory text about the process. A red circle highlights the left-hand navigation menu, which includes links for 'The CAP', 'Key Documents and Issues', 'Workshops and Training', 'CAP Launch and Follow-up Events', 'Best Practices', 'CAP FAQ', 'Acronyms', 'Contacts', and 'Links'. Below the text, there is a diagram titled 'The CAP cycle' showing a circular process with steps: 'Report', 'Analyze the Context', 'Assess Needs', 'Build Scenarios', 'Monitor & Evaluate', and 'Revise the Plan'. A globe with 'Human Rights' written on it is in the center of the cycle. The browser's taskbar at the bottom shows various application icons and the system clock at 15:49.

## Discussion

Discussion centred around how FLASH Appeal funding reached the ground in Samoa.

It was explained the difference between the UN facilitated FLASH Appeal process and the Red Cross Flash Appeal Process is that the Red Cross Flash Appeal funds are available only internally to Red Cross agencies whilst the UN facilitated FLASH Appeal funds are available to all Humanitarian Actors. When accessing the Red Cross funds the process and objectives are similar to the UN based FLASH appeal, a rapid consolidated report of planned relief activities is submitted to allow a rapid response of funds.

The Samoan Government process for funding disaster response activities is to prepare a submission to NDC/cabinet requesting access to the unforeseen fund. This fund equals 3% of the national budget. Once approved the normal process for making payments is made. Goods purchased under this agreement are exempt from duty.

Helga-Bara Bragadottir (IFRC) gave a brief overview of International Disaster Relief Law (IDRL), which was explained as working with countries to look at way to strengthen legal process associated with disaster response.

## 8.2 Analysing Constraints and identifying areas for improvement

Participants broke into groups to identify issues or constraints which they felt, as a result of their experiences in the simulation and learnings from the broader workshop, had the potential to reduce the effectiveness of future disaster responses. The findings were summarized and the full workshop group then worked through these findings to make suggestions for how to strengthen future disaster response performance as follows:

### **Coordination**

Confusion among various actors participating in the response regarding the roles of NDC/DAC, DMT/PHT (see 6.4) and the clusters and how they fit together was evident. Although many participants understood how their own system of operation worked, some did not. Further, whilst many participants did understand how their systems worked, they did not necessarily understand how the various systems interrelated.

Whilst the workshop itself made considerable progress in overcoming this problem, further steps which were recommended to continue to make progress include:

1. Cluster leads should identify their counterpart/s within DAC and make contact with them
2. OCHA and the RC are to clarify the structural relationships between DAC and other coordinating teams, such as the PHT.
3. DAC members are to clarify the relationship with actors within their own agencies
4. Ongoing briefings for village mayors regarding emergency response structures should take place

### **Communication**

It was suggested that in some instances, communication could be improved. Problems experienced included: information overload, one way information flow, poor information flow between agencies, and too many meetings.

Suggestions for overcoming these issues included:

1. That government agencies and cluster leads appoint a focal person whose role is to facilitate liaison during periods of disaster response, including liaison with the NDMO
2. That communication back to village communities became an operational focus and that broadcast media, mobile phones and field personnel were the main tools used to do this. Preparation for these activities should include the drafting of Standard Operating Procedures

### **Plans**

In a related problem to the coordination issue above, it was found that there were a large number of disaster response plans which often worked in isolation or with limited linkages. There was also concern that the underlying laws and policies upon which these plans were dependent were not always understood or supportive.

There was also the concern that there is a lack of familiarity by various actors at differing levels with the plans.

Finally, a need to incorporate budgeting and resource mobilization (appeal) processes into plans was emphasized to ensure that these processes ran smoothly under the pressure of a disaster response.

The main recommendation for overcoming these issues were:

1. That each agency, regardless of whether they think all staff are familiar with their plans, makes a concerted effort to ensure that all relevant personnel are familiar with their own disaster response plan and the broader NDC response plan
2. That each cluster familiarizes itself with the disaster response plan of its counterpart and the broader NDC response plan

### **Information Management**

Plans can only be enacted when appropriate information helps the NDC to understand the situation. Slow or one-way information flow and a lack of information sharing between clusters needs to be avoided.

When assessments are conducted gender balance in each assessment team is generally recommended. A strong capacity to mobilize multi-agency teams and deploy them to affected areas is required and over-assessment of affected populations, which can result in assessment fatigue, needs to be avoided.

Because the quantity of information collected by assessment can be overwhelming strong processes must be in place for data entry, cleaning, management, analysis, and publication of information.

