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Citation:

Lal, P.N., Rita, R. and Khatri, N. (2009). Economic Costs of the 2009 Floods in the Fiji

Sugar Belt and Policy Implications. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN. xi + 52.

ISBN:

978-2-8317-1175-1

Available from:

IUCN Regional Office for Oceania

Private Mail Bag

5 Ma’afu Street, Suva

Republic of Fiji Islands

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+679 3100-126

+679 3100-127

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www.iucn.org/oceania

A catalogue of IUCN publications is also available.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary __________________________________________________________________v
Preface ___________________________________________________________________________1

Acknowledgements

__________________________________________________________________2

Acronyms __________________________________________________________________________3
1.

The Fiji Sugar Industry Context ___________________________________________________4

1.1.

Harvest, Transport and Infrastructure ________________________________________5

Objectives ___________________________________________________________________5

The 2009 Fiji Floods and Effects __________________________________________________6

3.1 Growers __________________________________________________________________7

3.2. The Miller ________________________________________________________________8

3.3. Infrastructure _____________________________________________________________8

3.4. Humanitarian Assistance ____________________________________________________8

Economic Costs of Floods - Methodology _____________________________________________9

4.1. With-Without Analysis _______________________________________________________9

4.2. Cost Estimation Method ____________________________________________________11

4.3. Sources of Information _____________________________________________________11

Economic and Social Costs of the 2009 Floods – The Results _______________________15

5.1. Areas of Sugar Belt Affected ________________________________________________15

5.2. Economic Costs __________________________________________________________16

5.3. Humanitarian Responses ___________________________________________________22

Discussion _________________________________________________________________23

6.1. Increased Exposure to Floods _______________________________________________23

6.2. Sensitivity of Sugar Cane and Non-Cane Crops to floods __________________________23

6.3. Vulnerability & House and Household Losses ___________________________________24

6.4. Floods and Infrastructure ___________________________________________________24

6.5. Poverty Effects of the Floods ________________________________________________25

6.6. Increased Vulnerability _____________________________________________________27

6.7. Other Issues: Data Availability _______________________________________________28

Policy Recommendations ______________________________________________________30

Concluding Remarks __________________________________________________________33

References ________________________________________________________________34

ANNEX  1:  Survey  Team  _____________________________________________________________36
ANNEX 2:  Additional Relevant Key DRR&DM Policy Recommendations ________________________37
ANNEX 3:  Sample Questionnaire ______________________________________________________40

Photo Credits ______________________________________________________________________53

TABLES

Table 1: Direct and Indirect Effects of Floods on the Sugarcane Farming Households _______________8
Table 2: Economic Costs of Floods: With and Without Cost Estimation Methodology _______________10
Table 3: Cost Valuation Methods Used in this Study ________________________________________11
Table 4: Distribution of 2009 Flood-affected Farms & Proportion of Farms selected for Survey _______12
Table 5: Key Categories of Information Elicited From the 2009 Flood Affected Farms ______________12
Table 6: Key Local and International Communities that Provided Humanitarian Assistance __________13
Table 7: Key Data Sources ____________________________________________________________14
Table 8: Distribution of Sugar Cane Farmers by Cane Lost Category ___________________________17
Table 9: Total Loss to Growers and the Miller Due to Loss in Cane Output _______________________18
Table 10: Growers’ Farm and Off-Farm Losses ____________________________________________19
Table 11: Non-Cane & Other Farm-Related Costs __________________________________________19
Table 12: Direct and Indirect Economic Losses to Grower HH Income, Excluding Farm Costs ________20
Table 13: Miller Costs ________________________________________________________________20
Table 14. Infrastructure Statistics ______________________________________________________21
Table 15: Infrastructure Costs ($) _______________________________________________________21
Table 16: Humanitarian Response ______________________________________________________22
Table 17: Percentage of Surveyed Farms That Fell Below the FPL and BNPL ____________________26
Table 18: Net Revenue of Surveyed Farms (With and Without Flooding) ________________________26
Table 19: Percent of 2009 Flood-Affected Sugarcane Families Expected to Fall Below FPL & BNPL ___27

BOXES

Box 1: Effect of Floods ________________________________________________________________6
Box 2: Farm Survey _________________________________________________________________11

FIGURES

Figure 1: Total Economic Cost of 2009 Floods on the Sugar Belt, Excluding Humanitarian Assistance _16
Figure 2: Breakdown of Growers’ Costs __________________________________________________17
Figure 3: Number of Different Disaster Events in Fiji, 1970-2007 ______________________________25

MAPS

Map 1: Sector Affected by the Floods – by Percentage ______________________________________15
Map 2: Loss in Cane Income by Sector __________________________________________________18

Executive Summary

The January 2009 floods in Fiji were reported as the worst in the history of the country since the 1931 floods.

Many parts of the country were affected by a number of consecutive flood events that spread over several

days. The floods affected areas from Western Viti Levu where the impact was greatest, to the Northern and

Central Divisions of Fiji. With excessive rainfall experienced for over a week most of the low lying areas in

the country were under water for days and in places experienced flood levels of up to 3-5 metres.

This study was financed by the European Commission under its National Adaptation Strategy Technical

Assistance to Fiji, Accompanying Measures Support Program (AMSP) 2006. The project was jointly

implemented by the Regional Oceania Office of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature

(IUCN) in Fiji, and the Fiji Land Information System of the Department of Lands, Government of Fiji.

Activities were implemented in collaboration with Fiji Sugar Commission’s constituencies, the Fiji Sugar

Corporation (FSC), Sugar Research Institute of Fiji (SRIF) and Fiji Sugar Cane Growers Council (SCGC).

The key objectives of this study are to:

Assess the economic costs of the recent floods on the sugarcane farmers – sugar cane production and

•

household livelihood and cane access roads and farm drainage infrastructure; and

Identify policy options for minimising flood related disaster risk in the sugar belt of Fiji.

•

Methodology

The United Nation’s Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) disaster

assessment methodology (ECLAC 2003), combined with a ‘with and without’ cost analysis, was used to

assess the economic costs of the 2009 floods. Multiple sources of data was used, including a survey of a

stratified sample of flood-affected farms selected using SUGAR-GIS.

Results

Flooding, or waterlogging of low lying areas and overflowing of rivers and creeks is generally associated

with excessive rainfall beyond the regulatory capacity of landscape ecosystems. Flooding may also be

associated with intrusion of sea water through storm surges and water inundation due to high tides, or

breaks in coastal physical infrastructures, such as bund walls. Causes of flooding are wide and varied,

including human induced changes in the catchment that increases rainfall-runoff as well as climate change

and climate variability. Direct and indirect effects of floods in Fiji may be localized to low-lying areas or may

be felt throughout the economy.

The total economic cost of the January floods in the sugar belt through damage to infrastructure and losses

to growers and millers is estimated to be about $24 million. Additionally humanitarian costs of about $5

million were incurred. This assessment is based on a detailed ‘with and without’ floods impact assessment,

including a field-survey based analysis, revealing key effects of the 2009 floods to include:

Sugar cane and non-cane farms - loss in production

•

, additional ‘flood-related on-farm’ costs;

Sugarcane farm households – costs of house and/or possessions repair/replacement, health costs,

•

lost wage and cleanup costs;

Infrastructure – additional maintenance and repair costs of cane access roads, tramlines, drainage

•

scheme drains & canals, infield drains);

Mill repairs and loss in corresponding earnings due to decline in cane output; and

•

Disaster humanitarian assistance.

•

It is noted that in some cases, particularly

bila land, flooding actually may have an enriching effect on crop yields. These

though are difficult to judge, as it depends on what type of soil came down with the floods. If it is top soil, then this may increase yield,

but if it is sand that is brought down by flood waters, then cost of production may actually increase.

Growers’ Farms and Household Costs

Growers’ direct and indirect costs are estimated to be $13.4 million, or over half (56%) of the total flood-

related costs. Grower costs include losses in cane output, non-cane and other farm losses, and direct

and indirect household

The impact of flood on the sugar belt though was not homogeneous. In total only 15 percent of 14,503

active sugarcane growers recorded at the end of 2008 cane season were affected by the floods, across

34 out of 39 sugar sectors. Four sectors, Lautoka, Koronubu, Saweni and Qeleloa, had over 35 percent of

the farms affected by the floods. More than half the sectors had less than 10 % of the farms waterlogged/

‘flooded’, with majority of the sectors having only small proportions of affected farms.

The industry is expected to see a loss in cane output by about 131,409 tonnes, valued at about $8.0 million,

estimated using post devaluation cane price of $61.17/tonne. The largest loss in cane output is expected

in Rarawai and Lautoka mill areas, accounting for 86 % of the losses, or $6.9 million. This is not surprising

since Rarawai and Lautoka mill areas had the largest number of flood-affected farms and sectors.

House and Household Losses

Of the total grower cost of $13.4 million, direct and indirect losses to house and household due to loss

in possessions, household repairs, human health costs, and cleanup costs was about $2.5 million. Loss

to homes and household possessions were also relatively low (compared to the urban dwellers), largely

because only a small proportion of homes are located in flood-prone areas. Majority of farmers have their

home sites on relatively higher grounds even if their farms are not. Other effects, such as loss in off-farm

income and health costs were also small.

Miller Costs

Costs to the miller accounted for 31% of the total losses in the sugar belt, or approximately $7.5 million.

This included corresponding loss in FSC’s revenue due to the loss in cane output, tramline damage costs,

and the damage to the mills. The miller’s share of the loss in cane output is about $3.4 million, together with

the cost of extra maintenance of the tramlines (‘with and without’ flood costs), estimated to be about $1.57

million. Only Rarawai mill was directly affected by the floods, with an estimated cost of $2.43 million.

Infrastructure Costs

All aspects of the sugar industry infrastructure, cane access roads and tramlines, were badly affected by the

floods. The floods also damaged many drainage schemes in the mangrove reclaimed areas due to breaks

in the seawalls, scouring of drains, washing away of culvert crossings, flood gates, and flap gates. The

total costs of additional maintenance work required on the cane access roads and tramlines and associated

bridges are estimated to be $2.4 million, as compared with the earlier FSC estimate of $4 million. There are

also additional infrastructure costs associated with damage to the drainage schemes in lying coastal areas

valued at $2.4 million. Thus the total infrastructure cost was estimated to be about $ 4.8 million.

