Microsoft Word - Workshop Report

1 Background

In July 2008 OCHA Pacific held a Regional Level Contingency Planning Workshop for Humanitarian
Assistance in the Pacific region. The key outcome of the workshop was the establishment of the
Pacific Humanitarian Team and a Pacific cluster approach, in which key regional humanitarian
response partners participate (including UN agencies, NGOs and donors). It is expected that this
Pacific cluster approach will contribute to improved effectiveness, predictability and timeliness of
international assistance in the region.

To ensure that the Pacific Regional Cluster Framework effectively compliments each Pacific Island
Country’s national disaster management arrangements and specific context, contingency planning
workshops are being held in the most disaster prone countries. The Solomon Islands was identified as
a priority country due to its vulnerability to disasters. The recent introduction of a national version of
the cluster approach in the Solomon Islands disaster response mechanism and the chance to
investigate lessons learned from the recent flooding provided an excellent opportunity to test the
national cluster approach in conjunction with the regional cluster approach.

2 Workshop

objectives

The overall objective of the workshop was to bring together key disaster response actors from
Government, Red Cross, Donor partners, UN organizations and NGOs to review jointly the existing
disaster response mechanism both at national and regional level, test how effectively the regional
cluster approach could support the national level disaster response structure through exercise and
adjust/review regional cluster structure to the specific context in Solomon Islands. The workshop was
also expected to enhance the linkages and coordination between regional clusters and corresponding
governmental ministries/agencies.

3 Expected

outcomes

The outcomes expected of the workshop included:

Increased readiness for response

Identification of procedural and decision-making gaps as well as gaps in response actions

Identification of conflicts between departments and Ministries, amongst key stakeholders
along with interpretation of procedures and roles

Confirmation of roles and responsibilities between actors

Resource needs are identified.

Information and data needs for decision-making and action are identified

Effectiveness of existing emergency services is tested.

All key stakeholders in disaster response will have common understandings on needs,
gaps and steps forward to improve the response mechanism.

Additional training needs are identified.

Modifications and improvement to regional cluster approach as well as the contingency
plan are identified following lessons learned from the Exercise, which could guide
regional cluster lead agencies to further organize and plan their minimum preparedness
actions

4 Participation

In total 40 participants attended the workshop representing a mix of national and international actors
drawn from: the Solomon Islands NDMO, various Solomon Islands Ministries, the Red Cross,
International NGOs based in Honiara and Australia, UN Agencies and NGOs with an office in Honiara
and regional UN Agencies and NGOs.

5 Executive

summary

The workshop encouraged participants to become involved in a number of activities, which included:

•

Testing the new cluster based approaches (national and regional)

•

Strengthening relationships between humanitarian actors working in the Solomon Islands

•

Evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the existing disaster response system in the
Solomon Islands

These activities in turn led to a number of outputs which included:

•

The identification of emergency response gaps

•

Identification of areas of the Solomon Islands emergency response process which could be
improved

•

Recommendations for future actions

These outputs are summarised below.

Emergency response gaps

•

Emergency

medical

services

•

Camp

management

•

Shelter

coordination

•

Control of pests and diseases

•

Technical capacity to repair water facilities (pumps, generators, etc.)

•

Protection of specific vulnerable groups (sick, elderly etc)

•

Communication

networks

•

Understanding of roles and responsibilities

•

Identification of protection needs

•

Nutrition (food for specific groups)

•

Assessment

coordination

Summary of key recommendations for future actions
Information

•

Improve the quality of decision making information (comprehensive overview of humanitarian
needs and actions) provided to the NDC

•

Improving the flow of information between the NEOC, PEOCs and Ministries

•

Harmonising assessment methodologies, phasing assessments and improving information
management, which provides consistent information for all agencies to use

•

Review emergency information requirements and aim to collect all and only the information
required

•

Agree upon, compile and consolidated a baseline dataset. Where possible, disaggregate the
data

Roles &Responsibilities/Coordination

•

Clarifying the roles and responsibilities of humanitarian actors in the Solomon Islands

•

Streamline the process for declaring a disaster and requesting international assistance

•

Develop systems to ensure two way communication, in and out of the NEOC

•

Improving the use of systems for accessing funding and other assets

•

Communicate with all humanitarian actors to ensure that roles, responsibilities and expectations
are understood under the new disaster management structure

•

Review the internal processes and departmental responsibilities for releasing funds for disaster
response

•

Review provincial bank process for funds release and establish a working quick initial fund
mechanism

•

Redesign inventory management and tracking systems

•

Work with RAMSI, FRANZ, and the private sector to develop a contingency plan for securing
logistical assets over the long term

•

Analyse logistics needs and enable more coordinated use of assets

•

Improve HF radio efficiency by developing SOPs, securing a dedicated emergency frequency,
training radio operators, mapping capacity and raising awareness regarding proper HF use

•

International funding sources such as CERF and Flash Appeals to be considered and OCHA to
facilitate the process of adapting information from the national clusters for the international cluster
format

6 Workshop

Proceedings

The meeting was opened with a prayer led by Pearson before Loti Yates read the opening speech for
the absent minister.

Workshop objectives and program

Peter Muller provided a brief overview of the workshop which outlined: why we plan, defined
contingency planning, stated objectives for the workshop, explained expected outcomes, and outlined
the program.

Each participant then introduced themselves.

Disasters in the Solomon Islands

Loti Yates provided an overview of the types of disasters which are most likely to occur in the
Solomon Islands.  Common disasters included:

1.  Volcanoes, which are highly active in the Solomon Islands
2.  Flooding, which is often accompanied by an increase in diseases such as malaria and diarrhoea

and can also impact on infrastructure and agriculture.

3. Earthquakes, which damage infrastructure and livelihoods.
4. Landslides
5. Tsunamis. There have been 19 events between 1926 and 2007 and at least three have caused

loss of life. Also, at least three events had waves over six metres.

6. Coastal storm surges and sea level rise
7. Tropical

cyclones

Disaster history in Solomon Islands highlighted its vulnerability to various types of disasters and its
serious humanitarian impact including financial implication. He also summarized lesson learned and
challenges from past disaster response experiences.

Briefing on the outcome of regional contingency planning workshop and cluster approach in
the Pacific

Peter Muller provided some background to the humanitarian reform process.  He then discussed the
Regional inter-agency contingency planning for humanitarian assistance workshop held in Suva in
July 2008 and its key outcome, the agreed cluster framework in the Pacific.

Peter provided a description of the regional clusters and how they are expected to operate, outlined
the role of the cluster lead agencies and the expectation of cluster members.

