Microsoft Word - Samoa CPW Report.doc

1 Executive

Summary

The achievements of Samoa’s disaster management community were clearly
highlighted during the April 2009 Inter Agency Contingency Planning Workshop. In

recent years, much has been done to raise disaster related awareness, to build
capacity in disaster response at all levels of the Samoan Community, and to develop

and test disaster preparedness and response structures and plans. This work was
successfully put to the test as part of the response to the September 2008 bushfires

which affected two villages in Savai’i.

Similarly, at the regional level, Pacific humanitarian organizations and partners have
made important steps to jointly strengthen disaster preparedness for response
capabilities in support of Pacific Island Countries that request international assistance.

Examples include increased pre-positioning of emergency relief stocks, training of
rapid response personnel, agreed coordination structures and improved information

management.

However, it would be risky to assume that the considerable combined progress to
date leaves no work left to do. If, for instance, a disaster were to occur of the scale

which workshop participants agreed was a “reasonable worst case scenario”, where
70% of the population or over 100,000 people were affected, it is likely that Samoa’s
disaster response systems would be placed under great stress. No country has ever

been “completely prepared” for a major disaster. Consequently, it is important to
grasp every opportunity that arises to build further on disaster preparedness and

response capabilities in Samoa.

The simulation and discussions which took place during the workshop unearthed some
avenues for continued improvement of Samoa’s disaster response capability. For

instance, the diversity of response plans that could potentially be enacted during a
response, and the number of actors who were unfamiliar with counterpart plans or
even their own, was evidenced. This highlighted the shared responsibility that all

humanitarian actors take in disaster preparedness, and indicated that Samoa would
be well served if each and every actor associated with disaster response took the time

to revisit the contents of their own and their counterpart’s plans. The most productive
way to do this would be to go beyond merely reading the document, but to critically

examine it to ensure that it continues to offer an optimal blueprint to guide that
actor’s role in disaster response.

The flow of information is critical to the success of any disaster response, and there is
always room to improve in this area. In Samoa, the current process through which

information flows from the village, is analysed to provide recommendations for action
by the DAC, and passed to the NDC, remains complex. Information appears to be

able to flow along multiple routes including: through response personnel, through the
ministry of women, and directly to the Disaster Management Office. Further, no-one

appears to have ultimate responsibility for ensuring that this information does reach
its destination in a format which will enhance the decision making capability of the

NDC. In the “reasonable worst case scenario” referred to above, information would
be flowing from well over 200 villages. Perhaps defining a clear and definite pathway
through which this information should flow, assigning responsibility and resources for

ensuring that this information does flow, defining a clear destination for the
information to arrive at, and describing the systems which will be used to turn that

raw information into a decision making tool, would enhance the capacity of the NDC
to make informed recommendations during the response to a major disaster.

Similar opportunities may also exist with regard to (rapid) needs assessments.

Workshop participants recognized that slow or one-way information flow and a lack of
information sharing across clusters can hamper decision-making. The need for
carefully planned and phased assessments and gender balance in an assessment

team was also discussed and generally recognized as preferable. When assessments

are complete, the quantity of information collected can be overwhelming. Strong
processes must be in place for data entry, cleaning, management, analysis, and

publication of information. In short, the information management capacity with the
NEOC and clusters is an essential element of a successful disaster response. Perhaps
learnings from the workshop can be used to further improve information management

systems in Samoa.

Samoa may also be able to take advantage of the considerable work which has been
done by the statistics department in collecting baseline data. Information such as

that contained in the 2006 census, which is readily available, can support the
development of village disaster plans as spearheaded by the DMO, and can also be

combined with the work of other regional organizations such as SOPAC, the Ministry
of Health, UNDP or WHO, to provide a detailed understanding of the nature and scale
of vulnerabilities of communities in Samoa along with infrastructure and other assets

which can aid response. Such information can be invaluable in the first hours and
days of a disaster, but can be very hard to come by when everyone is under the

intense pressure of responding.

There is no doubt that, when preparing for a disaster, there is always more work to
do. The above observations are some examples of avenues which may provide easily

accessible improvements. Hopefully, the more detailed report below will help
workshop participants discover many more such avenues, and pursue them, to
further strengthen the capacity of Samoa to respond in times of crisis.

2 Background

In July 2008, OCHA Pacific facilitated a Regional Level Contingency Planning
Workshop for Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific region. The key outcome of the

workshop was the establishment of the Pacific Humanitarian Team and a Pacific
cluster approach, in which key regional humanitarian response partners participate

(including UN agencies, NGOs and donors). It is expected that this Pacific cluster
approach will contribute to improved effectiveness, predictability and timeliness of

international assistance to support PICs.

To ensure that the Pacific Regional Cluster Framework effectively compliments each
Pacific Island Country’s national disaster management arrangements and specific
context, contingency planning workshops are being held in the most disaster prone

countries, of which Samoa is one.

3 Workshop

objectives

The overall objective of the workshop was to bring together key disaster response

actors from Government, Red Cross, Donor partners, UN organizations and NGOs to
review jointly the existing disaster response mechanism both at national and Pacific
level, test how effectively the regional cluster approach could support the national

level disaster response structure through exercise and adjust/review regional cluster
structure to the specific context in Solomon Islands. The workshop was also expected

to enhance the linkages and coordination between regional clusters and
corresponding governmental ministries/agencies.

4 Expected

outcomes

The outcomes expected of the workshop included:

Increased readiness for response

Identification of procedural and decision-making gaps as well as gaps in

response actions

Identification of conflicts between departments and Ministries, amongst

key stakeholders along with interpretation of procedures and roles

Confirmation of roles and responsibilities between actors

Resource needs are identified

Information and data needs for decision-making and action are identified

Effectiveness of existing emergency services is tested

All key stakeholders in disaster response will have common
understandings on needs, gaps and steps forward to improve the response

mechanism

Additional training needs are identified

Modifications and improvement to regional cluster approach as well as the
contingency plan are identified following lessons learned from the Exercise,

which could guide regional cluster lead agencies to further organize and
plan their minimum preparedness actions

5 Participation

In total 44 participants attended the workshop representing a mix of Samoan and
international actors drawn from: the NDMO, various Government Ministries and DAC
members, the Red Cross, International NGOs based in Apia and Australia, UN
Agencies and NGOs with an office in Apia and regional UN Agencies and NGOs. For a

participants list see Appendix 4.

Day One Workshop proceedings

Opening

The workshop was led in Prayer and then the assistant CEO, Meteorology Division

officially made the first address on behalf of the CEO and Minister of Natural
Resources & Environment. The workshop was declared open.

Each participant briefly introduced themselves providing their name, organization and

a short overview of what they do during a disaster.

6.1 Objectives

Peter Muller, UNOCHA Regional Disaster Response Advisor, explained the objectives

of the workshop and explained that we undertake the planning process to improve the
quality of humanitarian response.

Planning helps us to think through and identify potential gaps and problems around:

•

What could happen?

•

What would the impact be on people affected?

•

What actions would be required to meet humanitarian needs?

•

How would organisations work together?

•

What resources will be required?

•

What can organisations do to be better prepared?

Contingency planning was defined as a process that includes:

•

Analysing potential emergencies

•

Analysing potential humanitarian impacts and consequences

•

Establishing clear objectives, strategies, policies and procedures and articulating
critical actions that must be taken to respond to an emergency, and

•

Ensuring that agreements are recorded and necessary actions are taken in order
to enhance preparedness.

Inter-Agency Contingency Planning provides a common, overarching framework for
collective action that is specified in cluster and agency planning.