Humanitarian Costs

The cost of humanitarian assistance in the west and the north, including the cane belt areas, is estimated

to be $4.7 million. This assistance was provided by many different domestic and international organizations

in various forms, including disaster emergency boxes, food aid, school lunches, bus fares and medical kits.

There was also $3.57 million in-kind assistance provided by the development partners directly to other

humanitarian groups such as Red Cross and the United Nations Chidren’s Fund (UNICEF). In addition

there was $2.01 million collected under the Prime Minister’s Disaster Relief Fund. There were also many

commercial houses that either provided in cash or in-kind assistance directly or indirectly through other

relief organizations, which are not captured in the above estimates.

Discussion

The 2009 floods caused widespread damage, affecting lives and livelihoods of many people in the sugar

industry, as well as elsewhere in the country. The impacts of floods depend not only on the intensity of

precipitation, the rainfall-runoff patterns and the resulting floods, but also on the ability of the excessive

water, to be flushed out of the system and the speed with which the flood waters can recede. Sugarcane,

being a hardy crop did not sustain much damage during the 2009 floods perhaps because the flooding

Value of washed away land is not included.

occurred at the end of summer, flood water did not remain stagnant for long, and the peak flood level was

relatively low compared to the height of the cane. Other non-cane crops in the low lying areas, which are

more sensitive to floods, though were totally lost; farms that had non-cane crops on higher grounds did not

report any losses to their non-cane crops. Loss to homes and household possessions were also relatively

low (compared to the urban dweller) because farmers usually have low household incomes, and thus fewer

valuables. Perhaps more importantly only a small proportion of homes are located in flood-prone areas,

and were thus affected. Majority of farmers have their home sites on relatively higher grounds even if their

farms are not.

Loss of income to the miller came largely from the flood waters in the Rarawai mill, as well as the loss in

their share of loss in cane output plus direct damage to the tramline infrastructure, which is the miller’s

responsibility. For other infrastructure, the costs will be borne by the growers, the government, and the

miller.

Some of the damages could have been avoided had the infrastructure been maintained and more targeted

disaster response and rehabilitation management had been adopted. The generally poor state of all

infrastructure, main and infield drains, tramline drain and drainage schemes, as well as cane access roads

and tramlines, contributed to effects of the flood.

Disasters, including floods, are known to have negative effects on national economic conditions, particularly

in those countries heavily reliant on the primary sector. However, the difference is that while Fiji has had

similar, if not higher, disaster related economic costs on the sugarcane farming sector in the past, the

January 2009 floods could not have come at a worse time than when it did for the industry and the sugar

belt.

The industry has been struggling to reform its operations, despite several attempts in the last decade. All

sectors of the industry, farm production, harvest and transport, and the milling and processing sectors have

been declining since at least the 1987 political coups (see (Lal 2008)). The floods will have direct impact

on the cash flow in the industry, as well as affect basic livelihoods and household welfares of those farms

worst affected.

The flood outcomes will be further aggravated by the contraction in the national economy by almost 4.7 % in

2008, and the potential loss of majority of the Euro 124 million (or approximately FJD 300 million) allocated

to Fiji under the National Adaptation Strategy

. Secondly, in October 2009, Fiji will be losing its last set of

price ‘subsidies’ from the European Union (EU), and thus its cash flow is expected to decrease considerably,

even if the dollar has been devalued. Such economic woes will have flow-on effects throughout the country

and many of the regional towns in the Western and Northern Divisions where cane is the lifeline, may

become ghost towns.

It is worth noting that the economic cost estimates arrived in this study are lower than the $27 million figure

provided by the industry stakeholders. The FSC estimated an economic cost of $27 million to the sugar

industry including an estimated $10.9 million for the sugarcane crops (before devaluation, which changed

the mill gate price of cane). At the same time, the SRIF has given an estimate of $22.6 million required

to rehabilitate the affected crops/farms. These impacts on the sugar industry/belt did not include the cost

of the floods on the drainage infrastructure, including in the main drainage schemes servicing the sugar

farms, or the costs to the drainage schemes.

The lower cost estimates are noted despite the IUCN/Fiji Land Information System (FLIS) study using the

higher forecast price following devaluation and including many other costs in this study not considered

by the industry. Such additional costs considered in the study include costs of house and household

level damages, drainage schemes costs and humanitarian costs. It should also be noted that many of

the subcategories of costs estimated in this study are less than those earlier provided by the industry

stakeholders. This may be as a result of differences in the assessment methodology used, and perhaps

lack of capacity in the industry to undertake appropriate ‘with and without’ disaster impact assessment.

Poverty Effects of the Floods

Using the Food Poverty Line (FPL) and Basic Needs Poverty Line (BNPL) of Narsey (2008), adjusted to

2008 equivalent value using the Consumer Price Index (CPI), it is observed that due to the 2009 floods

about 42 percent of flood-affected farms are expected to struggle to provide even their family’s basic food

The funds are expected to be released when the Interim Government takes firm steps to return the country to a democratically

elected government

vii

needs. This is in comparison with 19 percent of farmers that are expected to fall below the FPL had the

floods not affected their crops, off-farm income, and other indirect costs. In terms of basic needs poverty

measure, 77% of the flood affected sugarcane families will fall below poverty line, as compared with 54%

the families, had they not suffered from flooding. Labasa and Ba mill areas families were worst affected.

Such projections are particularly of concern as the ‘with and without’ analysis in this project took into

account off-farm income earned by members of the sugarcane household poverty analysis, and excludes

all costs not associated with income generating activities. The analysis also did not include considerations

of any debt which the farmers have.

It is thus not surprising that many sugarcane farmers, and others in the flood affected areas, were forced

to make some difficult choices immediately following the floods. Many families had to choose whether,

for example, to send their kids to school or to meet their basic food requirements. Had it not been for the

humanitarian assistance provided by many national and international organizations, it is likely that many

children would have dropped out of schools this year.

Policy Recommendations

Flood related disaster risk reduction and disaster risk management strategies cannot be treated in isolation.

Flood related disaster management is part and parcel of the institutional improvements needed to tackle

all hazards. Disaster risk reduction and disaster management of all hazards must become everyone’s

business.

In this report only immediate policy issues related to disaster risk reduction and disaster management that

need to be tackled specifically in relation to the flooding in the sugar belt are highlighted

. Two categories

of recommendations are relevant in this context of flooding in the sugar belt area - those that need to be

addressed by the Government of Fiji within its disaster risk management context, and those that are of

direct relevance to the Fiji sugar industry.

National level

As noted earlier, the probability of flooding is increased with changes in landscape for agriculture and

urban development. Such developments affect the regulatory ecosystem services provided by natural

systems, including the level of rainfall-runoff, and the amount of water that is not flushed out of the natural

waterways.

Recommendation 1: Invest in improving the health of natural ecosystem for flood mitigation through

integrated river catchment management, including sustainable management of upstream forestry, good

farm husbandry, and management remnant natural freshwater wetlands.

Disaster risk reduction produces higher benefits, particularly for the poor, than disaster management. For

every dollar invested in disaster risk reduction, between two and four dollars are returned in terms of

avoided or reduced disaster impacts. Poor people are more sensitive to disasters because they often

live in hazard-prone areas, live in poor conditions, and have limited capacity to respond to, recover from

disasters. Disaster events also increase the poverty level, thus increasing the vulnerability of people who

live below or near the poverty line.

Recommendation 2: Adopt a pro-poor development strategy that targets poor communities living in areas

prone to natural hazards.

In the past, the Fiji Government, together with the sugar industry regularly invested in drainage and flood

protection infrastructure, but the level of investment has decreased in recent years, particularly following the

1987 political coup. Poor maintenance of the drainage infrastructure affects not only the sugar cane farmers

and the industry but also causes externality costs on the urban and peri-urban residents downstream.

A more comprehensive policy recommendation regarding disaster risk reduction and disaster rim management is included

in the Annex 2 of this report, adapted from Lal et al 2009.

viii

Recommendation 3: Investigate appropriate insurance and other financing schemes for risk reduction and

disaster management for the sugar belt.

The Government needs to seriously consider establishing a disaster risk financing scheme that takes the

responsibility of maintaining all drainage infrastructures in the sugar belt area. Poor maintenance of the

drainage infrastructure affects not only the sugar cane farmers and the industry but also causes externality

costs on the urban and peri-urban residents downstream.

Recommendation 4: Increase investment in the maintenance of physical infrastructures including drainage

canals, drains and infield farm drains to reduce probability of flooding.

Unplanned and ad hoc peri-urban development also increases rainfall-runoff, increasing the probability

of flooding beyond the natural systems regulatory capacity. Developments in hazard-prone areas also

increase sensitivity of humans to flooding. Such impacts can be avoided through appropriate regulation of

developments.

Recommendation 5: Integrate disaster risk reduction considerations in all development initiatives,

including:

Integrate (in other words, ‘mainstream’) disaster risk considerations in national development

•

planning and budgeting processes at national, provincial, district, and village/settlement levels and

in development design

Revise infrastructure development planning, maintenance, and funding to reflect requirements for

•

hazard and risk assessments

Revise development approval processes and guidelines to require hazard and risk assessments of

•

development initiatives, particularly in hazard-prone areas-

Develop and enforce proper land-use planning and development as a flood mitigation strategy

•

Recommendation 6: Integrate disaster risk reduction considerations in all infrastructure construction

and maintenance initiatives and resource allocations that reflect considerations of disaster risk reduction,

particularly in flood-prone areas.

Industry Level

Sugar industry covers a wide area and thus has a significant impact on the dynamics of rainfall-runoff in the

sugar belt and associated riverine systems.

Recommendation 7: Establish a Fiji sugar industry disaster response strategy in partnership with the

National Disaster Management Office and the Divisional Commissioners, including coordination for post

disaster rapid assessment, disaster relief efforts, and post disaster rehabilitation.