Current disaster response structure in Solomon Islands

Loti Yates presented an overview of the governmental disaster response structure and its
coordination mechanism with other stakeholders.  The presentation briefed participants on the current
Solomon Islands disaster response structure as per the NDP 1987 and discussed the shortfalls of the
current arrangements. Then, he presented the new national disaster response structure based on
cluster approach in order to address the challenges in the current arrangement.

Creating a disaster scenario

Planning assumptions help humanitarian actors to manage uncertainty. They outline a broad set of
circumstances which can be used as a reference point for testing existing resources and processes
and then planning to improve future disaster responses.  Minako Kakuma led a mapping of a broad
yet probable disaster scenario in the Solomon Islands.

The outcome was as follows:

•

A typical scenario would result from a rapid onset natural disaster such as an earthquake,
cyclone (most likely to hit the southern provinces), volcanic eruption, tsunami or flood.

•

Up to four provinces and a total population of 50,000 people may be affected.

•

The affected population are likely to be mostly subsistence farmers and may not have
diversified food sources, consequently, there is likely to be issues with food security.

•

The affected areas are likely to be very remote and isolated with no landing sites, limited road
access, no formal evacuation centres, and limited to no health infrastructure.

•

The cost to access the area is likely to be high yet the funds available for the operation are
likely to be limited.

A list of humanitarian needs likely to arise during the above scenario was also brainstormed as
follows:

•

food

•

shelter

•

water

•

protection of the rights of the
vulnerable

•

clothes

•

health and health promotion

•

psychological support

•

medication

•

transport and infrastructure

•

information

•

education

•

non-food items

•

security and safety

•

protection of children who have been
separated from families

Mapping of key disaster response actors in the Solomon Islands

Minako Kakuma led a mapping exercise to identify response actions, actors, and gaps relating to
disaster response in the Solomon Islands.

Key gaps included:

•

emergency medical services

•

Shelter

coordination

•

camp

management

•

control of pests and diseases

•

Assessment

coordination

•

Information

management

•

Identification of protection needs

•

Nutrition (food for specific groups)

•

repair of public facilities (water,
sanitation, medical, schools etc)

•

protection of particular vulnerable
groups( sick, elderly etc)

A full list is provided in appendices 1.

Lesson learned from the recent Solomon Islands Floods

Participants broke into groups to identify key lessons learned as a result of the recent Solomon
Islands floods.  The main lessons identified were as follows:

Request for international assistance

The main trigger for a request for international assistance is when the extent of damage overwhelms
the Solomon Islands government.  However, there is often difficulty in getting the immediate
cooperation required from other ministries.  When the Ministry of Home Affairs is not appropriately
supported by its intergovernmental partners a request for international assistance can be slow to be
issued.

A slow request for international assistance can create difficulties for international donors and
organisations seeking to become involved in a response. Their involvement is not possible without a
declaration of Disaster from the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Capacity building

Capacity building for key government agencies will enable governments to respond more quickly and
effectively when a disaster strikes.

Training individuals on how to effectively use assets will also enhance their productivity during periods
of disaster response.

Information management

The slow flow of information has clearly hampered decision making and the humanitarian response in
the past.  The need to harmonise assessment forms and gain access to appropriate baseline data
was noted.

Coordination

The need to strengthen linkages between donors, Government and NGO agencies was identified.

Access to Information

Early access to information was inhibited by factors which included geographic isolation, the nature
and scale of the disaster, poor weather, lack of funds and a lack of communications equipment such
as radios and phones.

Recommendations for overcoming these problems included improving links with relevant ministries
who may have the resources required to access affected populations or related relevant information.
Such ministries included the Ministry of Lands, National Office of Statistics, Ministry of Health, The
Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development (MEHRD), and the Churches.  Testing of
any equipment, such as radios or phones, which would be relied upon during a response to ensure
that it was functional was also recommended.

Sharing of information

The way in which information was collected and shared was also recognised as a problem.  Issues
such as: too many actors collecting too much information, too greater breadth of information being
sought, and poor sharing of information were thought to be causing the problems.  It was felt that the
cluster approach may help to improve coordination between agencies whilst the harmonisation of
various assessment techniques may provide some consistency in the data collected.

A lack of clear roles and responsibilities among government departments during emergencies was
perceived as a problem which, among other things, was leading to one-way (lineal) information
sharing. It was hoped that this may be overcome by improved central coordination as a result of
NEOC.  A workshop explaining clusters and how each ministry fits into the coordination system was
also recommended.

Baseline data

Sufficient information exists but it isn’t being accessed at the right time.  For instance, in the case of
the recent floods a disaster overview was generated within the first day. However, it was very difficult
to get the baseline data needed to understand how many people had been affected.

It was generally acknowledged that data would be made available by the statistics office, including
data from the upcoming census, if it was requested.  The bottleneck was that there is still a need to
define what information is needed and request that information.  Consequently, it was recommended
that a list of required baseline data be developed so relevant information agencies could then be
approached to see if information exists.

Assessments

The assessment process was consistently described as being too long and convoluted. In addition to
the common recommendation for harmonisation of assessment forms, it was also recommended to
include NGOs and international actors earlier in the assessment process to avoid duplication.

Coordination

A better understanding of roles and responsibilities was recommended as being required to improve
coordination within and between clusters/sectors.

One-way communication was reported as being a problem inhibiting good coordination between
provincial and national administrators.  A centralisation of activities on a national level was expected
to help coordination activities.  The plan to establish provincial offices with access to appropriate
equipment such as working HF radios and a fully developed provincial disaster plan was commended.

It was suggested that international actors need to modify their expectations regarding the resources
they will find when working in the Solomon Islands but that equally, they needed clear information
from national actors as to what kind of assistance is needed.

Resource mobilisation

Inadequate information and information not being received in time for agencies to seek funds were
identified as problems which inhibited resource mobilisation. To help overcome this issue it was
suggested that the statistics department should be brought into the disaster management operations
for providing data and maps relating to the disaster.

Human resources

A human resources capacity gap exists which often consists of a lack of staff or a lack of the physical
equipment staff needed to fulfil their jobs. Increased recruitment and training efforts were recommend
as ways to try and overcome these problems.

Logistics and transport

There was perceived to be a lack of understanding regarding what assets are intended to be made
available during disasters.  To overcome this problem it was recommended that the chairman of the
PDC and his committee be helped to understand the work practices of the NDCR and the workings of
the various clusters.  It was also suggested that it be the task of the provincial offices to produce a
provincial disaster management plan.

RAMSI

Difficulties may result from losing the assets and logistical capacity of RAMSI when they withdraw.
Planning for this eventuality needs to take place.