Specific workshop objectives were to:

Set priorities and identify major tasks, functions and operations in response to a
disaster

Examine how some of the key emergency services would function during an
emergency

Test how national and international actors can effectively coordinate in order to

provide a timely and appropriate response in each sector

Feed back concrete suggestions in order to agree upon a disaster response

framework and minimum preparedness activities in Solomon Islands and plan for
the next steps

The desired outcomes from the workshop are:

Readiness for response is increased in the event of an actual impact on routine
operations

Procedural and decision-making gaps as well as gaps in response actions are
identified

Conflicts - if any, within departments and Ministries, amongst key stakeholders
along with interpretation of procedures and roles – are revealed

Role Clarity: Roles and responsibilities between actors are confirmed

Resource Requirements are identified

Information and data needs for decision-making and action are identified

Effectiveness of existing emergency services is tested

All key stakeholders in disaster response will have common understandings on

needs, gaps and steps forward to improve response mechanism

Additional training needs are identified

10.

Regional framework revision: Inform on potential modifications of, and
improvements to, the regional cluster approach

11.

National cluster approach: Inform on potential modifications of and improvement
to the national cluster approach

6.2 Disasters

Samoa

Filomena Nelson, Director of the National Disaster Management Office, presented an
overview of the factors which contribute to Samoa’s vulnerability and ability to
manage disasters as follows:

Contributing factors to Samoa’s vulnerability and ability to manage

disasters:

Natural Environment:

Samoa consists of two large volcanic islands (Upolu and Savai’i) and several smaller
islands. It lies in the southwest Pacific within an exclusive economic zone of 120,000
square kilometres. Samoa has a tropical climate with a rainy season from October to

March, and a dry season from April to September. Agriculture and fisheries are the
primary sources of revenue, followed by tourism.

Climate change, sea-level rise, environmental degradation, pollution, coastal

erosion, water quality and resource management are all factors which
influence disaster risk and impact in Samoa.

Social Environment:

The total population of Samoa is recorded in the 2006 census as 179,186. Upolu
houses the capital city of Apia (population of around 37,000), Faleolo International

Airport and a deep water harbour which is the entry point for international ships.
Savai’I’s population is approximately 35,000.

About 70% of the population live on low lying coastal areas including national and

community infrastructure. There are a number of large and small resorts and
accommodation complexes located on the two main islands.

Samoa is an independent state with its own Government and a Prime Minister as its
leader. Samoa is part of the Commonwealth, has a Head of State, and members of

Parliament are democratically elected for a period of 5 years. Traditional systems of
community leadership prevail, whereby Matai plays a large role at the national,

community and village levels.

The official language is Samoan, although English is spoken in most parts of the
country, often for business. Strong religious ties and the Church play a major role in
daily life. Diets primarily consist of tropical foods of fish, chicken, pig, coconut, taro,

yams, vegetables and fruit. Communal society – immediate and extended family –
are very important aspects of the Samoan Culture.

Built Environment

Most Samoans live in the traditional open fale (with no fixed walls). All buildings must

meet government building standards and the National Building Code for Samoa.
Mobile and land-line telecommunications services are provided on the major islands of
Samoa. Electricity supply is primarily maintained by diesel generators, supported by

hydroelectric generation. An electricity service covers most of the islands except for
some remote areas. Water supply is primarily sourced from natural springs, with the

city of Apia serviced by a dam and treatment facility. Septic tanks are the most
common form of effluent removal, with Apia and some larger facilities being serviced

by sewage treatment plants. Fuel and gas are supplied by ship from international
markets

Hazards and risks in Samoa

•

A basic hazard assessment has been conducted using Australian New Zealand Risk
Management Standard 4360 (AS/NZS 4360:1999)

–

To determine the likelihood of a significant disaster being caused by the

hazard, and the consequences of the hazard if it did occur, and

–

To rank the level of risk from each hazard

The most significant risk events are listed below. A full table of risk events is listed in

Appendix 1:

Hazard

Level of Risk

Cyclone

Extreme

Volcanic Eruption

Extreme

Tsunami

Extreme

Fire (Urban Environment)

Extreme

Public Health Crisis

Extreme

Environmental Crisis

Extreme

Flood High
Earthquake High
Landslides High
Forest Fire

High

Aircraft emergency (airport)

High

Hazchem incidents (marine)

High

Disaster history and impacts in Samoa

1917 - 8.3 earthquake at the Tongan Trench and tsunami. Damage to houses
and crops but no loss of life recorded

1918 – Spanish flu, 7,542 deaths, about 22 – 25% of total population

1960 – 8.5 Chilean earthquake and tsunami. Damage to houses and crops

but no deaths recorded

1983 - Bush Fire which affected about 5 villages in North West of Savai’i

1988 – Bush Fire which affected same area

1990 - TC Ofa, 8 deaths, damage to infrastructure, disruption to all social

services

1991 - TC Val, damage to infrastructure, disruption to all social services

2003 - Bush Fire at Asau and Aopo

2004 - TC Heta, minimal damage to crops, electricity, water and telephones,
roads

2008 - Bush Fire at Asau and Aopo

Discussion

Village education
In later discussion, the process of village disaster education and consultation which is
currently being conducted was mentioned as an avenue for gathering information held

by the elderly relating to previous disasters.

Busfires
There was also discussion regarding bushfire events. It was explained that the cause

of these usually related to prolonged dry spells during the dry season combined with
people taking advantage of these conditions to clear land by burning.

A national fire plan has been developed and is currently with the ministry for
approval. Proactive education on fire safe practices is part of the village disaster

education project and other communications initiatives are also expected to be
implemented in the near future.

Volcanoes
Active volcanoes in Savai’i were also discussed. There are currently no monitoring

systems in place for volcanoes and the NDMO is seeking to work with SOPAC to
implement them. The volcano which most recently erupted is believed to still be
active but there is no forecast for when it might next erupt.

There is also believed to be one underwater volcano which is located by the Tau island

about 200km southeast of Samoa.

Past experiences
The Secretary General of the Samoa Red Cross shared some of her experiences of

Cyclone Ofa and Heta. The Secretary General said that work done during the 1990s
had improved preparedness for cyclones. However, there were still issues relating to
a lack of coordination and duplication relating to the distribution of food. There was

also a lack of caution demonstrated by the general public in preparation for the most
recent cyclone.

Samoan Red Cross preparedness measures include the prepositioning of relief

supplies. When there is a declaration of emergency, plans are activated. The first
action is to conduct assessments and identify the most devastated parts of the

country along with the immediate needs of the affected populations. NDMO sitreps
are also used to inform this analysis. Common needs include water supply, clothing
and housing. Appropriate relief which meets these needs, such as tarpaulins for

houses which have lost roofs, are distributed as soon as the assessments are
completed.

The Bureau of Meteorology explained that, from their experience, during the 1990

and 91 cyclones the response was poorly structured. When aid arrived everything
became very confused and often very senior people were having to work right down

on the ground level to get things done. During 1990 the cyclone produced a lot of
storm surges. There was no warning and the met office was wiped out. By 1991 the
office was still not rebuilt and the met office was forced to receive their information

from the Fiji Met Office by fax. The situation has now improved but the Fiji Met is still
often used for meteorological information.

The Ministry of Women and Social Development reported that during the 1990 and 91

cyclones there was hardly any disaster management. Samoan Fale’s were not strong
so people took refuge in churches and school buildings. Some people were forced to

take refuge in water tanks. There was a lot of damage resulting from the cyclones
but not many casualties.

It was suggested that there was no meaningful document in place to guide response
during the 1990 and 91 cyclones.

Tsunami warnings

With regard to Tsunami warnings, there had been two drills and while the first had not
been taken very seriously the second had been quite successful. There was

widespread awareness within the community of what actions should be taken during a
Tsunami alert.

6.3 Planning assumptions for disaster preparedness

Peter Muller introduced the concept of producing planning assumptions as
follows:

We are preparing for a realistic worst case scenario. The focus should be on the
most critical hazards which are judged by:

the likelihood of a hazard occurring combined with

the potential humanitarian impact.

The aim of the exercise is to focus on situations in which the scale and impact of
the potential emergency requires the concerted action of a number of
agencies/organizations both national and international.

In producing planning assumptions we need to:

•

Agree upon anticipated numbers of affected, requiring assistance etc.