Recommendation 8: To minimize the risk of regular floods the industry, as a minimum, needs to “go back

to the future” and:

Ensure farmers adopt appropriate farm management practices that minimise- farm level soil erosion,

•

including the banning of agricultural development on slopes greater than 8

under the Soil Conservation

Act;

Re-establish maintenance of key infrastructure, main and arterial drains, and infield drains, as well as

•

tramline drains and cane access road drains if the risk of regular flooding is to be minimized;

Re-establish the old Colonial Sugar Refinery (CSR) drains, and reintroduce annual drainage gang

•

system for maintaining key drain infrastructure; and

Re-establish regular (annual) maintenance of drainage scheme infrastructure, including seawalls,

•

bridges, and culverts.

Information System

Good information is critical for disaster risk reduction and disaster management efforts. Fiji has limited quality

data on flood and climate related hazards, flood-prone areas and disaster impacts, including coverage

of disaster events and their effects on household welfare, sectoral activities, and national economy. For

the sugar belt, a SUGAR-GIS information system is already available, that integrates various layers of

information including, sugarcane farms, land owners and land tenure, mill catchment areas, rivers and

streams as well as cadastral maps. This can be extended to key infrastructure, such as cane access roads,

tramlines, and drainage schemes. Using flood inundation models for each river system, the database

can be extended to create flood hazard maps, as well as flood impact areas to support future decision-

making.

Recommendation 9: Enhance its SUGAR-GIS information system and develop a flood hazard layer of

information, together with a robust system for collecting and analysing disaster impact assessments to

support disaster risk reduction and disaster management. As a minimum:

Establish a robust sugar industry-based rapid assessment methodology that takes advantage of the

•

field knowledge of FSC field and extension workers, and cane growers councillors;

Develop a layer hazard related information system as part of the SUGAR-GIS information system,

•

including maps of hazard and disaster-prone areas, the geographic distribution and socioeconomic

characteristics of poor; and

Using the Sugar-GIS based information system and the results of objective rapid disaster impact

•

assessment, assist with targeted humanitarian assistance as well as post disaster rehabilitation in

partnership with the Divisional Disaster Management Committee (DISMAC) office, relevant government

ministries, humanitarian nongovernmental agencies, as well as development partners.

Recommendation 10: Improve the coverage and quality of data on floods and other climate related

hazards, including flood maps, and on the impacts of floods and other disasters on human livelihood and

wellbeing at household, sectoral, and national levels.

Develop time series information on determinants of natural disasters to support the forecasting of

•

disaster events

Compile time series information on household income and expenditure, the human poverty index

•

and human development index, and their key determinants to inform both development policies

Link the enhanced SUGAR-GIS with the national Geographic Information Systems (GIS) based

•

disaster information system, including maps of hazard and disaster-prone areas, the geographic

distribution and socioeconomic characteristics of poor, disaster records and disaster impact

assessments to help improve Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Disaster Management (DM)

Recommendation 11: Strengthen capacity in appropriate ‘with and without’ disaster impact

assessments.

Recommendation 12: Investigate appropriate insurance and other financing schemes for risk reduction

and disaster management for the sugar belt.

There are no financial mechanisms, including insurance schemes, available particularly to the farmers. Even

where available, such as to the miller, they had recently opted not to insure their assets. The government

needs to seriously consider establishing a disaster risk financing scheme for disaster risk reduction and

disaster management. Recently, the World Bank had helped the Caribbean island countries to establish

a Catastrophic Insurance Scheme. The experiences of the Caribbean island countries with the insurance

scheme may have some relevance to Fiji (and other Pacific Island Countries (PICs).

Concluding Remarks

The severe rainfall pattern in January 2009 was considered to be a one-in-50 year event and the volume of

water in the rivers and creeks were beyond their discharge capacity. However, the nature and duration of

flooding of the low lying areas in the sugar belt is also a product of the changes in the regulatory services

provided by the landscape due to increased agricultural developments, particularly on the steep lands and

mangrove reclaimed lowlands. Some of the damage could have been avoided had the sugar industry and

the government invested adequately in the maintaining of the natural health of the ecosystems, particularly

by maintaining the drainage systems.

To minimise future flood-related costs, a multipronged disaster risk reduction and disaster management

approach is required at all levels – national, industry and household levels. The government, the sugar

industry in partnership with the National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) and other catchment-based

stakeholders must invest in enhancing regulating ecosystem services provided by the natural landscape,

as well as in the maintenance of the drainage systems. As a minimum, unless the industry ‘goes back to the

future’ and invests in at least maintaining the key drainage infrastructures - including the old CSR drains,

main drains and infield drains in the sugarcane farms, as well as the drainage schemes in the reclaimed

mangrove and other coastal areas - such floods will continue, and will get worse with extreme weather

events associated with climate change.

Disaster risk management in the sugar belt area though must also go beyond what the sugar industry

should do. Economic wellbeing of rural households must also be improved to make them less sensitive to

disaster events, and better cope with the residual risks they may face. Without adopting a multipronged

approach to disaster risk reduction and disaster management, Fiji will continue to suffer the effects of

flooding, particularly the poor, and regular floods would force more people in the sugar belt to fall below the

basic needs poverty line.

Preface

The January 2009 floods have been reported as the worst in the history of Fiji, since the 1931 floods. Many

parts of the country were affected by floods that spread over several days – from Western Viti Levu where

the impact was greatest, to the Northern and Central Divisions of Fiji. With excessive rainfall experienced

for over a week most low lying areas in the country were under water for days and in places experienced

flood levels of up to 3-5 metres.

Almost 12,000 people are reported to have become homeless, and many have lost all their possessions –

foods, cooking utensils, clothing, livestock, and/or crops. Many roads, bridges and other infrastructure have

been damaged or washed away. Included in the affected area is the sugar belt. Many sugar cane farms,

cane access roads and rail infrastructures and mills were significantly affected by the floods. Segments of

tramlines and roads have been washed away, mills have seen debris and mud deposited on their premises.

The impacts of these floods were significant.

During and post-flooding, several assessments have been carried out by different government and non-

government organizations to assess the extent of damage and level of humanitarian assistance required.

Amongst the Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are the Red Cross, United Nations Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and Save the Children Fund. These different assessments

focused on issues and responses of relevance to the respective agencies interests/mandates. Government

agencies, coordinated through the DISMAC office, and later with the involvement of the Interim Prime

Minister’s office too, conducted their own assessments.

The Ministry of Agriculture surveyed the agricultural sector for damage to non-cane crops to identify

the nature of assistance the Ministry could provide. The sugar sector was excluded. The Public Works

Department conducted a survey of the public roads that were badly damaged. Cane access roads and

tramline infrastructure, and drains in the sugar belt were left to the sugar industry to assess. The Fiji Lands

Department conducted a survey of the state lands to assess the extent of flood damages on agricultural

farms to determine what actions need to be taken by the government to give respite to state land tenants.

Detailed impacts of floods in the Nadi and Ba areas were recently assessed under a joint Secretariat

of the Pacific Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

initiative. This study focused on developing an inundation ‘model’ for the two catchments, plus an economic

assessment of the urban areas, covering households and commercial properties, and activities. Impacts on

the sugar belt, covering the sugarcane farming area associated infrastructure and the mills are not included

in this survey.

Sugar industry stakeholders undertook different surveys and came up with different estimates for the

damage. FSC estimated an economic cost of $27 million to the sugar industry including an estimated $10.9

million for the sugarcane crops (before devaluation, which changed the mill gate price of cane). At the same

time, the SRIF has given an estimate of $22.6 million required to rehabilitate the affected crops/farms.

These impacts on the sugar industry/belt did not include the cost of the floods on the drainage infrastructure,

including in the main drainage schemes servicing the sugar farms or the costs to the drainage schemes.

Recognising the gap in flood impact assessments, and the diverse range of estimates put forward by the

different members of the sugar industry, this joint study of the IUCN and the FLIS was implemented, with

the support of the European Commission under its National Adaptation Strategy Technical Assistance to

Fiji, AMSP 2006

The study was undertaken to also obtain cross sections empirical information which could be used to assess potential costs

of climate change to Fiji’s second most important sector.

Acknowledgements

Assistance from many organizations and individuals helped to complete this study. The financial assistance

of the European Commission under its Technical Assistance for National Adaptation Strategy to Fiji, AMSP

2006 is gratefully acknowledged. Assistance of Mr Xavier Canton-Lamousse, European Commission in

Fiji and Mr Mohammed Habib of the EU Programme Management Unit is gratefully acknowledged. Co-

financing was also provided by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and Fiji Land

Information System (FLIS).

The study was supported by the Fiji Sugar Commission and its members, Fiji Sugar Corporation, Sugar

Cane Growers Council, Sugar Industry Tribunal and the Sugar Research Institute of Fiji. The farm survey

was conducted with the assistance of Chief Executive Officers of the respective industry stakeholders -

Mr Deo Saran (FSC); Mr Surendra Prasad (SCGC); Mr Jai Shree Gawander (SRIF); and Mr John May

(SCOF). They released their staff to help us implement the farm survey.

The field staff are too many to name them individually. Nonetheless the research team is very grateful

for their willingness to work even outside normal working hours to see this survey completed in each of

the sugar sectors affected by the recent floods (a list of survey team is attached as annex 1). The team

though wishes to mention some key persons who helped coordinate the field staff, including Mr Mikaeli

Bukuto, the then Manager Production Services, FSC Lautoka, Mr Apisalome Rokobaro, the Cane Logistics

Manager, FSC Lautoka, Mr Vishwa Nadan, Field Superintendent, FSC Rarawai, Mr Sailasa Waitawa,

General Manager, FSC Penang, Mr Amirka Prasad, Field Superintendent, FSC Labasa, Mr Sundresan

Chetty, General Manager Operations, SCGC, Mr Rajendra Prasad, SCGC SEO Labasa, and Mr Sashi

Kant, Senior Executive Officer, SCGC West. Many Sugar Cane Growers Councillors were also helpful in

the field. Without their support, data required for this study could not have been efficiently collected and

or compiled in the time available. Mr Sada Sivan, CEO, Fiji Sugar Fund also kindly shared information

about the status of grower debts with the Fund. Mr Hemraj Mangal freely shared his practical knowledge

of effects of floods on sugarcane farms. Review comments by Natalie Stalenberg of IUCN and Ms Paula

Holland from SOPAC are also much appreciated. To each and every person who assisted us in this study,

the team wishes to say:

Thank you, dhanyabad, and vinaka vakalevu.