Pre-positioning

Pre-positioning of stocks was reported as a problem, especially for perishable goods.
Recommendations for overcoming this problem included regularly rotating pre-positioned stocks with
normal supplies and having a pre-paid arrangement with suppliers which allowed rapid mobilisation of
perishable goods.

Finance

Apart from there being a shortfall of funds, the process for accessing finance is long and convoluted.

Monitoring of distributions

The lack of a main departmental institution assigned to the task of monitoring distributions is thought
to have created a lack of transparency. It was recommended that a real time monitoring system be
set up and delegated to a relevant institution.

All day exercise/simulation

To practice operating under the newly created cluster structure, a disaster response simulation was
conducted. Each participant was assigned a role to play and in most cases roles were aligned with an
individual’s real life role.

An initial overview of the scenario was provided and the first task was undertaken: to identify “What
are your immediate actions”. At regular intervals throughout the day more information was released
to allow participants to refine their activities.  At the end of each of the first three phases conducted
participants reconvened to discuss their actions.  The final phase required all groups to work together
to produce the basis for a CERF appeal.  A full summary of the actions undertaken is provided in
Appendix 2.

Revisiting key issues and making plans for managing them

After the examining lessons learned from the Solomon Islands floods and experiences during the
simulation, key issues were identified and plans were discussed to help to better manage them in the
future.

Assessments

Craig Williams presented an overview of assessments, their objectives and methodologies and how
these change through varying phases of a disaster. At varying stages the presentation was opened
up for discussion.  The results of the presentation and discussion are recorded below.

Phase 1

Overflights

Overflights usually happen as soon as possible at the request from the director of the NDMO, there is
no need to wait for a declaration of disaster. The process usually involves the commissioner of police
requesting RAMSI to provide a helicopter.

Some basic preparedness steps which will maximise the effectiveness of overflights were identified.
They included having maps, a predetermined flight plan, GPS functionality and communication with
the flight crew to enable proper coverage of each area. None of these things are currently happening
in the Solomon Islands and the disaster response process would benefit from using them. The IFRC
has people trained in doing overflights and may be able to help. The Police, Fisheries and Customs
may also have some expertise in this area which could be investigated.

Some constraints on initiating overflights include a financial bottleneck which often makes it difficult to
get access to air assets. Also, many aircraft have trouble covering the large distances required, often
needing to stop to refuel en-route to a destination and being constrained by the fact that fuel is in
short supply in the Solomon Islands.

Baseline information:

Statistics and Lands are the two main agencies which have access to baseline data and they are
willing to share. The key task is to identify the required information and compile it so that it is
prepared and ready to be used before the next disaster strikes.

Sectoral data is mainly aggregated at the national level. It is rarely disaggregated at the provincial or
ward level. However, through the partnership between UNFPA and the MoH there is some data
relating to reproductive health which is disaggregated right down to the household level.

The baseline data provided in the simulation was found extremely useful.  In past real operations it
has been difficult to access baseline because it was not clear who had it or how to get it. It was
suggested that the NDMO do a “stock take” of various data sources within the country so people know
where data is.  It would then be good to agree on a standardised set of data required for disaster
response so that there is some predictability about what would be available during a disaster.

There has been some work begun at the provincial level in collecting baseline data using information
relating to health cards.

Satellites:

Satellite imagery is not so easy to access in the Pacific because of the relatively large amount of
water and the facts that most satellites focus on land masses. Further, in some circumstances, such
as flooding which can occur in quite a narrow area, satellite imagery may not be that useful.

Contact with affected areas:

In the Tsunami experience, PDCs experienced an inundation of calls through HF radio.  However,
when trying to communicate with very remote islands HF is usually only good in the early morning and
in the evening. It was suggested that in Africa and the Caribbean, two channels were used to try and
overcome the patchy effectiveness of HF.  Another problem is the lack of control over HF Channels
which means that people can easily get cut off when they are trying to get information through HF.
Most HF radios are private and there are literally thousands throughout the islands. Almost all health
clinics have HF capability.  There is no national mapping of where HF sets are, however, some
provincial baseline data sets do have a mapping of HF sets in their province. The best people to get
outstanding information from are probably Spectrum, a body within the ministry of civil administration
and aviation, who is responsible for allocating the frequencies.  Alternatively the sellers of the sets
may be able to provide some information.

The large network of radios around the country can be used to try and define the extent of the
emergency. However, there is as yet no standard operating procedure for the HF sets and it was
agreed that one is needed for the network to work optimally. Further, it would be good to have a
dedicated emergency frequency.

Quick Visits

Police are usually the front line for doing initial village visits during a disaster and they have a
standard operating procedure.

Phase 2

Purposive sampling

In many cases purposive sampling can provide information which is just as accurate as Household
Surveys.

Household Surveys:

The reason household surveys are often used in the Solomon Islands is to kill “two birds with one
stone”. To collect detailed information whilst less detailed information is also being collected.

The Red Cross uses Household Surveys because they mainly distribute NFIs and the household
survey allows them to target effectively.

However, more general disaster relief and rapid assessment teams do not need such detailed
information for targeting. Consequently, there is not the same need to be conducting such detailed
assessments in the early stages of a disaster.

Multi-sectoral assessments:

In the provinces assessments are conducted by teams comprising of various sectoral representatives.
Each sector representative has their own survey form and their own terms of reference.  The Red
Cross also has their own assessment methodology.  The government forms are standardised across
provinces which provides some predictability of the information that will be generated.

During the recent floods experience the initial mobilisation and dispatch of the assessment teams was
very impressive.  However, the ability to collate and process the information was less efficient.

It takes 1-2 weeks for the information from the assessment to come back.  However, some
stakeholders reported that they still had not received assessment information from the recent floods.
The lack of information which resulted meant that funding opportunities were forgone and the disaster
response was inhibited.

A recommendation which was supported by the group was that the NDMO and other disaster
managers evaluate the assessment forms, the assessment process and the manner in which the data
is extracted from the assessment forms and consequently managed.  It was also recommended to
look at producing a standardised form which provides consistent information which all agencies can
use.  Further, it was recommended that phase one and phase two type assessments forms be
considered.

The Red Cross has the phases in place for their assessments.  They do an initial and broad
assessment to inform a DREF application for funding.  They will then do more detailed assessments.

Triggering:

The NDMO triggers the assessment and is not dependant on the declaration of disaster to do so.
However, funds cannot be released for an assessment without a declaration of disaster.

Decision Making

There were good examples in the recent floods of people working with slightly different figures,
coming together to discuss the difference and then making a collective estimation and decision
resulting from that. There were also some issues with rapidly changing and contradictory information
which made decision making difficult.