•

Define the characteristics of the population (i.e. gender, age, socio-economic

status)

•

Provide a specific projection of humanitarian needs (e.g. Food, water,

sanitation, shelter etc.)

•

Identify any particular vulnerabilities

•

Assess the capacity of the government and communities to respond

•

Identify potential operational constraints

A planning assumption example

Humanitarian assistance may be required to assist the Government in responding
to the protection and assistance needs of 100,000-150,000 displaced households

in the three districts .

Planning assumption created for the Pacific Humanitarian Team at the

Inter Agency Contingency Planning workshop in July 2008

“rapid on-set natural disaster (cyclone, floods, earthquake, tsunami) that would
affect a population of 30,000 people in multiple (island/country) locations”

It was agreed that if regional humanitarian actors were well prepared to respond

to such a scenario, this would also cover the humanitarian impact of smaller scale
natural disasters (e.g. more localized effects of cyclones and floods, volcanic
eruptions, etc.) and manmade disasters (fires, environmental disasters) and to an

extent even complex emergencies.

Samoa Planning Assumptions

After considering the information presented above, workshop participants
developed the following planning assumptions for Samoa.

Disaster events with a potential to overwhelm government capacity to respond
include: Cyclones, Urban Fire, Bushfires, Tsunami, Flooding, Earthquakes, and

Pandemic.

There is the potential for up to 70% of the population or approximately 100,000
people to be affected by a significant disaster.

Potential problems which need to be overcome during the response include: road,

port and air access; lifelines such as food, water and electricity; temporary
displacement; nutrition; communications; sanitation; strain on the education and
health systems; and protection.

6.4 Briefing

the

Outcome of Regional Contingency

Planning Workshop and Cluster Approach in the Pacific

Peter Muller provided a brief overview on the background of Humanitarian Reform,
the regional inter-agency contingency planning for humanitarian assistance workshop

held in Suva in July 2008, the agreed cluster framework in the Pacific including a
description of the regional clusters and how they are expected to operate, and the

role of the cluster lead agencies and expectations on cluster members, as follows:

Background

Humanitarian Reform and the implementation of the Cluster Approach have taken
place at the global level. In the local context, the Solomon Islands
Tsunami/Earthquake in April 2007 highlighted the challenges face in responding to

disasters in the Pacific and the importance of disaster preparedness. It has also
highlighted the need for more effective & predictable humanitarian. Inter-agency

coordination and collaboration and emergency preparedness are an important part of
this effort.

Some Findings from the 2005 Humanitarian Response Review

In 2005, in recognition of the still considerable gaps in the ability of the
humanitarian system to respond adequately to all humanitarian crises, a review

was initiated with the aim of finding ways to provide a more predictable
humanitarian response to vulnerable populations around the globe. Key findings

of the review included:

•

Lessons learned from past disasters have highlighted well-known, long-standing
gaps in response

•

There were limited linkages between UN and non-UN actors

•

Coordination of the response was erratic and dependent on personalities

•

There was insufficient accountability (particularly for Internally Displace People

(because there was not a clear organizational mandate and responsibility in the
international community for displaced people))

•

Donor policies were inconsistent

Lessons from Solomon Islands Earthquake/Tsunami

Data preparedness and collection for decision making was inadequate

Sustained coordination at multiple levels (Honiara, Gizo, Choisal, Suva,
Melbourne, Bangkok, Aukland) was difficult

Information management for coordination and decision-making could be
improved

Logistics, transport and supply were challenging

Roles and responsibilities of various actors needed to be clarified

Whose reform?

As a result of the Humanitarian Response Review, reform was initiated. The
Humanitarian Reform process was overseen by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee

(IASC), an international body composed of the following agencies:

Full members: Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Development Fund (UNDP), United

Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program (WFP),

World Health Organisation (WHO).

Standing invitees: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), International Federation of Red

Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), American Council for Voluntary International
Action (Inter-Action), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Office for the
High Commission of Human Rights (UNHCR), Office of the Special Representative of

the Secretary General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (RSG on
HR of IDPs), Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), World Bank

(World Bank).

The reform process is built on “three pillars” which are all underpinned by a
foundation of improved partnerships, as illustrated below.

The cluster approach

The cluster approach is the first of the three pillars and a key element of humanitarian

reform. It aims to organise a response according to sectors with a clearly identified
leader and ensure a clear system of leadership and accountability. It clarifies the
division of labour among organisations and better defines roles and responsibilities

within the different sectors of the response.

The cluster approach addresses gaps and strengthens the effectiveness of
humanitarian response through building partnerships. It is intended to strengthen

rather than to replace sectoral coordination under the overall leadership of the
Humanitarian Coordinator. It is about making the international humanitarian

community more structured, accountable and professional, so that it can be a better
partner for host governments, local authorities and local civil society.

Global Cluster/Sector Working Groups:

Clusters and their lead agency at the global level are listed below:

Sector/Cluster Lead

Agency

Agriculture FAO
Camp Coordination & Camp Management UNHCR & IOM
Early Recovery

UNDP

Education in Emergencies

UNICEF & Save the Children

Emergency Shelter

UNHCR & IFRC (Convenor)

Emergency Telecomms

OCHA (UNICEF & WFP)

Health

WHO

Logistics

WFP

Nutrition

UNICEF

Protection

UNHCR

Water, Sanitation & Hygiene

UNICEF

The Cluster Approach

Adequate capacity and

predictable leadership in

all sectors

Humanitarian

Coordination

Effective leadership and

coordination in

humanitarian emergencies

Humanitarian

Financing

Adequate, timely and

flexible financing

Partnership

Strong partnerships between UN and non-UN actors

Terms of Reference for cluster/sector leads include:

Below is broad a list of outcomes which cluster lead agencies agree to assume
responsibility for facilitating (the cluster lead does not necessarily have to produce the
outcome themselves, rather they should ensure that somehow the cluster provides

that outcome).

•

Inclusion of key humanitarian partners

•

Appropriate coordination mechanisms

•

Coordination with national/local authorities, local civil society etc.

•

Participatory and community-based approaches

•

Attention to priority cross-cutting issues (age, environment, gender, HIV/AIDS
etc)

•

Needs assessment and analysis

•

Emergency preparedness

•

Planning and strategy development

•

Application of standards

•

Monitoring and reporting

•

Advocacy and resource mobilization

•

Training and capacity building

•

Provider of last resort

The Regional Inter Agency Contingency Planning Workshop

In July 2008 a workshop was held in Suva to initiate the process of adopting the
cluster approach and improve coordination for more effective disaster response in the
Pacific. In total 65 participants from the UN, Red Cross, INGOs, Education/Training

Institutes and Donor Partners attended the workshop. The specific objectives of the
workshop were to agree on:

•

Mechanisms for humanitarian assistance in the Pacific

•

Priority areas/clusters

•

Lead agencies

•

Roll out strategy for country level inter agency contingency planning

Outcomes of the workshop included the formation of the Pacific Humanitarian Team,
which comprises of all disaster response actors that have a regional capacity to deploy

in Pacific Island Countries. The table below identifies the cluster lead agencies and
the cluster partners who took part in the workshop.

Humanitarian
Cluster

Global Cluster
Lead

Pacific Cluster Lead

Pacific Cluster Partners

Health &

Nutrition

WHO &

UNICEF

WHO & (UNICEF)

WHO, UNICEF, USG, Red

Cross (RC), UNFPA, WV,
UNDP, UNEP, SCF, OXFAM,

NZ, AUS, Fiji School of
Medicine/Monash

Water,

Sanitation &
Hygiene
(WASH)

UNICEF UNICEF

UNICEF, RC, OXFAM, NZ,

WV, SCF, USG, JP, WHO,
AUS

Shelter & Camp
Management

IFRC & IOM

IFRC (convener for
Shelter)
IOM (for Camp

Management)

IFRC, SCF, HFH, WV,
Oxfam, NZ, JP, AUS, IOM?