Acronyms

ACRP

Accelerated Cane Replanting Programme

AMSP

Accompanying Measures Support Program

AusAID

Australian Aid

BNPL

Basic Needs Poverty Line

CPI

Consumer Price Index

CSR

Colonial Sugar Refinery

DISMAC

Disaster Management Committee

Disaster Management

DRR

Disaster Risk Reduction

ECLAC

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

EMDAT

International Emergency Disasters Database

European Union

EPA

Economic Partnership Agreement

FLIS

Fiji Land Information System

FPL

Food Poverty Line

FMS

Fiji Meteorological Services

FSC

Fiji Sugar Corporation

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GIS

Geographic Information Systems

GVP

Gross Value Product

HDI

Human Development Index

HFA

Hyogo Framework of Action

IUCN

International Union for the Conservation of Nature

LWRM

Land and Water Resource Management

NDMA

Natural Disaster Management Act

NDMC

National Disaster Management Council

NDMO

National Disaster Management Office

NGO

Non Governmental Organisation

NZAID

New Zealand Aid

PICs

Pacific Island Countries

RBF

Reserve Bank of Fiji

RSE

Relative Standard Error

SCGC

Sugar Cane Growers Council

SIDS

Small Island Developing States

SRIF

Sugar Research Institute of Fiji

SOPAC

Secretariat of the Pacific Geoscience Commission

Total Costs

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund

UNOCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

USAID

United States Aid

WHO

World Health Organisation

The Fiji Sugar Industry Context

Flooding has been a common occurrence in Fiji with floods accounting for almost a third of all disasters

in the country since 1970 (Lal et al 2009). Flooding is generally associated with excessive rainfall beyond

the regulatory capacity of landscape ecosystems causing waterlogging of low lying areas and overflowing

of rivers and creeks. It may also be associated with coastal water intrusion through storm surges and high

tides and breaks in physical infrastructures. Although flooding events follows natural phenomena, they are

exacerbated by changes in rainfall-runoff patterns caused by changes in ecological landscape resulting

from deforestation, physical infrastructure, agricultural, and urban developments. The direct and indirect

effects of floods are often felt throughout the low lying areas, including the sugar belt. They may also have

flow-on effects on the economy.

The sugar industry from its establishment in the late 19

century significantly influenced the natural

landscape on the two main islands of Fiji. It has also been the largest contributor to Fiji’s economy, that

is, until recently when the tourism industry took over in the early 21

century. Even today, although sugar

industry’s dominance in the economy has been overtaken, it still accounts for about 5% of Gross Domestic

Product (GDP) and generates about 20% of exports in 2006 (www.adb.org/statistics). The 2006 export

value associated with the sugar industry was FD$234 million in 2006. It also provides around 12% of total

employment in the country

. The sugar industry is the single most important employer in the rural areas.

Clearing of land for the sugar industry started during the early colonial period provided the basis for

agricultural development in Fiji. The country was considered to have favourable climatic and suitable soil

conditions for sugarcane farming, similar to the colonial power’s experiences in the Caribbean Islands and

South Africa.

Bringing people from India under the indenture system, the CSR (and other companies that later went out

of business), established the sugar industry in Fiji on large estate plantations. The estate based farming

was only scaled down to smallholding and independent farms in the early 1920s, soon after indenture

system of recruiting labour was abolished, and the free ‘migrants’ chose to establish their own farms.

Free migrants and European settlers had difficulty in accessing good agricultural land for agriculture,

because much of land was (and still is) owned by indigenous Fijians (see France (1969)). The colonial

government created ‘new land’ by establishing large drainage schemes on coastal largely mangrove lands,

land that belonged to the state. This led to the expansion of cane farms in low lying flood plains. These were

developed largely at the turn of the 20

century by the CSR and also subsequently by the Fiji Government

just around independence in 1970.

These mangrove reclaimed lands were developed by constructing seawalls to keep seawater out and

clearing mangrove forests and reclaiming mangrove land for sugarcane plantations. Large drainage canals

were constructed to encourage drainage of low lying areas. These coastal flat plains today comprise

approximately 1/3 of the area under sugarcane.

Fiji sugar industry particularly expanded further following the preferential access to the markets, first in the

UK under the agreement with the UK Government, and subsequently in European Commission countries’

under the Lome Convention’s EU Sugar Protocol. The Lome Convention was subsequently replaced by

the Cotonou Agreement. Under these agreements, Fiji, and other African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries

producing sugar received a guaranteed access to the EU markets at sugar prices well over double the

world market price.

Such preferential prices led to the expansion of the industry (Kumar and Prasad 2004 and Lal and

Rita 2005a). The number of growers doubled in less than twenty years and the area of cane harvested

increased by over 50 percent. As the demand for land for sugarcane farming grew in direct response to

the EU preferential access and prices, more native land was released by the Native Land Trust Board. The

expansion particularly took place on hilly lands, including land over 8

that are considered unsuitable for

agriculture under the country’s Soil Conservation Act administered by the Ministry of Agriculture.

Estimated using data from several sources, including (http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj

and the Fiji Sugar Corporation Cane

Accounting System data, and 2003 Farm Economic Survey

More recently some of the sugarcane land has commercially been farmed for non-cane crops, particularly

on flat land near rivers and streams.

Harvest, Transport and Infrastructure

1.1.

The sugar industry has a sugarcane harvesting and transport system supported by a web of cane access

roads and tramlines. Sugarcane is harvested by harvesting gangs and cane transported to the four mills

using rail or road with sugar cane transported to the main roads and tramlines via cane access roads. Mills

are owned and operated by a statutory company, Fiji Sugar Corporation, in which the government has 68%

ownership. Although during CSR sugar cane was harvested green, particularly since 1987, almost fifty

percent of cane harvested were burnt (Lal 2006). This practice of harvesting burnt cane also meant that

much of the land was exposed to the elements, resulting in excessive soil erosion.

Harvested sugar cane is transported to the mills via rail on locomotive driven trucks or Lorries over road.

Over the last three years, on average 74% of cane was transported via road while the rest reached the

mills via rail system. Although the amount of cane transported via road has gradually increased over time

due to problems with the rail system (Lal and Rita 2008), the tramline system provides a critical mode of

transport for cane from farms particularly in the low lying areas susceptible to waterlogging where lorry

access is almost impossible.

The January 2009 floods had major impacts on all aspects of the sugar industry and the sugar belt. Sugar

industry stakeholders undertook different surveys and came up with different estimates for the damage.

FSC estimated an economic cost of $27 million to the sugar industry including an estimated $10.9 million

for the sugarcane crops (before devaluation, which changed the mill gate price of cane). At the same time,

the SRIF has given an estimate of $22.6 million required to rehabilitate the affected crops/farms. These

impacts on the sugar industry/belt did not include the cost of the floods on the drainage infrastructure,

including in the main drainage schemes servicing the sugar farms, or the costs to the drainage schemes.

Recognising the gap in flood impact assessments, and the diverse range of estimates put forward by the

different members of the sugar industry, this joint study of the IUCN and the FLIS was implemented, with

the support of the European Commission under its National Adaptation Strategy Technical Assistance to

Fiji, AMSP 2006

Objectives

The main objectives of this study are to:

Assess the economic costs of the January 2009 floods on the sugarcane farmers – sugar cane

•

production and household livelihood and cane access roads and farm drainage infrastructure

Identify policy options for minimising flood-related disaster risk, and disaster risk management

•

A second phase of this study will include an assessment of the expected economic costs of climate change

on the Fiji sugar industry, and policy implications for adapting to climate change.

The next section briefly examines the effects of the 2009 Floods, followed by a section on the methodology

used in the study together with data sources. Section 4 provides the results of the economic analysis followed

by Section 5 that discusses these results and draws out key policy recommendations for minimising flood-

related disaster risks associated economic costs. Lastly, key conclusions are summarised in Section 6.

The study was undertaken to also obtain cross sections empirical information which could be used to assess potential

costs of climate change to Fiji’s second most important sector.

The 2009 Fiji Floods and Effects

Flood is defined by the Australian Bureau of Meteorology as “an event that causes the inundation of land that

is normally dry, by excess rain or the overflowing of a body of water’ (http://www.ga.gov.au/hazards/flood/).

That is, flooding occurs when the natural ecosystems processes cannot cope with increased precipitation.

Such events and other hydro-meteorological disasters are common occurrences in Fiji, particularly because

of its geographical location and characteristics (Box 1), as well as changes in the physical landscape due

to human activities.

The 2009 floods resulted from a confluence of forces – high precipitation rate, two consecutive depression

zones and associated rainfall over a short period of time, intense rain coinciding with high tides - interacting

together with the geographic characteristics of the various catchment areas. The Western Division and parts

of the Northern Division suffered their wettest January in over a century, and with 75% of the reporting sites

received at least twice their average monthly rainfall (Fiji Meteorological Service 2009a). With extensive

rainful

experienced for over a week, and a few areas receiving over 45 cm of rain in a day,

most of the low

lying areas in the country had been under water for days and in places experienced flood levels of up to

3-5 metres.

The 2009 floods was assessed by the Fiji Meteorological Services to be a one-in 50 year event (Rajendra

Prasad, Chief Meteorologist, Fiji Meteorological Service Centre, pers comm. March 2009), although Fiji

regularly experienced floods. Since 1970, Fiji reported about 40 floods, which is about a third of the total

of 124 natural disasters reported during the 1970-2007 period. If one, however, takes a longer view, since

1840 when keeping records first began, almost one in every two disasters was recorded as floods (Lal et

al 2009). Often floods are associated with cyclones but these may not be recorded as floods per se but as

cyclone events. Thus the incidence of floods could be greater than recorded.

Box 1: Effect of Floods

Using the Australian Bureau of Meteorological definition of what comprises a flood

(http://www.ga.gov.au/hazards/flood/), the effects of floods in Fiji are broadly defined to arise from where

the heavy rainfall caused:

•

Overflowing of river and creek waters and flooding of farms, houses, access roads, and other

infrastructure etc., together with associated deposition of silt;

•

Scouring or washing away farm land;

•

Waterlogging of low lying farm lands, together with associated deposition of silt; and

•

Influx of seawater onto farms and homes resulting from breaks in seawalls caused by high flow

of large volumes of rainfall-runoff.