The sequencing of events after a disaster strikes

A process of mapping actions involved in responding to a disaster was undertaken. The map is
attached in appendix 3. However, during the process, two specific issues came up which the meeting
participants felt were worth noting.

It was noted that because the national cluster structure does not match the international cluster
structure, when producing CERF applications or FLASH Appeals the information received through
these clusters would need to be re-categorised to match the national clusters. It was decided that as
long as this process was facilitated effectively by OCHA then the situation can be managed. And it is
important that regional cluster lead agencies establish working relationship with their counterpart
ministries/clusters during disaster preparedness phase.

A concern was raised that whilst Under-Secretaries (US) are the chairs of the national clusters, it is
the Permanent Secretaries (PS) who make the final decisions. The fear was that the USs may not
have the power to work effectively.

General conclusions, recommendations and steps forward

On the final day Peter Muller facilitated a discussion of conclusions relating to key issues which had
come up during the workshop along with recommendations for future action.
Activation process

Problems

•

There is no consistent and agreed process to activate the initial actions and data gathering at
different levels (provincial, national) following a disaster event

•

An official Declaration of Disaster by the Government (Ministry of Home Affairs) is necessary to
release funds for a response, both for national agencies and for organisations funded by
international donors. The process for issuing of the Declaration is often too lengthy.

•

Related to the above, the official request for international assistance by the Government has to be
issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which requires an additional step in an already lengthy
process.

Suggestions and recommendations

•

To develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for a joint information gathering process to
improve the information available for use by decision-makers with the NDMO as focal agency

•

As part of the above, to develop an initial data collection procedure for the NDMO and its briefing
to the NDC

•

Review and simplify the procedure for the declaration of disaster and the request for international
assistance to speed up the response process

•

The NDMO with the help of the NEOC compiles the comprehensive humanitarian overview during
the first 24 hours and present it to NDC for their urgent decision making

Discussion

When discussing the issue of declaring a disaster it was suggested that often the NDC did not want to
declare without full information because if a disaster did not eventuate the NDC would be criticized.
Equally, if they declare late, they will also be criticised. It was suggested that an interim declaration
may be needed, such as an “alert declaration” or “declaration of potential disaster”.  The UN and Red
Cross alert systems were mentioned as examples.

It was also mentioned that the solution did not only lie with the NDMO. It was also intricately linked
with the entire information gathering process. If humanitarian partners can work more quickly and
efficiently together to collect accurate and timely information to describe the nature of the disaster, it
will be easier for the NDC to make a timely decision relating to the declaration.

What is however important to take away obstacles that lead to delayed decision-making and a
“chicken or egg” situation: because there is no declaration of disaster, there is no directive or funding
to trigger a response and gather more information. And because there is not enough information,
there is no declaration of disaster. Therefore it is recommended to closely review the process of initial
information collection and decision-making.

Financial

Problems

•

Related to the above, the process for the initial request for funding and subsequent commitment
to funding is cumbersome and results in a slow process of release of money and the need for
departments to find shortcuts to other budget lines.

Suggestion

•

Review the process to increase efficiency and timeliness, lead by NDC and Ministry of Finance.

Discussion

It was suggested that there were no problems with the current system for administering finance.
However, at a closer look it appeared that the problems lay with attempts to bypass the normal
approval system. It was emphasised that the systems are there, but unfortunately people are not
using them as they should be. In addition existing procedures may be also too slow for a timely
response. A further recommendation was made that a brief be created to help government agencies
better use these systems.

Problem

•

Money transfers for operations in the provinces were reportedly hampered by problems in the
banking system.

Suggestion

•

Each PDO (supported by the NDMO) check its financial transfer procedure with the bank in the
province as a part of their disaster preparedness activities

Funding

Problem

•

Lack of immediate resources for assessment team deployment and other initial activities

Suggestion

The National Disaster Council and Ministry of Finance review the current procedure and establish a
working quick initial fund mechanism. This issue should also be raised at the Pacific DRM partnership
meeting in May in Fiji where Chief Executive Officers form Planning and Finance departments will
meet.

Discussion

The discussion underlined that such a mechanism already exists but that quite often it does not work.
The money which is held in the NDMO contingency account is “paper money” which is budgeted for
but not physically in the account, which is why it can take so long to mobilise.

Problem

•

A lack of clarity on what responsibilities lie with which departments in relation to response and
rehabilitation activities. For example, who is to budget, pay for and/or undertake the rehabilitation
of schools (Ministry of Education or Ministry of Works??) and health clinics (likewise Ministry of
Health and Ministry of Works??)

Suggestion

•

National clusters and participating agencies are to clarify their roles and responsibilities as part of
their preparedness priorities

Problem

There is a concern that for international appeals the international clusters are used to determine the
(cost of) humanitarian response, while national clusters have a different composition.

Suggestions

•

Regional clusters identify their counterpart ministries/agencies and establish a working
relationship

•

OCHA to facilitate any consolidated appeal process for international funding

Logistics

Problem

•

High cost of transportation

Suggestions

•

Improve analysis of humanitarian needs and communication of intended actions to enable more
coordinated use of assets

•

The logistics cluster should if possible pre-negotiate rates for transport with transportation
agencies or otherwise negotiate rates in the earliest phase following a disaster.

Discussion

Experience from 2007 Tsunami indicates that in many cases logistics costs were under estimated.
This has impacted the ability of various organisations to deliver on their objectives.  Getting finances
right is essential to allow programs to be completed appropriately.  High logistics costs are a reality in
the Pacific and there is a need to rationalise this and work within this constraint appropriately.

Problem

•

There is a lack of prepositioned stocks in country

Suggestion

•

Redesign prepositioned stocks and inventory management system also considering revolving
regular stocks

•

Take into account the (need for) national stocks with existing regional emergency stock systems
(e.g. UNICEF, UNFPA, AusAID, WV, Oxfam, WHO, IFRC)

Problem

•

Lack of assets when RAMSI withdraws

Suggestions

•

A logistics contingency planning process is undertaken involving the logistics cluster and RAMSI

•

The logistics cluster remains aware of other regional partnership opportunities with partners such
as FRANZ (France, Australia, New Zealand military assets for humanitarian assistance)

Discussion

Because the recommendations are all linked to assets which are non-local, it was suggested that in-
country assets are also mapped for potential partnership opportunities in the future.  Further, the
NDMO may benefit from conducting some outreach to involve logistics cluster members who were
under-represented at the workshop.

Holding funds in provincial accounts on standby for immediate mobilisation was also suggested.