Logistics

WFP

WFP (to be
determined)

WFP, Oxfam, Red Cross,
USG, Church, FRANZ

Information
Management

Cross-cutting
issue

UNOCHA UNOCHA,

OXFAM,

SCF,

RC, USG, UNFPA, UNICEF,
Monash/ FSM, UNESCO,

FRANZ, SOPAC?, NZCID,
ACFID? PIANGO?

Protection UNHCR UNHCR/UNICEF/

OHCHR

UNHCR, UNICEF, OHCHR,

OXFAM,WV, SCF, OCHA,
USG, UNFPA, NZ, RC,

Churches, UNDSS, AUSAID

The Pacific Humanitarian Team (PHT) is open to all organizations and donor partners
in and around the region that have a mandate and capacity to provide international

assistance to Pacific island countries. As such, it integrates the (UN) Disaster
Management Teams in Fiji and Samoa and includes also non-UN organizations. The

PHT operates under the guidance and chair of the UN Resident Coordinators based in
Fiji and Samoa and is supported by UNOCHA.

More info on Humanitarian Reform & Pacific Humanitarian Team

Key documents:

•

Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian

Response

•

Specific cluster guidance, provided by global cluster leads

•

Humanitarian Assistance & OCHA: www.reliefweb.int

•

Reform Website:

www.humanitarianreform.org

6.5 Current disaster response structure in Samoa

Filomena Nelson provided an overview of governmental disaster response structures
and its coordination mechanism with other stakeholders as follows:

A disaster is a situation which arises from any event, whether natural or otherwise,

which involves threat to human life or health or to the environment and which might
require response agencies to respond under the Act.

An emergency is a situation which is more serious than a disaster which could result
in widespread human, property and environmental losses throughout Samoa. It will

require substantial mobilization and utilization of Samoa’s resources or exceed
Samoa’s capacity to cope using its own resources.

The national disaster management structure is mapped below.

The Community

The Community, which is represented by a village mayor and women’s
representative, governed by a village council, and also features a church based

response structure, is responsible for initiating the grass roots response to a disaster.
This response involves, information dissemination, shelter management,

damage assessment and relief coordination. The Ministry of Women,
Community and Social Development (MWCSD) supports, monitor and liaises with
Village Councils and organizations as they carry out their responsibilities under the

plan and keeps DAC informed of the level of village preparedness. There are 329
villages in Samoa.

The Disaster Advisory Committee (DAC)

The Disaster Advisory Committee (DAC) comprises the 48 operational government
agencies in Samoa. The DAC makes operational decisions and coordinates and

manages response activities. DAC members meet regularly to report to the National
Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC), of which they are also a part, regarding
progress within their agencies area of responsibility. DAC members also attend

meetings with the NDC to provide further information or clarify information in the
Sitreps.

The Disaster Management Office (DMO)

The Disaster Management Office (DMO) is the focal point for coordination and
implementation and provides coordination, support and administration during a

disaster response.

National Disaster Council

Governance, oversight, strategic direction

Chairperson, Disaster Advisory Committee

Co-ordination, advice to NDC

Disaster Advisory Committee

Implementation, operational management

i
s

t
e

r
M

nagem

ent

f
f
i
c

-
o

r
d

i
n
at

i
on,

uppor

t
,
admi

i
s

t
r
at

i
o

Community

The National Disaster Council (NDC)
The National Disaster Council (NDC) is the key decision making and conflict resolution

body during a disaster response. The NDC receives its information through reports
from the DAC and provides oversight and approval as well as strategic direction
and governance. The NDC is also responsible for providing advice to the Head of

State regarding the proclamation of an emergency and facilitating international
relations & communication.

Proclamation of a state of emergency

The proclamation of a state of emergency is provided for under the Constitution of
Samoa. The proclamation is made by the Head of State and may remain in force for

a period of up to thirty days. The proclamation empowers the Head of State to make
emergency orders to secure the public safety, essential supplies and services,
safeguard interest and welfare of the community/country.

Declaration of disaster

A declaration of disaster is made by the NDC Chair. It is only made when the Head of
State is not available to make a proclamation of emergency or the extent of damage

does not require a proclamation of emergency or response activities can be done
within 48 hours.

Emergency Powers
Any powers conferred on any response agency by their own legislation, mandates or

agreements remains in place during a disaster or emergency. Any powers,
responsibilities and functions exercised under the Act and National Disaster
Management Plan (NDMP) must be discharged and exercised subject to any exercise
of power under Part X of the Constitution. Any powers conferred on any agency

under the NDMP shall be exercisable only during the period of emergency unless
rescinded or altered by an Emergency Order.

Information flows
Information flows from the community to emergency response personnel or the DAC

via the MWCDS. The DMO also receives situation reports from the Village Mayors.

National Emergency Operations Center
The NDC can appoint any facility to be the NEOC, based on advise of the DAC.

There are three stages of activation:

Stage 1: Standby – comes into effect when it has been established that a hazard
exists or threatens to affect part of or the whole country

Stage 2: Action – becomes effective when the threat is imminent or has already

occurred

Stage 3: Stand-down – occurs when the disaster is over. The NDC determines
when stand-down from disaster should occur. NEOC will close down once the stand

down is effective.

Impact assessment

Impact assessments are required to determine the nature and scale of damage and
the relief and recovery needs which result from that damage. The DAC oversees

impact assessments and can form assessment teams. Each response agency
conducts an impact assessment for its own mandated area of operation.

Types of assessment include:

•

Aerial surveillance – to establish the extent of damage and identify the need for a
proclamation or declaration

•

Initial assessments – to determine immediate relief requirements

•

Detailed assessments – to determine long term recovery activities

Recovery Arrangements

The DAC is responsible for establishing appropriate structures to monitor and
coordinate disaster recovery and providing regular reporting to NDC for strategic

direction. The DAC will be responsible for implementation of any direction issued by
NDC.

Recovery begins when any proclamation of emergency is lifted or when the
operational disaster response role of the NDC, DAC and NEOC is complete.

Preparation for recovery begins during response.

The NEOC may continue to be used by recovery management personnel.

International Assistance for Response or Recovery

International Assistance usually takes the form of direct participation in response
operations or the provision of urgent relief supplies. Long term recovery is managed
by the Aid Coordination Committee.

Requests for international assistance can only be submitted to aid agencies on the
direction of NDC when it is clear that the situation is beyond the capabilities of

national resources.  The DAC collates requests for donor agencies for submission to
NDC and advises on the need for international assistance.  After approval by NDC, the
Aid Coordination Committee will be responsible for liaising with aid agencies.  The Aid

Coordination Committee is accountable to aid agencies for ensuring that assistance is
distributed in accordance with governing guidelines. The actual distribution of aid to

communities (shelter, food and clothing) is to be coordinated by DAC in accordance
with findings from detailed needs assessments.

The Aid Coordination Committee is responsible for providing information on donor

assistance to MAF and Customs to facilitate necessary clearances. Goods purchased
locally with disaster relief funding are exempt of duty.

Government Financial Support for Response or Recovery

The NDC may allocate funds for disaster purposes from other areas of operational
spending on the advice of the Minister of Finance. If approved the allocation is based

on the sole direction of the NDC. To be considered for emergency funding, all agency
expenditures committed to the disaster response must be approved by the CEO of the

agency or the Chairperson of DAC if directed from the NEOC.

Principles for Government support

The NDC may determine policies and principles to facilitate allocation of emergency
funding or supplies. The DAC or individual DAC agencies may provide advice in
developing these policies and principles.

Consideration should be given to making food relief a priority to a particular area if:

•

Recommended by MWCSD or MAF

•

Severe damage has occurred to greater than 60% of all crops and gardens

•

The community does not have access to alternative supplies or markets

•

The community does not have the financial capacity to assist itself

Consideration should be given to making the allocation of tarpaulins a priority for:
•

Government buildings

•

Hospitals

•

Churches and major community buildings

•

Lifeline utility facilities

•

Private homes when no alternative facility is available

NDC may consider providing assistance to cover transportation and other associated

costs with the delivery of food supplies from external sources/markets if the
community obtains their own assistance.