To ensure optimal information management, a phased assessment process, whereby each phase produces all and only the information needed, was discussed. The idea is that the assessment phases reflect the information needs of NEOC, clusters, agencies, donors, etc. and information is then rapidly processed, analysed and made available to decision-makers.

### **Suggestions for information phase 1 included:**

Focusing on the information needs of the first 1-3 days and drawing on:

- Baseline data – Statistics & Lands department staff seconded to the NEOC to help with the management of baseline data. Prior to the disaster the NEOC could lead a process of stocktaking of information and lead inter-cluster identification of baseline information needs for emergencies. Baseline data could then be compiled as a consolidated dataset available to all emergency actors
- Overflights - Prepare available options, staff and equipment for aerial observation techniques
- Imagery – The Lands department should to act as national focal point for imagery. Lands could be trained on UNOSAT and OCHA could support imagery needs
- HF radio reports - Systematic and proactive use of the radio network can establish extent of disaster impact
- Media
- Quick visits to gather broad information.

### **Suggestions for information phase 2 included:**

Focusing on the information needs of first month:

- Launched by day 4, complete by day 10-14
- A multi-sector rapid assessment
- Visiting all affected communities if possible
- Combining a community-level survey with sample of households
- Ensuring rapid processing and release of results to clusters/actors
- Ensuring results inform decision-making
- NEOC manage consolidation of information and ensure two-way information flow

## Appendix 1: Risk Hazards in Samoa

<b>Hazard</b>	<b>Level of Risk</b>
Cyclone	Extreme
Volcanic Eruption	Extreme
Tsunami	Extreme
Fire (Urban Environment)	Extreme
Public Health Crisis	Extreme
Environmental Crisis	Extreme
Flood	High
Earthquake	High
Landslides	High
Forest Fire	High
Aircraft emergency (airport)	High
Hazchem incidents (marine)	High
Lifeline utility failure – water	Moderate
Agricultural crisis – animal and plant diseases	Moderate
Civil emergency – external	Moderate
Electricity Failure	Low
Telecommunications failure	Low
Single asset infrastructure failure – building collapse	Low
Single asset infrastructure failure – dam	Low
Drought	Low
Aircraft emergency (other location)	Low
Maritime Vessel emergency	Low
Hazchem incident – land	Low
Civil emergency – internal	Low
Terrorism	Low

## Appendix 2: Response Functions

### Health and Medical

<b>Response Function</b>	<b>Lead Agency</b>	<b>Support Agency</b>
First Aid	Samoa Red Cross	NHS, MPP, FESA
Transport & movement of casualties	National Health Services	SRC, WHO
Medical treatment	National Health Services	Hospitals/Medical Centres, WHO
Public health	Ministry of Health (MoH)	SRC, Hospitals/medical centres, WHO
Management of deceased	Ministry of Police	NHS, MoH, Coroner, Funeral Directors
Mortuary services	Coroner (MJCA)	
Counseling and support	National Health Services	MWCSD, SRC, Aid Agencies, SUNGO, WHO

### Search and Rescue

<b>Response Function</b>	<b>Lead Agency</b>	<b>Support Agency</b>
Land rescue	Ministry of Police	Ministry of Works, Transport and Infrastructure (MWTI)
Land rescue (structural collapse, accidents, etc)	Ministry of Police	SAA, MWTI (Buildings), MWTI (Roads)
Maritime search and rescue (vessels & aircraft in the sea)	MWTI (Maritime)	SPA, MPP, FESA, Overseas Navy, SAA

### Evacuation

<b>Response Function</b>	<b>Lead Agency</b>	<b>Support Agency</b>
Evacuation of People	MPP, Village Council and Mayor	Foreign Government Representatives, SBC, Media, DMO

### Community Welfare

<b>Response Function</b>	<b>Lead Agency</b>	<b>Support Agency</b>
Registration of evacuees	Lead Agency/DAC	SRC, Hospitals/Medical Centres, Caritas, Aid Agencies, SUNGO, Churches, Village Council
Temporary shelter	Lead Agency/DAC	SRC, Hospitals/Medical Centers, Caritas, Aid Agencies, SUNGO, Churches, Village Council,
Disaster food	Lead Agency/DAC	SRC, Hospitals/Medical Centers, MoH, Caritas, Aid Agencies, SUNGO, Churches, Village Council
Disaster clothing	Lead Agency/DAC	SRC, Hospitals/Medical Centers, Caritas, Aid Agencies, SUNGO, Churches, Village Council
Animal welfare	Animal Protection Society	MAF (Quarantine), Vets
Disaster finances	Ministry of Finance	Aid Agencies, donors, MFAT