Other effects of heavy rain on hilly cane fields may include landslides and deposition of soil/silt on low

lying flat lands, bila farms. While the effects of silt on the low lying lands are included in this study, the

effects of loss of hilly lands are not included. To assess the economic costs of the 2009 floods it is

important to first understand the direct and indirect effects of floods and then translate these into

economic damages.

Direct effects are defined as losses caused directly to growers (farms and households), millers and

infrastructure due to the flood inundation. At the same time, there are also many flow-on ‘indirect’ effects

arising from flood inundation of farms, houses, and access roads etc., such as loss in wages, decrease
in national economy, and humanitarian costs.

3.1 Growers

In the sugar belt, there are many categories of farms and farmers that were affected by the floods - those

producing sugar cane only, sugar cane plus non-cane crops, and sugar cane and non-cane crops and/

or livestock. There were also some agricultural farms that produced only non-cane crops (these are not

included in this study).

Floods directly affect sugar cane yield as well as quality (sucrose content). The effects of floods depend

on the extent as well as the duration of floods and whether flood waters were stagnant or flowing. Losses

are suffered either because sugarcane drowns completely or because of decrease in sugar content (Weiss

1976 and Humbert 1968 respectively quoted in (Berning

et al. 2000)). Cane may also get ‘lodged’ (‘fall

down’), which, particularly when the cane is large, relative to the flood level, tends to recover quickly once

flood water recedes.

Scientific research in other countries, such as South Africa, suggests that the minimum period of flood

inundation before sugarcane is completely destroyed is approximately 3 days, particularly in the summer

months (Plessis 2001). This is also supported by practical experience of Mr Hemraj Mangal, Manager

Cane Development, FSC (pers comm. April 2009). Mangal notes that farmers can expect to see significant

damage if flood water remains stagnant for 2 days or more. If inundation remains for less duration and the

flow of flood water remains, cane losses of 2-10% could be expected in Fiji, as compared with a decrease

of about 20% in the first year in South Africa (Berning et al. 2000). Experience in South Africa also suggests

that the effects of floods on the cane crop could last at least 2 years after the flood event and the extent of

damage depends on the stage of the crop as well as the height of the cane.

On the other hand, total loss of cane crop occurs when cane is dislodged or uprooted due to the force

of flood water. In the case of non-cane crops, particularly vegetables which are highly sensitive to water

submersion, floods usually result in a total loss of the crop. Similarly, with animals they may be lost due to

drowning and/or being washed away. Where land is scoured away, the farmer loses a proportion of their

land value. Other direct effects of flooding on farmers’ livelihood included the impact on family homes and

household possessions.

Some of the cane farmers also had family members who worked in town or elsewhere and who also lost

their wages because of the inability to either get to work or the work places were closed. These indirect

costs are also regarded as a component of the effects of floods on household livelihoods. Similarly included

are the costs of treatments, including transportation costs to get to medical facilities incurred by family

members that suffered from water and insect-borne diseases spread by flood waters and poor conditions.

Direct and indirect effects of floods on the sugarcane farming households are summarized in Table 1.

Photo 3.1 Cane and noncane crops on

bila land on the river’s edge

Table 1: Direct and Indirect Effects of Floods on the Sugarcane Farming Households

Direct Effects

Indirect Effects

On-farm impacts

•

Total loss of cane and non-cane crop,

or reduced productivity of crops from

water logging, salt water intrusion and or

siltation

Loss in productive farm land due to

scouring /washing away of parts of farm

and other land

Loss in livestock (such as chooks/ ducks,

goats and sheep) due to drowning and or

being washed away

Loss of or damage to household possessions

•

and housing infrastructure

Loss in wages due to inability to get to work

•

either because the roads were blocked or

because the work place was closed

Costs incurred to clean-up farms, homes and

•

commercial sites

Human health effects caused by water and

•

vector borne diseases induced by poor water

and sanitation conditions following flood

conditions

Hardship caused by loss of household

•

possessions and belongings leaving families

unable to meet their basic food and nutrition

needs, clothing, and or schooling needs of

the family (often difficult to quantify). Some of

these would have been temporarily addressed

through humanitarian assistances

3.2. The Miller

Floods also cause significant damage to mill operations, including damage to machinery and equipment

and damage to key infrastructure such as tramline infrastructure. The nation also loses out on the millers’

share of the industry revenue due to a decline in cane processed by the miller.

3.3. Infrastructure

Floods have a direct effect on the local infrastructure on which the sugar industry depends - cane access

roads, tramlines and bridges to get the harvested cane from the farms to the mills, and infield drains and

drainage scheme infrastructure. The extent of such damage on infrastructure depends on the size of floods,

in terms of the volume of water that flows through the flood plains, and the length of roads, tramlines, and

other structures within the floodplains (Berning

et al. 2001) and the extent and value of current economic

activities within the sugar belt.

In Fiji, there are also many low lying areas, particularly mangrove reclaimed lands, where the force of the

deluge of water broke the seawall. This caused the influx of seawater into cane land, causing the cane

fields to become inundated with saltwater. Saltwater caused a total loss of the affected areas, in areas such

as the Drasa and Lovu flats. These salt-inundated farms may not produce crops for 2-3 years, depending

on the rainfall and flushing of salts.

3.4. Humanitarian Assistance

In situations of disasters, civil societies, governments, and development partners come together to provide

humanitarian assistance to disaster victims. Such humanitarian support helps reduce immediate human

suffering and alleviate the stress. Often individuals, religious and other civil societies group together with

commercial houses and international development agencies to provide post disaster reliefs, such as food,

shelter, water, and medical assistance. Other forms of humanitarian assistance included direct support to

communities for rehabilitation and recovery in sectors such as education. Such humanitarian efforts also

have opportunity costs, which must be taken into account as part of the economic costs associated with
floods

It has often been argued that it is because of such humanitarian responses that in many developing countries’ governments

often do not invest in disaster risk reduction strategies, as governments know that there will be assistance in times of disasters; this is

commonly known as a It has often been argued that it is because of such humanitarian responses that in many developing countries’

governments often do not invest in disaster risk reduction strategies, as governments know that there will be assistance in times of

disasters; this is commonly known as a moral hazard problem (see for example, World Bank (2006). Not if But When: Adapting to

Natural Hazards in the Pacific Islands Region. World Bank, Sydney)..

4. Economic Costs of Floods - Methodology

The United Nation’s Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) disaster

assessment methodology was used to assess the effects of the 2009 floods (ECLAC 2003). This

methodology involves 3 components: assessment of the cost of immovable assets and stock

(damage), assessment of income foregone, and the secondary or macroeconomic effects. In this

study, which was undertaken immediately following the disaster relief period was over, only the first

two cost components are assessed using costs and values measures defined in the ECLAC (2003).

The macroeconomic impacts were not assessed as these could only be assessed after a significant

period has passed for the flow on effects to be realised.

4.1. With-Without Analysis

To translate direct and indirect effects of floods into economic cost estimates, a ‘with and without’

cross-sectional static analytical approach is used in this study

(See table 2). The economic cost of

floods is estimated by determining, for example, the difference between cane and non-cane output

in the absence of the flood (‘without’), and the cane and non-cane output following the floods (‘with’).

These effects are then translated into economic cost estimates, using the cost estimation method

described below. In addition, any related costs incurred by the farmers are also considered, such

as the cost of removing the debris from the farms. A similar ‘with and without’ analysis approach is

also adopted when determining the cost of floods on infrastructure (cane access roads, seawalls,

tramlines, and drainage).

Photo 4.1 Some effects of the 2009 floods

It is acknowledged that this may result in an underestimation of costs, since flooding results in impacts on sugar

cane farms for at least 2 years, (See Berning, C., Viljoen, M. and Plessis, L.D. (2000). ‘Loss Functions for Sugar-Cane: Depth

and Duration of Inundation as Determinants of Extent of Flood Damage’, Water South Africa 26: 527-530). However, in the
absence of time series data on the effects of floods on sugarcane in Fiji, cross sectional single-year costs are estimated.

Table 2: Economic Costs of Floods: With and Without Cost Estimation Methodology

Value of Activities

With Floods Scenario

‘With and Without’ Flood Damage

Analysis

Farm

Sugarcane Production

(Plant & Ratoon)

Cane Output Following Flooding

GVP

Without

floods

- GVP

With floods

Non-Cane Crops &

Livestock

Non-Cane Crop & Livestock

Output Following Flooding

(Assuming farmers lost only

a 6-month equivalent of their

annual non-cane crops revenue)

GVP

Without floods

- GVP

With floods

Clean-Up of Farm

Land of Debris

Non-Cane Crop & Livestock

Output Following Flooding

(Assuming farmers lost only

a 6-month equivalent of their

annual non-cane crops revenue)

Cleanup due to floods

- TC

Cleanup without floods

Farming Materials

Replacement (Lost) or Damaged

Farming materials replacement/repair

Cane Access Road

(Private maintenance)

Repair Costs Following Flood

Cane access road repair

House & Household

House & Household

Possessions

Replacement (Lost) or Damaged

House replacement/repair with floods

- TC

Household Possessions replacement/repair without floods

Normal Off-Farm

Income

Gross Income Earned Following

Floods

Off-farm Income without floods

Off-farm Income with floods

Normal Home

Clean-Up

Total Clean-Up Following Floods

Cleanup due to floods -

- TC

Cleanup without floods

Human Health

Increased Disease Incidence

and Injury Following Floods

Health Costs with floods

- TC

Health Costs without floods

Mill

Mill Infrastructure

Maintenance

Regular Maintenance Costs Plus

Additional Cost of Damage

Maintenance with floods

- TC

Maintenance Without floods

Miller Share of Sugar

Revenue

Reduced Level of Cane

Throughout

Miller Revenue

Without floods

- Miller Revenue

With floods

Infrastructure

Cane Access Road

(Regular maintenance)

Regular Maintenance Costs

plus

Additional Cost of Damage to

the Cane Access Road Due to

Floods

Maintenance with floods

- TC

Maintenance without floods

Tramline (Normal

maintenance)

Normal Maintenance Costs

plus

Additional Cost of Damage to the

Tramlines Due to Floods

Maintenance with floods

- TC

Maintenance without floods

Drainage Scheme

Canals and Drains

Normal Maintenance Costs

plus

Additional Cost of Damage to

the Drainage Schemes Due to

Floods

Maintenance with floods

- TC

Maintenance without floods

Humanitarian

Humanitarian

Assistance

Humanitarian Disaster Response

Monetary Equivalent of Disaster Packs,

Medical Kits, Food Rations, Education

Support

4.2. Cost Estimation Method

Cost estimates are derived using several different valuation methods (see e.g. (Freeman 1999) . In this

study only a limited set of valuation techniques were used, as summarized in table 3:

Table 3: Cost Valuation Methods Used in this Study

Cost Valuation Methods

Item

Production Method

Gross value of loss in sugar cane production

Gross value of loss in non-cane crops and

livestock
Gross loss in wages due to lost work time

Replacement Method

Cost to replace household possessionsl ‘clean-

up’ costs

Replacement Method (repair cost)

Cost to repair houses, household capita, etc.