Problem

•

Lack of monitoring of distributions

Suggestions

•

Undertake a mapping of actors and types of relief items (NFI, food, etc.) to determine the
characteristics of what needs to be monitored

•

The logistics cluster, including the NDMO, designs a monitoring system and seeks advice from
relevant international organisations with expertise in the area of stock control (e.g. WFP, UNICEF,
IFRC, Oxfam)

Discussion

The Solomon Islands Red Cross was encouraged to take the lead of a working group which looks into
the distribution of NFIs.

It was also suggested that the distribution of relief items is monitored but that the feeding back of the
information to humanitarian partners is weak. This feedback is not only needed for tracking stock, but
also needed for planning where to distribute to avoid duplication. Consequently, the NDMO was
called upon to aggregate the information they receive and feed it back to humanitarian partners.

Coordination

Problem

•

Lack of awareness of roles and responsibilities

Suggestion

•

The PDO/NDMO prepare briefings for PDC and NDC members on their individual roles and the
new DM structures

Problem

•

Under-Secretaries as cluster leads do not have the decision making power needed for quick
response during an emergency

Suggestion

•

Clarify responsibilities in agreed SOPs (between Under-Secretaraies and Permanent Secretaries)

Discussion

There is what is called a DRM plan which is supported by legislation and provides the Under-
Secretaries with the power to make the decision. However, it was argued that in practice this was not
the case and the assurance was made that under the new cluster arrangements this would be looked
after.

Problem

•

International actors’ expectations of what local responders are able to do and what support would
be needed in disaster response.

Suggestion

•

International actors clearly define their capabilities and requirements so that the NDMO and
partners can work actively to accommodate these needs

•

OCHA and the regional cluster leads play their role in bringing agencies into the region, briefing
them (on the local situation, actors, constraints, counterparts, etc.) and facilitating their interaction
with local agencies.

Discussion

It was also raised that there is often confusion over the transition from response to early recovery. It
was suggested that this should be clarified when working out the new DRM arrangements, where the
NDC provides oversight to the disaster response “cluster” and also a early recover “cluster” (which
this workshop did not dwell on.
Problem

•

Information sharing among various actors

Suggestion

•

Clusters work to genuinely form themselves with pro-active lead agencies, include NGOs and
international actors, define and work towards common goals and minimum preparedness
measures, and prioritize the provincial preparedness planning process

Communication

Problems

•

Radio frequencies used by all with no system of coordination in place

•

Bad reception at different parts of the day

•

Accessing frequencies of existing networks

Suggestions

•

SOPs for the use of HF radio are developed

•

A dedicated emergency frequency for NDMO and PDO is sought (NDMO)

•

Radio operators are to be trained for emergencies and deployed in the case of an event (NEOC)

•

Analyse technical problems and explore multiple channels at different parts of the day to
overcome reception difficulties (Logistics cluster & Spectrum)

•

Map the different frequencies and user networks in country (NDMO and Spectrum)

•

Raise awareness of the needs of emergency operators during an emergency amongst the
broader community.

Other

Problem

•

Human

resource

gap

Suggestion

•

Training and recruitment

•

Capacity building of ministries and provinces in disaster preparedness

•

Training on how to use basic emergency assets (life jackets etc)

Problem

•

Lack of participation from certain ministries

Recommendation

•

The NDMO visits each ministry to have face to face dialogue regarding disaster response
responsibilities

Discussion: It was mentioned that the lack of participation may be because the ministries do not have
enough people, or they do not have the required interest. The Public Service Commission will follow
up on this.

Information management conclusions, recommendations and steps forward

Craig Williams also facilitated a discussion of conclusions relating to information management with
recommendations for future action.

Observations on information

•

Slow flow of information can hamper decision making

•

One-way

information

flow

•

Lack of information sharing across clusters

•

Information not fully exploited for decision making

•

Lack of available baseline information

•

IM capacity within NEOC, PEOC, Clusters

Specifically on assessments

•

Assessment

fatigue

•

Gender balance in assessment team

•

Strong capacity to mobilize multi-agency teams and deploy them to affected areas

•

Quantity of information collected by assessment can be overwhelming

•

Weak process in place for data entry, cleaning, management, analysis, publication

Recommendations on information

•

Establish phased assessment process, whereby each phase produces all and only the
information needed

•

Assessment phases to reflect information needs of NEOC, clusters, agencies, donors,etc.

•

Information to be rapidly processed, analysed and available to decision-makers

Suggestions for Phase 1

•

Information needs of first 1-3 days

•

Draws on baseline data, overflight, imagery, radio reports, media, quick visits

•

NSO & MLHS second staff to NEOC & PEOCs

•

Baseline

data:

NEOC to lead stocktaking of information

NEOC to lead inter-cluster identification of baseline information needs in emergency

Baseline data to be compiled as a consolidated dataset available to all emergency actors

•

Overflight

IFRC to be consulted for aerial observation techniques

•

Imagery

MLHS to act as national focal point for imagery

MLHS to be trained on Charter / UNOSAT

OCHA to support imagery needs

•

Radio

Reports

Systematic and proactive use to be made of radio network to establish extent of disaster

impact

Current constraints on use of radio network to be addressed

•

Quick

visits

Assessments and reporting done by police to be reviewed and made compatible with rest

of phase 1 assessment

Suggestions for Phase 2

•

Information needs of first month

•

Launch by day 4, complete by day 10-14

•

Multi-sector

rapid

assessment

•

Visit all affected communities is possible

•

Combine community-level survey with sample of households

•

Ensure rapid processing and release of results to clusters / actors

•

Ensure results inform decision-making

•

NEOC to manage consolidation of information

•

NEOC to ensure two-way information flow

•

NEOC to manage ‘Who does What Where’

•

IASC IM Guidance to be reviewed for potential inclusion in cluster system

International Funding

•

CERF to be considered as a source of initial funding

•

Members of UNCT to be trained on CERF

•

OCHA to provide support on future CERF requests

•

Standby CERF request template to be drafted to ensure speedy completion in a disaster

Discussion

It was mentioned that there are numerous agencies gathering information but the process of
ascertaining collectively exactly what is needed and how these needs will be obtained has not yet
been undertaken.

It was also suggested that a monitoring and evaluation person could be useful in the NDMO.

The MoH has great concerns over nutritional issues because they have no information relating to this
variable. Household food security appears to be a big gap that might be worth exploring. UNICEF
was recommended as the regional cluster lead for this type of issue. Including a measure of food
security in the baseline dataset to enable identification of highly vulnerable communities when
disaster strikes was recommended.