**Logistics Supply**

<b>Response Function</b>	<b>Lead Agency</b>	<b>Support Agency</b>
Incoming resources	Lead Agency/DAC	SRC, Aid Agencies, DMO, Foreign Govt Reps, SQUIP, SAA, SPA

**Information Management**

<b>Response Function</b>	<b>Lead Agency</b>	<b>Support Agency</b>
Public information	Lead Agency/DAC	SBC, radio stations, other media outlets, All response agencies
Enquiries about affected people	Samoa Red Cross	Foreign Govt. Reps, Samoa Hotel Associations
Communication between response agencies	Lead Agency/DAC	Response agencies, utility providers, Village Council, MWCSO, MESC, Aid Agencies, SUNGO

**Impact assessment**

<b>Response Function</b>	<b>Lead Agency</b>	<b>Support Agency</b>
Reconnaissance and needs assessment	Lead Agency/DAC	All response Agencies, SamoaTel, Digicel, Radio communication providers
Building safety evaluations	MWTI (Buildings)	Consulting engineers
Building health assessments	MoH	WHO
Utility service impacts	Utility operators	
Access impacts - roads	MWTI (Roads)	MPP
Access restoration – air	SAA	
Access restoration – marine	MWTI (Maritime)	SPA
Environmental impacts	MNRE	SPA, MWTI (Maritime)

### Appendix 3: Mapping of Key Disaster Response Actors in Samoa

#### Agriculture/Fisheries/Livelihoods

Response	Actors
Boats	Samoa Ports Authority, <i>Ministry of Works Transport &amp; Infrastructure</i> ,
Tools & seeds	MOAF, SPREP, OXFAM NZ, UNDP, <i>FAO</i>

#### Health

Response	Actors
Emergency Medical/First Aid	MoH, Samoan Red Cross (SRC), LDS, <i>National Health Services, MEDCEN</i> ,
Vector Control	<b>GAP</b>
EPI & Vitamin A & cold chain	SRC, <i>NHS</i> ,
Surveillance	<i>NHS</i> ,
Public Healthcare Systems & Outreach	SRC, National Health Service (NHS), MoH
Special needs (diabetes, HIV, TB)	<i>NHS, Samoa Aids Foundation</i>
Reproductive Health	<i>NHS, UNFPA</i> , MoH,
Transport/Ambulances	SRC, Fire
Psychosocial support	SRC
Health Waste Disposal	<i>MNRE (WASTE), MoH, Samoa Water Authority</i>
Mortuary Services	<i>NHS</i>
Hospital and Clinics reconstruction	WHO,

#### WASH

Response	Actors
Hygiene promotion	<b>GAP</b>
Public Promotion	<i>Oxfam, MNRE (Waste and Water), Samoa Water Authority</i>
Water Testing & Treatment	<i>Samoa Water Authority</i> , MoH, MNRE (Water), SPREP, SUNGO,
Sanitation	MoH, UNICEF, OXFAM, Women in Business (WIBDINC), <i>Samoa Water Authority, MoWorks Transport and Infrastructure</i>
Water Supply and Systems (Rural and Town)	<i>Samoa Water Authority</i> , SRC, Oxfam, WHO, <i>Independent Water Rural Schemes Association</i>
Containers and Tanks	SRC, Oxfam,
Solid waste disposal	MoH, Oxfam, <i>MNRE (Waste Disposal), Water Sector Steering Committee</i>

#### Food/Nutrition

Response	Actors
Procurement	MoFinance
Food ration testing and distribution	WIBDI, SRC
Special groups (Lactating women, children, etc.)	UNICEF, SUNGO, WIBDINC, <i>Ministry of Women</i> ,
Communications/Public Promotion	UNICEF, WIBDINC, <i>MoH</i>
Protocols	UNICEF, WHO, WIBDI
Seeds and Tools	<i>FAO, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF)</i> , LDS, SPREP, WIBDI
Quarantine	Inland Revenue Department (IRD), MAF
Surveillance	UNICEF