Costs to repair infrastructure – cane access

roads, tramlines, drainage, etc.

Opportunity Cost

Costs for treatment of diseases (Human health)

Value of humanitarian assistance

4.3. Sources of Information

4.3.1. Information on the Effects of Floods on Growers’ Farms and Households

Multiple sources of information were used in this study. Information about the effects of floods at the farm

and household level was obtained using an economic survey of a stratified sample of sugar cane farms

affected by the floods (see Box 2).

Box 2: Farm Survey

To design a stratified economic survey, several steps were followed.

Sugarcane sectors that were affected by the 2009 floods were identified. This information was obtained

from industry field officers – FSC field officers, Sugar Cane Growers Council Senior Executive Officers

and SCGC Councillors.

For those sectors affected by the floods, respective FSC field Officers and the Cane Grower Councillors

were asked to identify those farms (by cane contract numbers) that were flooded.

Location of the selected farms in each sector and mill area was verified using the SUGAR_GIS (Lal

and Rita 2005; and Lal 2008), and the base cadastral maps.

A sample of affected farms was selected to ensure geographical representation of the farms within

the sector. Sample farms were selected on the basis of the nature of flooding such as waterlogged/

inundated/silted and/or affected by salt water intrusion), ensuring at least 15-20 percent of each

category of farms were selected.

Each selected farm was then visited by trained enumerators to elicit detailed information using a

specially designed questionnaire (see Annex 3).

Due to data quality issues, ultimately 12-22% of the affected farms per mill area were included in the

analysis, except in the case of Penang where only 9% of farms were included (table 4).

Table 4: Distribution of Farms across Sectors and Mills affected by the 2009 Floods and

Proportion of Farms selected for Survey

Mills

Number of Farms

Affected

Number of Farms

Surveyed

Percent of Farms

Sampled

Labasa

223

12%

Lautoka

874

150

17%

Penang

184

Rarawai

900

195

22%

Source: 2009 Flood Economic Survey

Types of information obtained from the farmers are summarized in Table 5.

Table 5: Key Categories of Information Elicited From the 2009 Flood Affected Farms

Household characteristics (number of people, people working on farm,

in house and off-farm)

Nature of flood impact on farm (flooding/waterlogged, silted, land washed

away, salt water intrusion; sugarcane and other crop production expected before

flooding and after flooding)

Nature damage/loss to house and household possessions due to floods and the

cost of repair

Human health effects (water and vector borne diseases associated with floods, actual treatment

costs)

Lost wages due to illness, temporary closure of workplace or road blockage

Risk perception to flooding and actions taken

Adaptation responses by government, self and or communities to minimise future flooding risks

Other information, such as time series farm level sugarcane production data was obtained from the FSC

Cane Accounting, FSC. To estimate ‘with’ flood sugarcane output, farmers expected output was used.

4.3.2. Scaling Up of Sector Level Survey Data

Sector level data collected from the Flood Economic Survey were scaled up to mill and industry level.

Sample cost estimate for each cost category was derived for the sampled farms. These category costs

estimates were aggregated within a sector. This sample total for each sector was then aggregated to the

sector level using the ‘sector sample factor’. A ‘sector sample factor’ is equal to 1 divided by the percentage

of sampled farms as a percentage of the number of affected farms in the sector. The sector total was

then aggregated across sectors to arrive at an estimate for each mill area. Mill area estimates were further

aggregated to obtain the industry total.

4.3.3. Information on Mill Damage

Only direct costs associated with the mills were obtained directly from the FSC. These estimates were

based on the assessment of the mill engineers.

4.3.4. Information on Infrastructure Damage

Effects of floods on cane access roads and tramline infrastructure was assessed using information

collected from the FSC field officers, civil engineers, cane logistic managers and field superintendents.

These officers were asked to identify the cane access roads and tramlines that were affected by the floods,

identify the nature of damage, and repair works required to get them back to pre-flood conditions. A data

template was provided to the officials to systematicaly determine the incremental effects of the floods on

these infrastructures. That is the additional cost of maintainance caused by the floods as compared with

their normal annual maintenance costs.

Similarly the Ministry of Land, Water, and Resource Management (LWRM), were asked to determine the

lengths of drainage that were affected in each area, the nature of damage, and repair works required to get

them back to pre-flood conditions. They were also asked to provide the incremental cost of reparing the

damages caused by flood.

Siltation and incremental damage to infield drains was assumed to be negligible, since the drains were

already silted and the drains had not been maintained (Hemraj Mangal, Manager Cane Development, FSC,

and various Field Officers, FSC, pers comm. April & May 2009). However, the costs of maintaining these

drains were estimated using the industry average per kilometer cost of their maintenance provided by Mr

Hemraj Mangal (Manager Cane Development, FSC (pers comm. May 2009).

4.3.5. Humanitarian-Response Data

Data was obtained directly from the DISMAC office (Fiji Government Office of the Prime Minister 2009),

where available, as well as directly from various humanitarian organizations (Table 6). In order to avoid

double accounting, effort was made to ‘track’ funds provided by the donors that were ultimately used, and

if this were reported by the providers of services during and after the 2009 floods. In some cases, where

in-kind assistance was provided, market value of this assistance, such as food relief packs, were estimated

using retail price of the content of the pack.

Table 6: Key Local and International Communities that Provided Humanitarian Assistance

Key activities

Red Cross

Distributed humanitarian assistance

Rotary Clubs of Fiji

Distributed humanitarian boxes and food rations

Fiji Sevashram Sangha

Distributed food rations, water, school supplies

Fiji Water

Crates of bottled water to official evacuation shelters and flood-

affected areas

Air Pacific

Provided free air freight for over 40 containers of relief supplies

from NZ, Australia, USA, and Canada

(Australian Aid) AusAID

School infrastructure repairs and furniture plus paid for a year’s

school fees (planting material in non-cane farms)

School infrastructure repairs and furniture plus paid for a year’s

school fees

(New Zealand Aid) NZAID

Provided humanitarian assistance post disaster

UN agencies (UNICEF, UNOCHA

Undertook rapid appraisal, coordinated UN assistances, and

supplied humanitarian assistance

Price and cost data were collected from different sources summarized in Table 7.

Table 7: Key Data Sources

Source

Farm
Sugarcane Price

FSC (previously Fiji Sugar Marketing) data

Price of Livestock

Flood Economic Survey, unit price values supplemented/validated by

FSC Field Officer and SCGC Senior Executive Officer

Cane Inputs

Fertilizer costs from the South Pacific Fertilizer Company.

Harvest and transport costs from Flood Economic Survey (Lal & Rita

2008) updated with information obtained from the Flood Economic

Survey in April 2009

House and Household

Household Goods

Flood Economic Survey of farms, supplemented and validated by price

data from local retail outlets

House Repair

Flood Economic Survey of farms, supplemented/validated by sectoral

FSC Field Officers’, and SCGC Senior Executive Officers’ local

knowledge

Other Sources of Income

Flood Economic Survey of farms & local knowledge

Mill

Millers Share of the Value of

Cane Production

FSC projected price, with sensitivity analysis done using EPA negotiated

price minus industry cost* and miller’s share of 30% as formulated in the

Master Award (see (Lal 2006 & 2008)).

Mill Cleanup & Repairs

FSC engineers

Infrastructure Costs

Cane Access Roads

Sectoral level damage estimates by FSC Field Officers and cost estimates

by FSC Civil Engineers

Tramline

Sectoral level damage estimates by FSC Field Officers and cost estimates

by FSC Civil Engineers

Drainage Scheme

Divisional LWRM technical staff, including civil engineers, European

Commission report 2004

Infield Drains

Manager Cane Development, FSC

Humanitarian Assistance
Food and Food Packs,

Disaster Relief Packs,

Clothes, Books, Water

Local and international organisations (such as Rotary, RamaKrishna

Mission), commercial houses, DISMAC and UN agencies (see table 5)

Education Assistance

AusAID, EU, DISMAC and Save the Children Fund

CEO, FSC pers comm., 120509 - cost of production over the last three years is $326/tonne sugar and $32.03/tonne cane.

Not all humanitarian assistance could be estimated because of difficulty in getting a comprehensive list of domestic assistance, as well as difficulty in getting detailed

information about the contents of assistance provided from abroad.

5. Economic and Social Costs of the 2009 Floods – The Results

Floods in Fiji have always caused significant social and economic costs, and this time was no different. The

officially reported economic cost of the 2009 floods for the country is over $100 million dollars. DISMAC

reported that over 20 percent of Fiji’s population was affected by the floods across the three main Divisions,

Western, Northern, and Central, including urban and sugar belt areas. There was also a loss of eleven lives

during the 2-week period. In addition, during the peak flooding period almost 12,000 people took shelter

in government evacuation shelters (Fiji Government Office of the Prime Minister 2009). These estimates

included some but not all flood related costs in the sugar belt. In order to avoid double accounting, the

impact of the main infrastructure, such as public roads, utilities, and other related costs are not included in

the sugar belt costs provided in this study.