The NDMO is responsible for ensuring that the NEOC is in a state of readiness when a disaster
strikes.  The majority of the NEOC positions will be part time by seconding people from other positions
during an emergency.  It was suggested that information management professionals should be
deployed to the NEOC to assist in the management of information.  Having a template which allowed
information to flow to NEOC in a standard form was also suggested. When a disaster is confined to a
few provinces rather than the whole country, PDO staff from non-effected provinces will be brought to
the affected provinces as surge capacity to assist.

There is a legal tool that the Ministry of Home Affairs can use to get people to come in and contribute
to a disaster response even if they are on leave or otherwise occupied.

UNFPA will consider supporting the ministry of lands in the baseline data stocktake.

It appears that sharing information management activities across clusters will remove the likelihood
that the NEOC will become an information management bottleneck during emergencies. Training for
people managing information was requested. It was suggested that if the key information
management people in the clusters were identified then training could be organised.

It was asked whether the current disaster response arrangements were a “one size fits all”
arrangement or whether they could be scaled down to meet smaller disasters.  It was contended by
other members of the workshop that the procedures would remain the same regardless of the size of
the disaster. The key thing is to build adequate disaster response capacity within the Humanitarian
community.  However, some aspects of the disaster response framework may not need to be
activated (such as a request for international assistance) in the case of a small event.

Other conclusions, recommendations and steps forward

In addition to the recommendations of the facilitators, a number of additional conclusions and
recommendations were also generated through the discussion of participants throughout the
workshop. Participants recommended that:

•

Where possible data is disaggregated at the provincial or ward level and that advantage is
taken of the partnership between the UNFPA and the MoH to develop health related baseline
data disaggregated to the household level.

•

Each province is to map the locations of HF radio sets in their province. Spectrum and
private handset retailers are potential partners in this task.

•

Regularly test equipment such as radios or phones which may be relied upon during a
response to ensure that it is functional

•

The police are the front line for initial village visits. Ensure that they participate in the
assessment harmonisation process and use the harmonised assessment format in future
disasters.

•

The NDMO and other disaster managers should evaluate the manner in which the data is
extracted from the assessment forms and consequently managed and investigate producing a
standardised assessment output form which provides consistent information for all agencies
to use

•

Include NGOs and international actors early in the assessment process to avoid duplication

7 Closing

remarks

Peter closed the content of the workshop by thanking the NDMO for its support in organising the
workshop, UNICEF for its funding and all the participants for their efforts.

Loti reiterated these sentiments and related the findings of Matt Gibbs recent assessment of disaster
preparedness in the Pacific which found that no ministry in Solomon Islands had a Disaster
Contingency Plan whilst all ministries in Samoa had one. He urged everyone to go back to their
ministries and start mobilising the planning process. He hopes to see the resulting plans on his desk
in the next few weeks!!!

Appendix 1

Mapping of disaster response actions, actors, and gaps. Agencies listed in normal font have listed
themselves. Agencies listed in italics have been suggested by others.

Public Services & Welfare

Health
Response Actors
Emergency Medical Service

GAP

Health Promotion

Ministry of Health, Red Cross, Oxfam, World
Vision

Nutrition

World Vision, UNICEF, Ministry of Health and
Medical Services

Psychological/Support

Save the Children, MHMS, Ministry of Women,
Youth and Children’s Affairs

Surveillance

Ministry of Health, MHMS, WHO,

Reproductive Health

UNFPA,

EPI UNICEF
Infectious Disease

World Vision,

Rehabilitation of Health Facilities

MHMS

Vector Control

MHMS

Materials MHMS
Staff MHMS
Vaccines MHMS

Wash
Response Actors
Water Supply – Town

World Vision, MHMS

Water Supply – Rural

World Vision, UNICEF, MHMS, Red Cross

Water Supply – Displaced

World Vision, UNICEF, MHMS, Oxfam

Sanitation

World Vision, UNICEF

Hygiene

World Vision, UNICEF, Red Cross, Oxfam,

Water Quality

Oxfam, Save the Children, MHMS

Water Facilities (technical engineering)

GAP

Protection
Response Actors
Separated children

Save the Children, Red Cross, MHMS

Disability Red

Cross,

MHMS

Elderly

GAP

Sick/Vulnerable

GAP

Women and Children

UNICEF, UNFPA, Save the Children

Psychosocial

Safety and Security
Response Actors
Violence Police
Civil Unrest

Police, Red Cross

Evacuation

Police, MHMS (Medical Evacuation), Churches,

Rescue

Police, Marine Search and Rescue

Property Police

Education
Response Actors
School

Ministry of Education, Churches, UNICEF,
MWYCA,

Safety

World Vision, Save the Children,

Rehabilitation of Schools

UNICEF,

Infrastructure

Shelter and Camp Management
Response Actors
Temporary Shelter

IFRC, Habitat for Humanity, World Vision, Red
Cross, Oxfam

Shelter Recovery Plan

UNDP

Camp Management

GAP

IDPs

Ministry of Home Affairs (GAP?)

Non-Food Items
Cooking utensils

Churches, Red Cross, World Vision

Tools

Churches, Rotary Club, World Vision

Food
Food

Ministry of Home Affairs, NDMO, Churches,
MHMS

Children’s food

Save the Children, NDMO, UNICEF

Pregnant/lactating mothers

UNICEF

Infrastructure
Response Actors
Repairs of infrastructure

MHMS

Rehabilitation of Infrastructure

MHMS

Telecommunications
Response Actors
Telecom Solomon

Telecom

Internet

GAP

HF Police,

Spectrum

Sat Phone

UNDP

Note: Although not identified during the exercise, subsequent discussions highlighted issues with the
effectiveness of HF radio communication.

Transport/Logistics
Response Actors
Sea Assets

Police, NDMO, Private Sector

Road Assets

Police, MHMS, NDMO, Private Sector

Air Assets

NDMO, Private Sector

Livelihood

Agriculture
Response Actors
Food for animals

Ministry for Agriculture and Livelihoods

Recovery planning

UNDP

Seeds

Ministry for Agriculture and Livelihoods, Kastom
Gaden,

Planting Materials

Ministry for Agriculture and Livelihoods

Pests and Diseases

GAP

Fisheries
Response Actors
Rehabilitation of fishing grounds/methods

Worldfish Centre

Marine Protected Area

Ministry of Fisheries

Cross Cutting

Information
Response Actors
To Communities

NDMO,

Among Actors

Oxfam, AusAID, NZAID, UNICEF, UNDP,
Ministry of Home Affairs, UNFPA, OCHA

Official Information

NDMO, Ministry of Home Affairs,

Who is Doing What Where (3W)

National Statistics Office, NDMO/NEOC, OCHA

Baseline Data

National Statistics Office

Mapping

Ministry of Lands,

Reporting UNICEF,

NDMO,

OCHA

Media Liaison/Advocacy

Oxfam, Ministry of Health, Save the Children,
UNICEF, NDMO, OCHA

Other PDC

Gender
Response Actor
Antenatal Care

Ministry of Health

Women are protected from violence/rape etc.