Further discussion

There are currently 48 members of the DAC and any agencies which are not a
member are encouraged to join. The council seeks to spread the responsibility for

humanitarian response across as wider group of actors as possible.

The DAC will provide a recommendation to the NDC and if this recommendation is
approved then it must be carried out. Agencies are encouraged not to act outside of
these directives or, if they do in exceptional circumstances, to inform the DAC of

these activities to avoid duplication.

The role of the ministry of women is to support the village mayor in their preparation
for disasters and in reporting back to the DAC on the extent of damage sustained by

communities.

The government women representatives have been given the responsibility of
warning dissemination. School teachers, village nurses, etc. receive early warnings
through their mobile phones and it is their responsibility to disseminate this

information within their communities.

6.6

Mapping of key disaster response actors in
Samoa

Peter Muller led an exercise of mapping key disaster response actors in Samoa. The

exercise identified humanitarian needs, the necessary response to meet those needs,
and who does what and where during the emergency response and early recovery
phases in Samoa.

The full list of responses and agencies is contained in appendix 2. The main gaps

identified were in: Vector Control, Gender Based Violence and Domestic Violence,
Hygiene Promotion, Shelter, Internally Displaced Communities, and WatSan facilities.

7 Day Two Proceedings

ALL DAY EXERCISE/SIMULATION

Peter Muller provided a brief summary of the day one program and then introduced
the simulation. Participants were divided into one of four groups: Regional actors from

outside of Apia, Government actors in Apia, Non Government actors in Apia, and
community level actors.

7.1

Phase 1

The first phase of the scenario was introduced as follows:

Groups broke off to discuss their first actions in response to the scenario and reported
back their actions as follows:

Community Level

When the mayors received the alert they called an informal council meeting to discuss

their response to the tsunami.

They then called for an evacuation using a conch shell (not church bells as this could
be confused as time for church).

They prepared an evacuation for people with special needs, the elderly and young
children first – special transport was arranged using vehicles normally available in the

village. It was recognized that using a vehicle is not the best method of evacuation
because soil liquification makes driving during an earthquake potentially dangerous.

Consequently, able bodied villagers walked to the evacuation sites. Faith based
organizations were also involved in the above process.

PHASE 1

At 06:00 on 16 April a USGS EQ ALERT stated that a magnitude 8.5 earthquake
had struck 200km southwest of Samoa in Tongan Trench.

There were unconfirmed reports of damage both in Upolu and Savaii Islands, the
extent of which is unknown.

At 06:10 on 16 April a GDAC TSUNAMI warning issued an alert that a Tsunami
had been generated and hit the coast line of Savai’i and Upolu Islands, 10
minutes after the earthquake.

The exact areas affected are unknown, as is the extent of the damage

70% of Samoa’s population and infrastructure are located on low lying coastal
areas

Information products

Statistics relating to deaths and damage in selected villages were introduced at

the village level.

At the evacuation sites, head counts were conducted and the results were
communicated to the mayors. When people were discovered missing, a search party

was initiated. For the elderly and children, the search party was despatched
immediately, for fit and healthy people a delay was used on the assumption that
these people can fend for themselves and that there is a risk to going back into the

affected areas.

At the evacuation site committees were established to look after the distribution of
food and water and treating injured people.

Government in Apia

Government received the alert and activated their standard operating procedures.
The early warning system was activated and the media and telecoms companies were

contacted and a warning was issued. DAC members all received a text message
warning. The NDMO began preparing to call a DAC meeting.

People began to head to higher ground.

All government agencies were asked to activate their response plans.

Non Government in Apia

The UN issued an alert on the status of the Tsunami to allow staff to activate their
evacuation plans. Individual UN agencies were instructed to activate their evacuation
plans and check their stockpiles. A standby request for an UNDAC team was issued.

The Red Cross mobilized local community staff to do registrations of evacuees from
affected areas. The higher ground which people are likely to go to has already been

identified. They also mobilized to look for the injured and provide first aid.

The Red Cross reported back to the NDMO on what they had found and made contact

with the IFRC. In practice, whether the National Society contacts the IFRC or vice
versa depends on circumstance.

Local NGOs began to execute national plans.

AusAID activated their contingency plan and tried to keep in contact with Canberra

and the NDMO.

Regional staff outside of Apia (The international group)

The alert triggered emergency focal points within agencies who tried to make contact

with their staff in the field through field offices and with satellite phones.

UNOCHA tried to make contact with the NDMO. Other agencies waited on OCHA and
the Red Cross for feedback on the situation.

As feedback came in they started contacting each other at the international level to
share information.

UNOCHA called a PHT meeting at which the intention is to look at the stockpiles which

are already situated in the field, baseline data which is available, and generate a map
of potentially affected areas.

After the meeting contact with the field was again attempted: Red Cross, NDMO,

UNICEF were the main points where contact was sought.

Response teams were alerted because it was assumed that there will be an impact
and simulations were requested to try and understand the potential impact.

Other

Confusion arose within the NGOs in Apia over which committee to activate and
whether to activate the UN DMT system independently.

The question of how it was decided when families got split

(in the case of young

children being transported by vehicle) at the community level was raised. The
response was that it is not part of the Disaster Action Plan for children to specifically

be separated from their parents. Rather, children may be taken by vehicle when
there is no other way to evacuate them quickly and safely.

It was pointed out that the village committee having a meeting after the alert left no
time for action before the Tsunami hit.

7.2 Phase

With this new information participants again split into their groups to continue their
response.

By 18:00 on 16 April it was known that there had been 3 large aftershocks at
the epicentre since the initial EQ:

6.2 @ 09h30

5.4 @ 11h55

5.8 @ 14h48

Early figures on humanitarian impact were also beginning to drift in: Dead - 15,
Injured – 25, Missing – 5, Displaced - around 2,000.

The main areas affected appeared to be villages on the Southern Coast line of
Savai’i and the South West coast of Upolu.

By 20:00 on 16 April it was clear that the number of casualties and displaced

was rapidly increasing: Dead – 25, Injured – 46, Missing – 18 and Displaced -
around 3,500. Damage to houses had also been reported by police and village

councils.

Information products

The NDMO was provided with: baseline data gender disaggregated to the village

level and p-coded, images from an overflight and maps which detailed villages
which lay below 20 metres above sea level. The international community was

provided with the same map.

The MoH was provided with an overview of the level of damage sustained by each
hospital in Samoa and the Ports Authority was provided with an overview of
damage sustained by each port and airport in the country.

The village community was provided with information on dead, missing, injured

and displaced from a broader range of villages and also issued with images of
damage in their community.

Village Level

The villagers created a sitrep to describe what their needs were and attempted to
present it to the DAC via a sat phone. Unfortunately the DAC were unable to take the
call.

The village received a welcome visit from the Electric Power Corporation (EPC) and

they indicated that they needed a generator for the evacuation site.

The village district hospital had been destroyed. They again tried to contact the DAC
to discuss this issue but the DAC was in a high level meeting and weren’t able to

respond. The village has recruited retired nurses and anyone else with medical
experience to support those who are injured.

A second village head count was conducted. They had requested a search and rescue
team but until such support arrives they are creating their own.

The evacuation centre has been partitioned to provide separate living areas for men,

women, and dead bodies. A request has been placed for mortuary services and
pastors are on standby to conduct emergency funerals if no help is provided.

The village still has not received relief.

Government Level

The DAC members convened and were briefed on the situation.

The NDMO has received a large amount of data ranging from baseline data, a flight
overview, and information relating to damage to hospitals, ports and roads which they

are using to assess the severity of the situation.

They have decided to proclaim a disaster and will request international assistance so

they are making a list of things that are needed.

Individual agencies were deployed to continue their work in the field.