5.1. Areas of Sugar Belt Affected

A detailed survey of the sugar belt in this study reveals, as expected, the impact of the flood was not

homogeneous. Nor were the floods as devastating in aggregate on the sugarcane growers, as reported in

the local media.

In total only 15 percent of active sugarcane growers were affected by the floods. These farms were

distributed across 34 of the 39 sugar sectors in the industry, excluding the FSC estate-sectors. Only four

sectors, Lautoka, Koronubu, Saweni and Qeleloa, had over 35 percent of the farms affected by the floods.

More than half the sectors had less than 10 % of the farms that were waterlogged/‘flooded’. In the rest of

the sectors, only a small proportion of farms were flood- affected (see map1).

Map 1: Sector Affected by the Floods – by Percentage

Source: 2009 Flood Economic Survey

Figure 2: Breakdown of Growers’ Costs

61%

13%

17%

Lost Cane Income

Lost Noncane Income

Other Farm-related costs

Housing & Household

Possessions
Other Flow-on effects

Source: 2009 Flood Economic Survey

5.2.1.a. Loss in Cane Income

The industry is projected to lose about 131,400 tonnes of sugar cane or a gross value to the farmers of

almost $8 million, using 2009 the projected cane price of $61.17/tonne. This is in comparison with $10.9

million estimated by FSC and $22.6 million estimated by the Sugar Research Institute of Fiji, using pre-

devaluation cane prices of $44/tonne.

Of the farms surveyed, the majority (65%) of growers lost less than a quarter of their expected individual

cane output (table 8). However, 14 % of the growers reported 50% or more loss in cane. Out of these, 3%

of active growers lost all their cane, particularly those farms in the low lying coastal areas where breaks in

the seawall occurred in areas such as Drasa, Lovu and Rarawai flats.

Table 8: Distribution of Sugar Cane Farmers by Cane Lost Category

% Area of Cane Lost

% Affected Farms that Lost Respective Amounts of Cane

100%

50% - 99%

11%

49% - 25%

21%

<24%

65%

Source: 2009 Flood Economic Survey

The largest loss in cane output is expected in Rarawai and Lautoka mills, accounting for 86% of the losses,

113,000 tonnes or $6.9 million. This is not surprising since Rarawai and Lautoka mill areas had the largest

number (and area) of flood-affected farms.

Table 10: Growers’ Farm and Off-Farm Losses

Cost Categories

Labasa

Lautoka

Penang

Rarawai

% Farms Affected by The Floods

16%

11%

20%

% Farm with Non-Cane Losses

12%

16%

% Farm with Livestock Losses

% Growers with Damage to Their

Home

% Growers with Damage/Loss to

Their Household Possession

16%

% Growers Reported Flow Health

Effects

14%

18%

% of Growers With Loss in Off-Farm

Income

15%

Source: 2009 Flood Economic Survey

The total loss in non-cane crops and livestock across the sugar belt is estimated to be about $732,162, with

almost 50 percent of these losses reported from the Rarawai mill area. Majority of the losses were reported

from sectors Rarawai, Nalato, Koronubu and Yaladro.

Table 11: Non-Cane & Other Farm-Related Costs

Non-Cane Losses (FJD$)

Labasa

$38,009

Lautoka

$231,989

Penang

$128,806

Rarawai

$333,359

Industry

$732,162

Source: 2009 Flood Economic Survey

5.2.1.c. Loss to Homes, Household and Other Costs

Official statistics indicate that 164 houses were completely destroyed in the country (Fiji Government Office

of the Prime Minister 2009) during the 2009 floods. None of these were in the sugar belt areas. Nonetheless,

where the flood water did enter family homes of sugarcane farmers the flood damage was significant, as

discussed next.

Generally speaking, only a small proportion of cane farmers had flood waters enter their homes, and

even a smaller proportion of them had to leave their homes for higher grounds or evacuation shelters.

Approximately a third of the growers reported water entering their home, and with only about half of these

people evacuated. Majority went to neighbour’s houses, with only 14 percent of growers evacuated to

official evacuation centres.

24% (or 91) of growers surveyed reported damage to their homes and household possessions. Of these,

35 surveyed farms reported some damage to their homes out of which 17 farms had over $1000 damage

to their homes. These families lost most if not all their household possessions – foods, cooking utensils,

clothing, beds, and other furniture. There were also many flow-on effects of the flood, such as loss of wages

because of inability to travel to work or work places were closed. Approximately 42% of the 380 households

surveyed reported family members suffering from water and vector-borne diseases, such as diarrhoea,

dengue and leptospirosis.

The total economic cost associated with the damage to growers’ homes, loss in household possessions,

human health costs as well as loss to the off-farm income is estimated to be almost $2.5 million. The low

lying flood plains of the Ba River suffered the highest loss, accounting for 61% of the losses, followed by

farm households in the flood plains around the Nadi River and low lying coastal areas in the Lautoka mill

area (table 11).

Table 12: Direct and Indirect Economic Losses to Grower HH Income, Excluding Farm Costs

Cost Categories

Labasa

Lautoka

Penang

Rarawai

Industry

Injury Costs

$935

$74

$1,009

Disease Costs

$19,086

$39,515

$5,680

$32,987

$97,268

Housing Costs

$15,244

$66,271

$185,655

$267,170

Personal Possessions Costs

$85,129

$547,740

$708

$1,132,557

$1,766,134

House Cleanup Costs

$3,499

$54,221

$666

$58,060

$116,446

Lost Earnings Costs

$3,554

$116,769

$6,283

$92,424

$219,030

Evacuation Costs

$352

$3,784

$898

$5,034

TOTAL

$126,864

$829,235

$13,337

$1,502,655

$2,472,091

Source: 2009 Flood Economic Survey

5.2.2. Costs to Millers

The Fiji Sugar Corporation suffered three types of economic losses: loss in the miller’s share of industry

revenue due to a decline on the cane output and associated loss in industry revenue; direct cost of damage

to the mills; and the additional costs to the maintenance of the tramline infrastructure, which is the sole

responsibility of the miller.

Under the Master Award, the sole miller received 30% of the industry revenue net of costs. Taking the

grower’s cane price of $61.17 /tonne projected by FSC, the miller share of the industry net revenue would

be $26.22/tonne. This results in an equivalent miller’s loss in gross revenue of about $3.4 million. Only

Rarawai mill was directly affected by the floods. The damage to the Rarawai mill was estimated by the FSC

engineers to be $2.43 million. The cost of extra maintenance of the tramlines due to the floods (‘with and

without’ flood costs) is estimated to be about $1.57 million, giving a total miller costs of the 2009 floods to

be about $7.5 million (table 12).

Table 13: Miller Costs

Corresponding

Sugar Revenue

Loss to the FSC

Tramline/Bridges

Mill Repairs

Total

Labasa

179,654

294,000

473,654

Lautoka

1,275,805

541000

1,816,805

Penang

301,626

192,000

493,626

Rarawai

1,687,904

544,000

2,430,270

4,662,174

Industry

3,444,989

1,571,000

2,43,270

7,446,259

Source: 2009 Flood Economic Survey

5.2.3. Infrastructure Costs

There are 336km of main tramline, together with 184 km of secondary lines (European Commission 2008).

In addition there are about 5,039 km

of cane access roads, which are maintained by the industry using

co-financing by the Government (2/3) and the growers (1/3)

. Annual maintenance of the cane access

roads usually happened just before the start of the crushing season.

Table 14. Infrastructure Statistics

Mill

Cane

Access

Roads

Tramline

-Main &

Branch (km)

Main Drains

(km)

In-field

Drains (km)

Drainage Schemes

Seawall

Drains (km)

Internal

Drains (km)

Labasa

1,174

114

N/A

Lautoka

1,595

221

191

174

Penang

540

Rarawai

1,730

150

Industry

Total

5,039

520

390

330

273,048

Source

FSC

Lal 2005 in

European

Commission

2008

Hemraj Mangal, FSC,

pers comm., May 2009

Latchman Mudaliar, LWRM,

pers comm., May 2009

Source: 2009 Flood Economic Survey

All aspects of the sugar industry infrastructure were badly affected. Of the 5,039 km of cane access roads,

23% of roads (1,136km) were damaged, requiring various forms of repairs, from grading, gravelling,

drainage, and/or culvert replacement (table by mill area). In the case of tramlines, many parts of the

tramlines, including in places foundations of bridges and culvers, were washed away in the low lying areas.

Parts of tramlines were blocked by debris and covered by silt/soil. In at least the Rarawai mill area, over

10% of the 130 km of main tramline network and 25 % of the affected bridges (50) had serious damages,

which required a total overhaul (Mr Vishwa Nadan, Field Superintendent, with inputs from his Field Officers,

FSC Rarawai, pers comm. April 2009 ). The total cost of cane access roads and tramlines, including

related bridges (except the Sigatoka Bridge) is estimated to be $2.4 million. This is much lower than the

$4.0 million estimated by FSC (unpublished Fiji Sugar Corporation, 2009, pers comm.), which included all

maintenance costs and not just the incremental costs due to the floods.

Flooding also damaged many drainage schemes due to breaks in the seawall, scouring of drains, culvert

crossings, flood gates, and flap gates. The total costs of additional work required on the cane access roads,

tramlines, and drainage infrastructure was estimated to be about $4.8 million.

Table 15: Infrastructure Costs ($)

Mill

Cane Access

& Tramline

Infrastructure

Drainage Scheme

Infrastructure

All Infrastructure

Labasa

362,030

211,500

Lautoka

984,400

2,169,789

Penang

418,550

Rarawai

620,000

Industry Total

2,384,980

2,381,289

4,766,269

Source: 2009 Flood Economic Survey

FSC figure used; differs slightly from European Commission Report 2008 figure.

In 2008, the Interim Government had changed this, removing the responsibility of sugarcane farmers, with the government

deciding to pay the total cost of maintenance.

5.3. Humanitarian Responses

For the 2009 floods, humanitarian assistance in the west and the north is estimated to be $3.67 million,

provided by many different domestic and international organizations. Assistance came in various forms,

including disaster emergency boxes, food aid, school lunches, bus fares and medical kits (see Table 15).