### Safety & Security

Response	Actors
Food storage	WIBDI
Looting/Crime/Fraud	<i>Ministry of Police and Prisons, Attorney Generals Office, UNDSS, SUNGO,</i>
Marine Safety	<i>MWTI, Samoa Ports Authority, Samoa Shipping Corporation, Ministry of Prime minister and Cabinet</i>
Consular activities	Australian High Com, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Safety of humanitarian workers	SRC, UNDSS, Ministry of Police and Prison (MPP)

### Protection

Response	Actors
Gender based violence	<b>GAP</b>
Domestic Violence	<b>GAP</b>
Dignity	Caritas, SRC, SUNGO, MWCDS, <i>UNFPA</i>
Shelter	<b>GAP</b>
Trafficking	MWCDS, MPP,
Displaced communities (tension with host community/physical security)	<b>GAP</b>
Reporting	MWCDS, SUNGO
Protection of Vulnerable	WIBDI, UNICEF, SUNGO, MWCDS

### Information Management/Assessment

Response	Actors
Health, Wash, Food and Nutrition, Education assessment	Caritas, Red Cross, UNOCHA, UNESCO
Data processing	MNRE/DMO,
Standardising	UNOCHA
Dissemination	UNOCHA
Sitreps	Village Mayors, NDMO
Media liaison	<i>Media Organisations</i>
Tools ( eg. www)	
Public information messages	UNRC, SUNGO (NGO support)
Reporting	UNOCHA

### Education

Response	Actors
Temporary schools (structures)	Ministry of Education Sports and Culture (MESC), Ministry of Women, Community & Social Development (MWCSD), UNICEF,
Education materials	UNICEF, Church of Latter Day Saints, SPREP, UNDP, <i>MESC</i>
Facilities (toilets, water, etc.)	<i>MESC, Faith based and private school boards</i>
Teachers	UNESCO (training and providing temporary teachers)
Reconstruction	<i>Ministry of Works Transport and Infrastructure (MIWTI)</i>
Fees/Costs	<i>MESC,</i>
Special programs (for disabled/disadvantaged children)	SUNGO (NGO Support), <i>Disability Council, MESC</i>

### Shelter/Camp/Evacuation Centres

<b>Response</b>	<b>Actors</b>
Alternative evacuation centres	Caritas, Ministry of Health, <i>MESC, MoH, Samoa Sports Facilities Authority (SPFA), Oxfam Australia, UNDP, IFRC, NWTI</i>
Land Allocation	MNRE, MWCSO, Caritas, <i>Samoa Land Corporation</i>
Tools, labour, materials for repair/construction	LDS, Red Cross, <i>Samoa Water Authority</i>
Registration	Samoa Red Cross,
WATSAN facilities	<b>GAP</b>
Management	MWCSO

### Non-Food Items

<b>Response</b>	<b>Actors</b>
Distribution of clothes, buckets, fuel, buckets, tarpaulins, lanterns, mosquito nets, etc.	MWCSO, LDS, SUNGO (NGO Coordination), National Council of Churches, SRC

### Logistics/Transport

<b>Response</b>	<b>Actors</b>
Air	UNOCHA (Funding), UNDP, Airport Authority, MPMC, <i>Oxfam, Ministry of Works Transport and Infrastructure</i>
Sea	UNDP, <i>Ministry of Works Transport and Infrastructure</i> , Samoa Ports Authority, Samoa Shipping Corporation
Trucks and Vehicles	UNDP, SRC, <i>MWTI, Samoa Water Authority</i>
Fuel	UNDP, <i>MoF</i>

### Telecoms/Communications

<b>Response</b>	<b>Actors</b>
VHF	<i>Samotel, Digicel, Ministry of Communication Information and Technology</i>
HF	<i>Samotel, Digicel, Ministry of Communication Information and Technology</i>
UHF	<i>Samotel, Digicel, Ministry of Communication Information and Technology</i>
Land Phone	<i>Samotel, Digicel, Ministry of Communication Information and Technology</i>
Mobile Phone	<i>Samotel, Digicel, Ministry of Communication Information and Technology</i>
Sat phones	<i>Samotel, Digicel, Ministry of Communication Information and Technology (MCIT)</i>
Radio Programs	<i>Ministry of Communication Information and Technology, UNDSS, Media Organisations, UNESCO (radio in a box)</i>

### Infrastructure

<b>Response</b>	<b>Actors</b>
Power supply	Electric Power Corporation,
Roads	<i>MWTI</i>
Airports	<i>MWTI</i>
Wharfs	Samoa Shipping Corporation, <i>Ministry of Works, Samoa Shipping Corporation</i>