Non Government Group in Apia

NGOs are continuing to assess information as it comes in to try and gain an
understanding of the severity of the situation. The UN has activated its internal
cluster approach.

UNDAC remains on standby, stock piles have been assessed and the availability of

further regional support is being scoped.

They are continuing to communicate with the NDMO and are awaiting an official
request for assistance from the government. A request has been received, however,

from the MoH for basic medical supplies and personnel.

The NGOs are working together in the field and are developing a database of

information which can be shared with other agencies. They are also continuing to
share information with the international community and producing a sitrep.

Internationals

The internationals sought to identify what resources they had, both within their base

countries and internationally, how they would coordinate them, and what the situation
is on the ground.

The looked at available data and also made guestimates from satellite images to try
and get an understanding of the possible extent of damage.

No emergency had been declared yet so they were taking pre-emptive action. They
initiated a meeting of the PHT and discussed activating regional clusters. They tried

to make an estimation of which needs may exist and thought that: shelter, medical
supplies, water purification/storage and protection might be issues.

They had started meeting with donors and began laying the ground work for a Flash

Appeal. They also started producing sitreps and placing information on the Red Cross
system DMIS (Disaster Management Information System).

They estimated that the extent of the disaster would be in the area of 10,000 people
affected.

Other

In later discussion, it was stated that assessments were to be done on a sectoral

basis. Access would come through the inland/cross island roads and then walking. It
was felt that there were adequate staff to undertake this process.

7.3 Phase

For the purposes of the exercise the international group is now allowed to sit in the
same room as the government and Apia based NGOs. The groups reconvened and
planned their next steps.

A coordination meeting was convened which quickly led to participants breaking off

according to response sector. The general groups formed were: community, shelter,
health, WASH, transport and logistics, and the DAC.

By 08:00 on 17 April sketchy information on the current situation was beginning

to emerge, including:

Lack of access to clean water and sanitary facilities as an urgent issue

Food shortages at evacuation centers

Pre-arrangement not having been made for many of evacuation centers

Overcrowding of evacuation centers meaning that some people cannot be
accommodated

Difficulty in acquiring information due to telecommunications problem and
difficulty accessing the affected areas

At 10:00 on 17 April the Government officially requested international assistance.
The runway at the Faleolo airport is active.

More detail on humanitarian impact is coming out: Loss of Life – 35, Injured – 89,

Missing – 45, population displaced - 3,683.

Information products

The village community was provided with information on dead, missing, injured

and displaced from a broader range of villages.

The Red Cross went to the community and conducted a needs assessment which
largely related to injuries and specific family needs. The information which is

identified during the assessment will be shared with the NDMO and the media. The
community made a special request to the Red Cross to share the information with
others to avoid duplicative assessments.

An issue brought up by the community related to dead bodies, of which 45 had been

identified so far. Following on from this was the issue of whether the government will
require further identification of the bodies for records or whether the families will be

allowed to bury the bodies straight away. The Red Cross intends to advocate relating
to this issue in advance to the health sector.

The Red Cross will deploy supplies in accordance with the assessment which has been
made and have already begun deploying some supplies.

The transport and logistics group were given aid from UNICEF but were not supported

in distribution. They liaised with the police for field agents to aid in the distribution
and also the army to secure a large helicopter to distribute by air. They felt that

distributing by sea was still a significant risk.

The Health Cluster found that they were confused by the number of international
organizations offering to provide relief. It was hard for the national staff member,
who was also a member of the DAC, to understand what aid should be accepted. A

lack of clarity on needs, on how the aid offered could be used to meet as yet only
vaguely identified needs, and the sheer volume of offers of assistance made
coordination difficult.

WASH discussed the resources that were available. They wanted to discuss in smaller
groups but the UNICEF representative and national counterpart were missing which

delayed activity. They already had some idea of what is available and what might be
needed but needed further detail to act decisively.

Further discussion centred on the importance of having some kind of coordination as
soon as possible for the receipt of international aid. Specifically, it is important to

know what is needed and to know what is being provided.

A system is also required for collecting and processing the above information.

7.4 Phase

Further information was introduced and participants broke off into sectors to produce

more detailed plans for action. These plans were then costed and placed into a
consolidated appeal. This approach required a joint approach to planning and

budgeting.

The result is that donors can consider one fully researched and costed document
rather than a disparate range of appeals across varying periods of time. By working

together humanitarian actors can produce a comprehensive and consolidated appeal
document which covers all gaps and eliminates duplication and mobilises resources
very fast.

8 Day

Three

Proceedings

EXERCISE DEBRIEF, NEXT STEP, FOLLOW UP ACTION

Peter Muller provided a presentation on the Flash Appeal Process which can be
enacted during an emergency as follows:

8.1 What is a Flash Appeal?

A Flash Appeal is part of the Consolidated Appeals Process, and is the humanitarian

sector’s main tool for coordination, strategic planning and programming. It is a tool
that provides an overview of urgent life-saving needs within a week of the
emergency's onset. A Flash Appeal contains rapid needs assessment information, a

common humanitarian action plan, and specific sectoral response plans and projects.
It addresses acute needs for up to six months (and can be developed into a

consolidated appeal if the emergency continues beyond six months).

What is the Flash Appeal's rationale?

A Flash Appeal is designed to avoid competing and overlapping appeals. It should
provide a framework for strategic, coordinated, and inclusive programming and serve
as an inventory or catalogue of priority humanitarian project proposals and a

barometer of funding response.

What warrants an Appeal?

Any crisis or disaster needing humanitarian response that (a) exceeds the capacity of
the affected country government, and (b) exceeds the capacity and/or mandate of

any one UN agency warrants a Flash Appeal.

GA Resolution 46/182

“For emergencies requiring a consolidated response, the Secretary-General should

ensure that an initial Consolidated Appeal covering all concerned organisations of the
system, prepared in consultation with the affected State, is issued within the shortest

possible time…”

Who is involved?

•

UN Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator (leading the process, with

OCHA’s support)

•

UN Agencies

•

Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement

•

NGOs (international and local)

•

Donors (field office reps)

•

Affected country government (The appeal is done in consultation with the

government)

Indicative Timeframe from disaster/crisis onset

Day 1

UN HC/RC triggers Flash Appeal – consults IASC country team – Government
consulted.

Day 2-3

Country Team conducts rapid needs assessment and prepares Flash

Appeal

Day 4

CAP Section shares draft with IASC HQs for 24 hr review

Day 5

CAP Section processes & electronically publishes the document

Official launch of appeal

Because all this has to happen very fast with imperfect information, Flash Appeals are

routinely revised a few weeks after the first edition.

1st/2nd editions

No one expects the early first edition to be comprehensive. You’re only expected to
do the best you can with the fragmentary info available, plus good inference.

The second edition (or revision) is prepared when better information is available—
usually 4-6 weeks later. It includes more information relating to early recovery.

Content of a Flash Appeal

•

Executive Summary

•

Context and Humanitarian Consequences / Needs

•

Response Plans per sector (incl. project summaries)

•

Roles and Responsibilities

•

Tables of project funding requirements (per agency, per sector, etc.)

Is Flash Appeal funding channeled through OCHA?

No. But to ensure a system of accountability, funding must be channeled through a

UN agency, even if that agency is not the end user of the funds. This is per instruction
of the UN General Assembly.

Cluster leads have a crucial role:

•

Leading rapid needs assessments

•

Setting sectoral strategy and priorities

•

Gathering project proposals inclusively (incl. NGOs), but also…

•

Vetting projects ‘ruthlessly.’

=> ALL VERY FAST

The job of a cluster lead regarding appeal projects:

•

Get all actors to the table

•

Identify highest-priority needs, and make sure projects are proposed that cover

those. (These form the top-priority projects in the appeal.)

•

Gather other proposals and filter them, applying criteria of relevance to need,

feasibility (within timeframe, agency capacity, & operating environment), etc.

•

Try to stimulate proposals to fill gaps. Call in more capacity if needed.