UNFPA

Assessment
Response Actors
Initial Rapid Assessment

Ministry of Home Affairs, Oxfam, MHMS, UNDP,
NSO, MLHS, NDMO, Police, Red Cross, UNFPA,
OCHA, UNICEF

Sectoral Assessment

Ministry of Home Affairs, MHMS, UNDP, NSO,
MLHS, NDMO, Save the Children, Red Cross,
UNFPA, OCHA, UNICEF

Quick Overview

Ministry of Home Affairs, UNOSAT, Spider,
NDMO, OCHA, Red Cross

Appendix 2

All Day Simulation Activity

This exercise was designed to simulate a major disaster that overwhelms the government’s capacity
and necessitates international assistance. The aim was to stimulate thinking and awareness
regarding aspects of national/international disaster response and national/international coordination.

Doing so helped to identify areas requiring enhancement or better coordination, increase
preparedness and capacity, develop and encourage teamwork, develop problem solving capacity, and
highlight the importance of:

•

Data

preparedness

•

Multi

sectoral

assessments;

•

Coordination;

•

Information

management;

•

Reporting;

•

Logistics

•

Resource

Management

•

Planning according to needs

•

Interpersonal communication skills;

•

Working in a multicultural, high pressure environment.

•

Awareness of security/safety requirements;

The simulation activity was conducted in four phases.

Phase 1: At 06:30 11/03/09

USGS alerted that a magnitude 7.9 earthquake had struck Makira Province, Solomon Islands at
05h30 on 12 February 2009.  The epicentre was 20km South West of San Cristobal Islands.
Unconfirmed reports indicated large scale damage in those areas, the extent of which is unknown.

A Tsunami was caused by this earthquake and hit the coast line of San Cristobal and Rennell Island.
However, the exact areas affected and the extent of the damage is unknown.

Actions: Provincial level

The provincial staff felt the earthquake which was so strong that some staff fell off their beds!
Consequently, they knew that a Tsunami would be generated. The chairman was informed and the
Provincial Disaster Council (PDC) held an urgent meeting.  They agreed to activate the provincial
disaster centre.

The PDC agreed to organise a fly over of the affected area. They tried to get in touch with the
National Disaster Council but did not receive much information and are waiting on funding for their fly
over.

They called the statistics office and learnt that the population in the area was around 15,000 people.

They used the medical/police radio systems to contact the affected area and managed to speak to
Teteri village.  They were told that there were 300 people in the village, 2 deaths, that gardens had
been destroyed, there were an unknown number of injuries.  They found that getting this information
was challenging because other people kept cutting in on the HF radio.

An assessment team was put on standby to be deployed but as yet has not received funding.  A
request was sent to the national disaster council to ask for funds to activate this team. A request for
an initial situation overview/aerial overview was also issued to the NDMO

The provincial MoH also got on the radio to speak to affected villages and put in a request to national
MoH to be on standby for emergency assistance.

Actions: Government level

The Director of the NDMO was sleeping and got an SMS to alert that there was a disaster occurring.

The director immediately made phone contact with the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) manager
and the chairman of the PDC. A request was made for the PDC to convene and to activate the
(PEOC).  .  The director then went to the NDMO office to set up a staff meeting, set up the NEOC,
and then called an immediate national disaster council (NDC) meeting. The NEOC went to the
National Statistics office to seek baseline data.

There was police officer stationed at the NEOC. The police requested a report from their provincial
counterparts and made contact with them using their radio network.  The report was expected to be
received within 10 hours.  There is an MOU between RAMSI and the Police to share assets which
was activated. The National MoH went to the province.

Actions: International Group

The international group contacted their in-country staff to check their security and to try and get some
information.  They were looking for local knowledge around the geography, population and cultural
situation to get an idea of the potential impact. They also checked internet sites seeking information
relating to weather or geography which may give an indication of the likely extent of the damage.

They expected their field offices to contact the National Government Departments and seek
information.

An emergency meeting was convened among Suva based agencies and a teleconference was held
with Honiara.

They made tentative flight bookings and started to get an idea of the capacity in country such as staff,
stocks etc.

UNICEF Regional spoke with UNICEF Honiara who informed regional that they had some data but
that they were trying to get it verified from the MoH.

Actions: Non Governmental Group in Honiara

The NGO and donor group in Honiara reported to their respective head offices and gave notice that
there is a problem.  They contacted the NDMO to collect information and were informed that a
stakeholders meeting would take place in half an hour’s time, which they attended.  They also
contacted the PDC to try and gather information.  Once the information had been gathered the
relayed that information to headquarters in the form of a sitrep.

They itemised and collated available information on the affected areas and combined this with
available baseline data to try and get an understanding of the possible extent of the problem. They
also tried looking into secondary data such as schools and their location to plan for possible
responses such as opening evacuation centres.

Phase 2: At 20:00 11/03/09

New information is available.  There have been 3 large aftershocks since the initial EQ:

1.  6.2 @ 09h30
2.  5.4 @ 11h55
3.  5.8 @ 14h48

The main areas affected appear to be villages on Southern Coast line of San Cristobal Islands from
Anuta to Marau, the northern coast of Rennell Islands, and also the Northern part of San Cristobal
appears to be affected by earthquake.

There continue to be reports of aftershocks although their intensity seems to becoming less. The
number of causalities and displaced rapidly increasing

•

Loss of Life

•

Injured

•

Missing

•

Population displaced

around 3,500

Actions: Provincial

The provincial disaster council have activated the cluster system and set up a provincial operational
structure. The police have deployed and are on the ground with the health team conducting
assessments.

The provincial disaster coordinator has gathered data on the total population for the area and, through
information gathered from the statistics office, they have established that the worst affected area is
Haonunu in Makera. At this stage believe that 2,109 people have been affected.

They have followed up on their request to NEOC for funding for logistics and have received $50,000.
NEOC have approved the overflight and they have 6 people who are scheduled to be on the flyover.
However, the PDC has still not been told when the flight will happen.

The PDC has discovered that the health centre they were hoping to use as an evacuation centre has
also been damaged so they are taking people to Kirakira hospital. There is a helicopter airlifting
seriously injured people out to this hospital.