### Legal

<b>Response</b>	<b>Actors</b>
Accreditation	MoH, <i>Attorney General's Office, Legislative Department,</i>
Drug importation	<i>Attorney General's Office, Samoa Ports Authority, Ministry for Revenue</i>
Quarantine (for food imports) and GMO	<i>Attorney General's Office, Samoa Ports Authority</i>

### Donor Appeals

<b>Response</b>	<b>Actors</b>
Resource mobilization	<i>MoF, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Foreign Embassies, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment/NDMO (MNRE), EU, JICA, SANGO, UN Resident Coordinator, AusAID, Red Cross, UNOCHA, Caritas,</i>

### General coordination

<b>Response</b>	<b>Actors</b>
	UNOCHA, MRNE/DMO

#### Appendix 4: Workshop Attendees

Name	Organisation	Email Address
Alanna Seugamatupu	MWCSD	Mapu_alanna@hotmail.com
Ameen Benjamin	UNDP	ameen.benjamin@undp.org
Anoano Seumalii	MAF – Quarantine Division	<a href="mailto:techpolicy@samoaquarantine.gov.ws">techpolicy@samoaquarantine.gov.ws</a>
Dolores Devesi	Oxfam New Zealand	dolores.devesi@oxfam.org.nz
Douglas Tomane	Electric Power Corporation	tomaned@epc.ws
Felix Devries	IFRC, Asia Pacific Zone	felix.devries@ifrc.org
Filomena Nelson	DMO	Filomena.Nelson@mnre.gov.ws
Florentine Swanney	UNDSS	florentine.swanney@undp.org
Fuatai Maiava	WHO	maiavaf@wpro.who.int
Fuatino Meritiana Muliaga	Women in Business Development	disastermgmt@womeninbusiness.ws
Hatu Tiaria	LDS Church	Tiakiaha@ldschurch.org
Helga-Bara Bragadottir	IFRC	helgabara.bragadottir@ifrc.org
Ioane Siatua Foma'i	Samoa Shipping Corporation	
Jan Steffen	UNESCO	j.steffen@unesco.org
Josephine Stovers	MNRE-Legal	Josephine.stovers@mnre.gov
Kirsty Robertson	Caritas Australia	Kirstyr@caritas.org.au
Laulu Tenago	MWCSD	Laulu.tenaga@lesamoa.net
Luis Roqueta	UNDSS	luis.roqueta@undp.org
Masuisui Mose Tagiilima	MCIL	mose.tagiilima@mcil.gov.ws
Mesa Sua	Department of Foreign Affairs	
Misileti Masoe-Satuala	AusAID	Misileti.satuala@ausaid.gov.au
Moatasesa Samuelu-Matthes	National Health Service	moatasesas@nhs.gov.ws
Muelu Meatoga	Ministry of the Prime Minister & Cabinet	
Navin Pal	UNICEF	npal@unicef.org
Nanai Mafaeliua Sua	MoR	
Oata Tuatgoaloo	SUNGO	sungoinfo@lesamoa.net
Papalii Natu Tugaga	Talofa Insurance Services	pnt@talofainsurance@lesamoa.net
Petaia I'amafana	SPREP	petaiai@sprep.org
Puletini Tuala	Caritas – Pacific	archdiocese_dev@samoa.ws
Rose McNairn	UNICEF	rmmcnairn@gmail.com
Roseini Iosia	Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Labor	roseini.iosia@mcil.gov.ws
Sala Maresi Isaia	NUS	
Shirleen Filo Fuimaono	Samoa Ports Authority	shirleen_f@spasamoa.ws
Seini Kurusiga	UNICEF	skurusiga@unicef.org
Susan Faoagali	UNICEF/UNFPA	faoagaliS@wpro.who.int
Tautal Mauala	Samoa Red Cross	samoaredcross@samoa.ws
Telea Kamu I Potogi	MWCSD	
Terenia Simanu	Ministry of Health	terenias@health.gov.ws
Tipaula Laupue	FESA	fireservice@lesamoa.net
Toane Fama'i	Samoa Shipping Corporation	john@ipasifika.net.ws

Tom Bamforth	Australian Red Cross	tbamforth@redcross.org.au
Tupuola Siasia Hunt	LDS Church	tgshunt@yahoo.com
Tu'u'u Dr. Ieti Taule'alo	MNRE	Tuuu.ieti@samoas.ws
Vaialia Iosua	MWCSD	v.iosua@lesamoas.net
Yoshitaka Yanazah	JICA	