A Flash Appeal is a strategic response plan which includes a set (“catalogue”) of
projects and a request for funds.

Relationship between the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) Rapid

Response Window and Flash Appeals

Situations requiring CERF funds should normally also generate a Flash Appeal. The
Humanitarian Coordinator allocates available CERF funds to the highest-priority Flash

Appeal projects. CERF provides the initial injection of funds for the most urgent
life-saving projects in the Flash Appeal to cover the time lag between issuance of
the Appeal and receipt of commitments and funds from donors. In the ideal

situation, the Flash Appeal will prioritize projects within it for CERF funding and show
CERF allocations in summary financial tables within the Flash Appeal document (if

they are already decided).

Why do both a CERF request and a Flash Appeal?

Major emergencies require a strategic plan, not a series of disconnected projects.

Further, most emergencies need more funding than CERF can provide and require
humanitarian actions that are more holistic than those meeting CERF’s strict life-

saving criterion.

Examples of disasters and the CERF and Flash Appeal Funding they received

2 0 0 7 Fla sh a ppea ls: funding w ithin a m onth a fter a ppea l la unch, a nd la ter

$0 million

$10 million

$20 million

$30 million

Mozambique Floods and Cyclone

Peru Earthquake

Pakistan Cyclone and Floods

Madagascar Cyclones

Sudan Floods

Uganda Floods

Lesotho Drought

Korea DPR Floods

Nicaragua Hurricane

Swaziland Drought

Bolivia Floods

Dominican Republic

Ghana Floods

Zambia Floods

CERF funding committed to appeal within 1
month
Other funding (excl. CERF) committed to
appeal within 1 month
Funding committed to appeal later than 1
month

Further material:

www.humanitarianappeal.net

Discussion

Discussion centred around how FLASH Appeal funding reached the ground in Samoa.

It was explained the difference between the UN facilitated FLASH Appeal process and
the Red Cross Flash Appeal Process is that the Red Cross Flash Appeal funds are

available only internally to Red Cross agencies whilst the UN facilitated FLASH Appeal
funds are available to all Humanitarian Actors. When accessing the Red Cross funds

the process and objectives are similar to the UN based FLASH appeal, a rapid
consolidated report of planned relief activities is submitted to allow a rapid response

of funds.

The Samoan Government process for funding disaster response activities is to prepare

a submission to NDC/cabinet requesting access to the unforeseen fund. This fund
equals 3% of the national budget. Once approved the normal process for making

payments is made. Goods purchased under this agreement are except from duty.

Helga-Bara Bragadottir (IFRC) gave a brief overview of International Disaster Relief
Law (IDRL), which was explained as working with countries to look at way to

strengthen legal process associated with disaster response.

8.2 Analysing

Constraints

and identifying areas for

improvement

Participants broke into groups to identify issues or constraints which they felt, as a
result of their experiences in the simulation and learnings from the broader workshop,

had the potential to reduce the effectiveness of future disaster responses. The
findings were summarized and the full workshop group then worked through these

findings to make suggestions for how to strengthen future disaster response
performance as follows:

Coordination

Confusion among various actors participating in the response regarding the roles of
NDC/DAC, DMT/PHT (see 6.4) and the clusters and how they fit together was evident.

Although many participants understood how their own system of operation worked,
some did not. Further, whilst many participants did understand how their systems

worked, they did not necessarily understand how the various systems interrelated.

Whilst the workshop itself made considerable progress in overcoming this problem,
further steps which were recommended to continue to make progress include:

Cluster leads should identify their counterpart/s within DAC and make contact with
them

OCHA and the RC are to clarify the structural relationships between DAC and other
coordinating teams, such as the PHT.

DAC members are to clarify the relationship with actors within their own agencies

Ongoing briefings for village mayors regarding emergency response structures

should take place

Communication

It was suggested that in some instances, communication could be improved.

Problems experienced included: information overload, one way information flow, poor
information flow between agencies, and too many meetings.

Suggestions for overcoming these issues included:

That government agencies and cluster leads appoint a focal person whose role is

to facilitate liaison during periods of disaster response, including liaison with the
NDMO

That communication back to village communities became an operational focus and

that broadcast media, mobile phones and field personnel were the main tools used
to do this. Preparation for these activities should include the drafting of Standard

Operating Procedures

Plans

In a related problem to the coordination issue above, it was found that there were a
large number of disaster response plans which often worked in isolation or with
limited linkages. There was also concern that the underlying laws and policies upon

which these plans were dependent were not always understood or supportive.

There was also the concern that there is a lack of familiarity by various actors at
differing levels with the plans.

Finally, a need to incorporate budgeting and resource mobilization (appeal) processes

into plans was emphasized to ensure that these processes ran smoothly under the
pressure of a disaster response.

The main recommendation for overcoming these issues were:

That each agency, regardless of whether they think all staff are familiar with their
plans, makes a concerted effort to ensure that all relevant personnel are familiar
with their own disaster response plan and the broader NDC response plan

That each cluster familiarizes itself with the disaster response plan of its
counterpart and the broader NDC response plan

Information Management

Plans can only be enacted when appropriate information helps the NDC to understand

the situation. Slow or one-way information flow and a lack of information sharing
between clusters needs to be avoided.

When assessments are conducted gender balance in each assessment team is
generally recommended. A strong capacity to mobilize multi-agency teams and

deploy them to affected areas is required and over-assessment of affected
populations, which can result in assessment fatigue, needs to be avoided.

Because the quantity of information collected by assessment can be overwhelming

strong processes must be in place for data entry, cleaning, management, analysis,
and publication of information.

To ensure optimal information management, a phased assessment process, whereby
each phase produces all and only the information needed, was discussed. The idea is
that the assessment phases reflect the information needs of NEOC, clusters, agencies,
donors,etc. and information is then rapidly processed, analysed and made available to

decision-makers.

Suggestions for information phase 1 included:

Focusing on the information needs of the first 1-3 days and drawing on:

•

Baseline data – Statistics & Lands department staff seconded to the NEOC to help

with the management of baseline data. Prior to the disaster the NEOC could lead
a process of stocktaking of information and lead inter-cluster identification of

baseline information needs for emergencies. Baseline data could then be
compiled as a consolidated dataset available to all emergency actors

•

Overflights - Prepare available options, staff and equipment for aerial observation
techniques

•

Imagery – The Lands department should to act as national focal point for imagery.

Lands could be trained on UNOSAT and OCHA could support imagery needs

•

HF radio reports - Systematic and proactive use of the radio network can establish

extent of disaster impact

•

Media

•

Quick visits to gather broad information.

Suggestions for information phase 2 included:

Focusing on the information needs of first month:

•

Launched by day 4, complete by day 10-14

•

A multi-sector rapid assessment

•

Visiting all affected communities if possible

•

Combining a community-level survey with sample of households

•

Ensuring rapid processing and release of results to clusters/actors

•

Ensuring results inform decision-making

•

NEOC to manage consolidation of information and ensure two-way information
flow

Appendix 2: Response Functions

Health and Medical
Response Function

Lead Agency

Support Agency

First Aid

Samoa Red Cross

NHS, MPP, FESA

Transport & movement of

casualties

National Health Services

SRC, WHO

Medical treatment

National Health Services

Hospitals/Medical Centres,
WHO

Public health

Ministry of Health (MoH)

SRC, Hospitals/medical

centres, WHO

Management of deceased

Ministry of Police

NHS, MoH, Coroner,
Funeral Directors

Morturary services

Coroner (MJCA)

Counseling and support

National Health Services

MWCSD, SRC, Aid
Agencies, SUNGO, WHO

Search and Rescue
Response Function

Lead Agency

Support Agency

Land rescue

Ministry of Police

Ministry of Works,
Transport and

Infrastructure (MWTI)

Land rescue (structural
collapse, accidents, etc)

Ministry of Police

SAA, MWTI (Buildings),
MWTI (Roads)