The provincial MoH has talked to the national MoH and asked for additional staff, supplies and drugs,
and have set up a trauma centre.

In the next day a number of further clinics will be set up so a request for trauma surgeons and nurses
to be brought in from other provinces has been sent to the National MoH.  There will also be a team
mobilised to assess water and sanitation.

The provincial and national MoHs have agreed to be in 24 hour radio contact.

Actions: National Government

The NEOC is getting information from the PEOC and the NDC has activated the clusters.

The cluster chairs have been to the NDMO and received a briefing.  The cluster chairs have been
advised to go back and work within their clusters to prepare plans and actions and to advise the
NEOC the next day.

Since the disaster has struck the police have sent a rapid assessment team on request of the PDC.
The police also intend to do a flyover to give an initial overview and will set up a forward command
base.
The police have secured four satellite phones for use for communications.  They are waiting for the
NDMO to declare a disaster so that they can fuel their boats to use for assessments.  A state of
disaster has not yet been declared. However, RAMSI assets can be made available without this
declaration.
Medivac and missing persons are being handled as per usual.

The MoH has met with donors to request support in obtaining key health related items.

Actions: NGOs in Honiara

The NGOs in Honiara are using the information they have gathered to put in a situation report for
circulation to head quarters. They are in the process of contacting relevant ministries to find out their
immediate needs. Some key ministries have been identified and approached first. Health &
WATSAN identified a need for clean water for care centres. Education indicated that 20 schools have
been destroyed (MoE later came back to clarify that they assumed that was the number of schools
affected based on baseline data - they did not have not hard data).  The ministry will also come back

on the number of students displaced.  The NGOs are starting to lay plans to respond to these needs
with initiatives such as play safe areas.

The NGOs are also regularly checking to see if a declaration of disaster has been made and have
requested immediate cash and supplies from headquarters as well as support for technical needs.

They have put together a list of what needs can be met with existing stock in their warehouse. They
have assumed that the assessment has been done and are acting on that assumed information.

They have contacted the ministries and will attend cluster meetings with MoH at 7.00 am and the MoE
at 9.00 am.  They will feed back to HQ after the meetings.

Actions: International Group

The international group in Suva think that a search and rescue team may be necessary and have
contacted UNDAC and FRANZ.  They have done some preliminary calculations on the likely impact of
the disaster and think that in the worst case scenario 1,100 families or about 6,500 people will be
affected.

They have started checking stocks which are available for mobilisation through agencies such as:
OCHA, UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, and UNDP.

Areas they were seeking to be able to respond in were: food supply, health kits, water purification and
shelter equipment for displaced people. Flights have been booked for people to go to Honiara.

Phase 3: At 10:30 15/03/09

Sketchy information on the current situation is emerging. Information on certain sectors is not
disaggregated or available

It is known that there is a lack of access to clean water and sanitary facilities.  Food is lacking at the
Evacuation Centers which have been set up.  The centers are centers overcrowded and cannot
accommodate everybody. There has been anecdotal evidence of a “violent incident”.  Relief items
continue to arrive but there is tension due to how food and NFIs are being distributed among the
affected population.

It is difficult to acquire information due to telecommunication problems and difficult to access the
affected areas.  The runway at the airport is still active and the Government of Solomon officially
requests international assistance.

The first international assistance begins to be mobilized and arrives from outside of the Solomon
Islands.  Access to certain affected areas is extremely difficult due to damage to infrastructure and
isolated locations.  This poses huge constraints on assessment and delivery of relief services.

•

Loss of Life

243

•

Injured

324

•

Missing

123

•

Population displaced

8,650 (some are accommodated in facilities such as churches and

schools while the others are not accommodated at proper facilities)

All actors

Clusters were fully formed with actors from the provincial, National, International, and Local NGO
spheres.

A rapid assessment team was dispatched and the information from these assessments was
consolidated with other information at NEOC and a sitrep was produced.  However, there were still a
very large number of information gaps relating to key humanitarian needs such as the status of water
and sanitation, health clinics, etc. The challenges of conducting assessments were demonstrated by
the information that came out of some of the assessments which often needed to be clarified or was
not comprehensive.  Gender balance in the team also arose as an issue as the affected population
did not feel comfortable discussing gender sensitive issues with the male assessor.

The disaster situation had by now become very complex.  The main issues related to the flow of
information. It appeared that information from assessments was not flowing through to the whole
humanitarian community. Some sectors of the community were getting information whilst others were
not.  There also appeared to be a situation where provincial actors were contacting the NEOC for
information which had originated at the provincial level.

A database of who does what where was set up.

Despite the complexity some clusters, such as the logistics cluster, were operating quite effectively
and were making very detailed plans on how to move forward. The logistics cluster was liaising with
provincial authorities via satellite phone to have supplies which had been provided by Australia and
New Zealand brought into the province. UNDAC was supporting in the coordination of these
deliveries.  Trucks and casual labourers had been sourced from the private sector.

Phase 4: CERF Appeal

There was initial scepticism regarding the concept of a consolidated appeal given the varying
mandates of the different humanitarian actors working in the Solomon Islands. However, given that
this scenario was purely an exercise, and in recognition of the fact that a united appeal which
presented and met the needs of the entire humanitarian situation, avoiding the oversight of some
gaps, was desirable, the exercise was pursued.

The clusters broke off to identify the costs of the various humanitarian needs identified on Day 1.
These amounts were then consolidated under the guidance of the EOC who were supported by
OCHA.

The main challenges faced centred on:

•

The differentiation between life saving response activities and early recovery/rehabilitation
activities.

•

How to deal with costings for sectors which do not have a provider to implement the response
program. It was recommended that this situation be brought to the attention of the donor so they
could work together with NEOC to find a solution to this problem.

•

How to present costs which may be very high due to the unique context of the Pacific e.g. very
large distances that need to be covered to reach remote areas can inflate logistical costs.
Coordination becomes all the more important in these situations in order to maximise efficiency.

•

Trying to get a comprehensive analysis of humanitarian needs with limited information.

•

A potential problem was identified where the international appeal will have to follow a standard
format using the agreed international clusters, while in the Solomon Islands clusters have a
different focus or grouping. It was flagged that OCHA and NEOC would have to be aware of this
in the facilitation of the appeal.

Key benefits of the consolidated appeal system were considered to be:

•

Donors can consider one fully researched and costed document rather than a disparate range of
appeals across varying periods of time.

•

By working together humanitarian actors can produce a comprehensive and consolidated appeal
document which covers all gaps and eliminates duplication and mobilises resources very fast.