Maritime search and

rescue (vessels & aircraft
in the sea)

MWTI (Maritime)

SPA, MPP, FESA, Overseas

Navy, SAA

Evacuation
Response Function

Lead Agency

Support Agency

Evacuation of People

MPP, Village Council and
Mayor

Foreign Government
Representatives, SBC,

Media, DMO

Community Welfare
Response Function

Lead Agency

Support Agency

Registration of evacuees

Lead Agency/DAC

SRC, Hospitals/Medical
Centres, Caritas, Aid

Agencies, SUNGO,
Churches, Village Council

Temporary shelter

Lead Agency/DAC

SRC, Hospitals/Medical

Centers, Caritas, Aid
Agencies, SUNGO,
Churches, Village Council,

Disaster food

Lead Agency/DAC

SRC, Hospitals/Medical
Centers, MoH, Caritas, Aid
Agencies, SUNGO,
Churches, Village Council

Disaster clothing

Lead Agency/DAC

SRC, Hospitals/Medical
Centers, Caritas, Aid

Agencies, SUNGO,
Churches, Village Council

Animal welfare

Animal Protection Society

MAF (Quarantine), Vets

Disaster finances

Ministry of Finance

Aid Agencies, donors,
MFAT

Logistics Supply
Response Function

Lead Agency

Support Agency

Incoming resources

Lead Agency/DAC

SRC, Aid Agencies, DMO,

Foreign Govt Reps, SQUIP,
SAA, SPA

Information Management
Response Function

Lead Agency

Support Agency

Public information

Lead Agency/DAC

SBC, radio stations, other
media outlets, All response

agencies

Enquiries about affected
people

Samoa Red Cross

Foreign Govt. Reps,
Samoa Hotel Associations

Communication between
response agencies

Lead Agency/DAC

Response agencies, utility
providers, Village Council,

MWCSD, MESC, Aid
Agencies, SUNGO

Impact assessment
Response Function

Lead Agency

Support Agency

Reconnaissance and needs

assessment

Lead Agency/DAC

All response Agencies,

SamoaTel, Digicel, Radio
communication providers

Building safety evaluations MWTI (Buildings)

Consulting engineers

Building health
assessments

MoH

WHO

Utility service impacts

Utility operators

Access impacts - roads

MWTI (Roads)

MPP

Access restoration – air

SAA

Access restoration –

marine

MWTI (Maritime)

SPA

Environmental impacts

MNRE

SPA, MWTI (Maritime)

Appendix 3: Mapping of Key Disaster Response Actors in Samoa

Agriculture/Fisheries/Livelihoods
Response Actors
Boats Samoa

Ports

Authority,

Ministry of Works

Transport & Infrastructure,

Tools & seeds

MOAF, SPREP, OXFAM NZ, UNDP, FAO

Health
Response Actors
Emergency Medical/First Aid

MoH, Samoan Red Cross (SRC), LDS,

National Health Services, MEDCEN,

Vector Control

GAP

EPI & Vitamin A & cold chain

SRC, NHS,

Surveillance

NHS,

Public Healthcare Systems & Outreach

SRC, National Health Service (NHS), MoH

Special needs (diabetes, HIV, TB)

NHS, Samoa Aids Foundation

Reproductive Health

NHS, UNFPA, MoH,

Transport/Ambulances SRC,

Fire

Psychosocial support

SRC

Health Waste Disposal

MNRE (WASTE), MoH, Samoa Water
Authority

Mortuary Services

NHS

Hospital and Clinics reconstruction

WHO,

WASH
Response Actors
Hygiene promotion

GAP

Public Promotion

Oxfam, MNRE (Waste and Water), Samoa

Water Authority

Water Testing & Treatment

Samoa Water Authority, MoH, MNRE
(Water), SPREP, SUNGO,

Sanitation

MoH, UNICEF, OXFAM, Women in
Business (WIBDINC), Samoa Water
Authority, MoWorks Transport and

Infrastructure

Water Supply and Systems (Rural and
Town)

Samoa Water Authority, SRC, Oxfam,
WHO, Independent Water Rural Schemes

Association

Containers and Tanks

SRC, Oxfam,

Solid waste disposal

MoH, Oxfam, MNRE (Waste Disposal),

Water Sector Steering Committee

Food/Nutrition
Response Actors
Procurement MoFinance
Food ration testing and distribution

WIBDI, SRC

Special groups (Lactating women,
children, etc.)

UNICEF, SUNGO, WIBDINC, Ministry of
Women,

Communications/Public Promotion

UNICEF, WIBDINC, MoH

Protocols UNICEF,

WHO,

WIBDI

Seeds and Tools

FAO, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries

(MAF), LDS, SPREP, WIBDI

Quarantine

Inland Revenue Department (IRD), MAF

Surveilance UNICEF

Safety & Security
Response Actors
Food storage

WIBDI

Looting/Crime/Fraud

Ministry of Police and Prisons, Attorney

Generals Office, UNDSS, SUNGO,

Marine Safety

MWTI, Samoa Ports Authority, Samoa
Shipping Corporation, Ministry of Prime

minister and Cabinet

Consular activities

Australian High Com, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

Safety of humanitarian workers

SRC, UNDSS, Ministry of Police and Prison

(MPP)

Protection
Response Actors
Gender based violence

GAP

Domestic Violence

GAP

Dignity

Caritas, SRC, SUNGO, MWCDS, UNFPA

Shelter

GAP

Trafficking MWCDS,

MPP,

Displaced communities (tension with host

community/physical security)

GAP

Reporting MWCDS,

SUNGO

Protection of Vulnerable

WIBDI, UNICEF, SUNGO, MWCDS

Information Management/Assessment
Response Actors
Health, Wash, Food and Nutrition,
Education assessment

Caritas, Red Cross, UNOCHA, UNESCO

Data processing

MNRE/DMO,

Standardising UNOCHA
Dissemination UNOCHA
Sitreps Village

Mayors,

NDMO

Media liaison

Media Organisations

Tools ( eg. www)

Public information messages

UNRC, SUNGO (NGO support)

Reporting UNOCHA

Education
Response

Actors

Temporary schools (structures)

Ministry of Education Sports and Culture
(MESC), Ministry of Women, Community
& Social Development (MWCSD),
UNICEF,

Education materials

UNICEF, Church of Latter Day Saints,

SPREP, UNDP, MESC

Facilities (toilets, water, etc.)

MESC, Faith based and private school
boards

Teachers

UNESCO (training and providing

temporary teachers)

Reconstruction

Ministry of Works Transport and
Infrastructure (MIWTI)

Fees/Costs

MESC,

Special programs (for
disabled/disadvantaged children)

SUNGO (NGO Support), Disability
Council, MESC

Shelter/Camp/Evacuation Centres
Response Actors
Alternative evacuation centres

Caritas, Ministry of Health, MESC, MoH,

Samoa Sports Facilities Authority (SPFA),
Oxfam Australia, UNDP, IFRC, NWTI

Land Allocation

MNRE, MWCSD, Caritas, Samoa Land

Corporation

Tools, labour, materials for
repair/construction

LDS, Red Cross, Samoa Water Authority

Registration

Samoa Red Cross,

WATSAN facilities

GAP

Management MWCSD

Non-Food Items
Response Actors
Distribution of clothes, buckets, fuel,

buckets, tarpaulins, lanterns, mosquito
nets, etc.

MWCSD, LDS, SUNGO (NGO

Coordination), National Council of
Churches, SRC

Logistics/Transport
Response Actors
Air

UNOCHA (Funding), UNDP, Airport
Authority, MPMC, Oxfam, Ministry of

Works Transport and Infrastructure

Sea UNDP,

Ministry of Works Transport and

Infrastructure , Samoa Ports Authority,

Samoa Shipping Corporation

Trucks and Vehicles

UNDP, SRC, MWTI, Samoa Water
Authority

Fuel UNDP,

MoF

Telecoms/Communications
Response Actors
VHF