Many commercial houses also provided assistance either directly or indirectly through other relief agencies.

The EU and AusAID provided almost $2 million in the form of school levy payments for children attending

schools that were affected by floods, as well as towards repairs and rehabilitation of school buildings, library,

and furniture (Fiji Government Office of the Prime Minister 2009). There was also $3.57 million in-kind

assistance provided by the AusAID, NZAID, and United States Aid (USAID) to other humanitarian groups,

such as Red Cross, UNICEF, and World Health Organisation (WHO). This assistance is in addition to the

$2.01 million in the Prime Minister’s Disaster Relief Fund, which was distributed in all areas of Fiji, including

the areas in the Central Division. There were also many commercial houses that either provided in cash or

in-kind assistance directly or indirectly through other relief organizations. Their values are not captured in

the estimate provided, nor are the hundreds of person hours and days spent by relief workers.

Table 16: Humanitarian Response

Humanitarian Partners

Activities

Contributions

Rotary

Disaster Relief Kits, Medical Kits

720,000

Air Pacific

Air Freight For at Least 30-Container

Load of Relief Supplies from Australia,

New Zealand, Canada and USA.

600,000

School Levy and Building Repairs,

Furniture, and Library Supplies

1,806,209

AusAID

School Levy and Building Repairs,

Furniture, and Library Supplies

142,440

Fiji Water

900,000 Litres of Bottled Water

1,000,000

Save the Children

School Fees and Lunches

84,960

Others (Yadeen, Fiji Sevashram

Sangha, Rama Krishna,

Couriers, etc.)

Relief Supplies (Food, Food Packs,

School Lunches, Clothes, Etc.)

359,096

Subtotal Post Disaster

Humanitarian

2,679,096

Subtotal Rehabilitation &

Education Assistance)

2,033,609

Total Sugar Belt

4,712,705

In-Kind Donations (AusAID,

NZAID, USAID) through the UN

Agencies, Red Cross, etc.

3,576,000*

Other External Humanitarian

through the PM Relief Fund

2,005,903*

Total Humanitarian

Assistance

10,296,610

*Some of these may also have been spent in the sugar belt area, but difficult to disaggregate.

6. Discussion

Changes in natural landscape for agricultural development unintentionally cause a decline in regulatory

ecosystem services, including those responsible for reducing peoples exposure to floods (Millennium

Ecosystem Assessment 2005). The extent of flooding experienced in an area is thus a product of the

interaction between natural precipitation, the dynamics of natural ecosystem services, as well as the effects

of man-made changes in an area. The effects of floods also depend on the ability of the excessive water

to be flushed out of the system, the speed with which the flood waters recede, and the socioeconomic

status of the communities. The vulnerability of households, communities, and countries is a product of the

interaction between the hazard, the economic status of households, the sensitivity of the environment and

economy to hazards, the state of infrastructure, as well as the ability to respond and cope with disaster

events. These also have some broad ranging policy implications which go beyond the sugar industry, as

discussed below.

6.1. Increased Exposure to Floods

Alongside changes in the landscape for agricultural development, an extensive drainage system was

established to ensure proper drainage and reduce risks of flooding especially in flood plains and mangrove

reclaimed lands. These systems were traditionally well maintained, especially during the CSR days.

However, over time major drainage canals, in-field and main drains have become inadequately maintained.

Similarly, the good farm husbandry practices, which minimizes soil erosion, that were strictly enforced

during the CSR days have progressively declined after the company’s departure. For instance, following

the signing of the Lome Convention which provided an incentive to increase production, sugarcane farms

have expanded onto steep lands.

Generally speaking, farm management practices have deteriorated,

particularly since at least the 1987 coups when contour planting was generally not practiced, and farm

husbandry was also found lacking. Soil erosion was exacerbated by the practice of increased pre-harvest

burning of cane, which exposed bare cane fields to the elements following the 1987 coups (see (Lal and

Rita 2008)) for details about cane burning and its causes). Consequently, with even short periods of

intensive rain, excessive soil erosion and even landslides seem to have become common, silting up drains,

waterways, and rivers.

In recent years, there has also been ad hoc housing and other developments in the peri-urban areas

around the major towns and cities in the West and the North. This too would have affected the balance

in the ecological services and a change in the rainfall-runoff patterns. Consequently, with intense rainfall

beyond the capacity of the natural system to cope with excessive volume of water, sugar belt areas easily

became waterlogged, drains overflowed and water levels in rivers rose, with water overflowing from the

river and creek embankment. In the long term, if the ‘business as usual’ sugarcane farming practices

continues, vulnerability of the sugar belt will continue and may even increase with climate change and

climate variability.

6.2. Sensitivity of Sugar Cane and Non-Cane Crops to floods

The impact of floods on the sugar cane crops is particularly dependent on the stage of the crop cycle when

flooding occurs, the duration of the flood condition, and the speed of water flow, as well as the height of the

cane relative to the flood level (Weiss 1976 and Humbert 1968 respectively quoted in (Berning et al. 2000)).

Since the flooding occurred around the mid season in the sugarcane growth cycle, experience from South

Africa suggests that the impact of flooding is normally expected to be above the average. On the other

hand, damage to crops is below the average during the winter months (Plessis 2001).

Since the January floods were at the tail end of the summer, the damage could have been high. However,

partly because the flood levels relative to the cane height were low the damage to the cane crop was not as

high as expected. Based on the South African experiences, had the flood heights relative to the height of

cane been higher and the flood water remained stagnant for longer periods of time, the impact could have

been much higher (Berning, Plessis et al. 2001). Sugarcane is considered to be a relatively hardy plant

Lome Convention provided preferential access to Fiji sugar at prices two-three times greater than world price.

(Vashist

et al. 2003). On the other hand, 85 percent of farms that were also engaged in commercial non-

cane crops lost all their non-cane cash crops, such as vegetables, which are highly sensitive to flooding.

6.3. Vulnerability & House and Household Losses

Loss to homes and household possessions, were also relatively low (compared to other reported costs)

although it was still significant ($2 million). The relatively low cost is largely because only a small proportion

of homes are located in flood-prone areas, and thus was subject to the effects of the floods. Majority of

farmers have their home sites on relatively higher grounds even if their farm fields are not. Furthermore,

the economic loss is very much a function of the economic status of the families.

6.4. Floods and Infrastructure

The impact of the floods is not homogeneous across the sugar belt. As discussed earlier, Lautoka and

Rarawai mill areas accounted for about 80 % of the farms affected, and incurring $15.67 million (81%)

of the total industry costs. The impacts are no doubt associated with the presence of major rivers, Nadi,

Sabeto and Ba, that broke their banks in some places, as well as areas where bridges and culverts were

broken. In addition, in the low lying reclaimed coastal areas, such as Drasa, Lovu and Rarawai, breaks in

the seawalls and high tides coinciding with flash floods caused major damage.

Basic infrastructure that includes cane access roads, tramlines, and drains, as well as drainage schemes

also have not properly been maintained for at least the last 20 years. Under the CSR days, the company

had drainage maintenance schemes, where each year after cane harvest, staff were employed to clean

and maintain main and other drains (Mr Jagannath Sami, ex Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Sugar Cane

Growers Council, pers comm. April 2009). Since the late 1980’s this system has been abandoned. Similarly,

the Drainage Board used to annually maintain each of the drainage schemes. In recent times, because of

shortage of funds, only spot maintenance of flood outlets and limited mechanical drainage of arterial drains

is practiced.

This deterioration of the drainage infrastructure is also confirmed by the European Commission in its 2008

report on infrastructure (European Commission 2008). It particularly commented on the state of what used

to be CSR drain infrastructure at the foothills in the sugar belt area, essentially upstream of the lower

drainage system. These drains have become ‘totally derelict’ the report notes, which have contributed to

the increased flooding in the sugar belt. The European Commission report notes that this has been the

case ‘since the past 20 years or so and this has resulted in major farming areas being seriously affected by

temporary or permanent waterlogging’ (p 34). Cane access roads and tramlines have not been maintained

adequately, with funds allocated to just get the infrastructure to the stage that meets the immediate transport

needs. The cumulative effects of these changes have been an increase in the sensitivity of the drainage

system, rivers, and the catchments to high rainfall, resulting in regular flooding.

This also supports the observations made by the sugar cane farmers surveyed who noted that they

regularly experienced flooding following heavy rains. In some areas, farmers reported having 3-4 events

of floods a year following heavy rainfall, and which seems to be a recent phenomenon. This observation is

also found to be consistent with the recent disaster statistics. For Fiji, while the number of climatic events

(precipitation, cyclones and storms) does not seem to show an upward trend, the incidence of flooding

events has increased, particularly following the departure of the CSR in the late 1970s, and then mid 1987,

when Fiji’s first coup was carried out (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Number of Different Disaster Events in Fiji, 1970-2007

Disasters Over 1970-2007 Period

Year

Number

Tropical Cyclone

Flood

Drought

Earthquake

Severe Local Storm

Tsunami

Source: Lal et al 2009, based on data compiled from The International Emergency Disasters Database (EMDAT),

Glide, Fiji Meteorological Services, and National Disaster Management Office

Thus, while the climatic condition that led to the 1-in-50 year flood events may have been unusual, the poor

drainage infrastructure exacerbated the scale and duration of flooding.

6.5. Poverty Effects of the Floods

Disasters cause significant impact on the wellbeing of farmers’. Natural (and other) disasters are known

to increase national level poverty of opportunities in Fiji, measured in terms of human development index

(Lal et al 2009).

At the household level too, natural disasters can be a cause for pushing families below the poverty line.

Household poverty in Fiji has been defined in terms of basic FPL and BNPL, which includes also non-

food basic needs (Narsey 2008). Using the 2002-2003 FPL and BNPL estimates of Narsey (2008), and

time series CPI reported by the International Monetary Fund (www.imfstatistics.org), the 2008 equivalent

measures are $4,054, and $8,361 respectively. That is, any family earning less than the FPL, or $4,054,

will not have sufficient income to meet their basic nutritional needs, and may even ‘go hungry’. On the other

hand, any household earning less than $8,361 a year will struggle to meet basic needs of their family.

Using these poverty line measures, the gross margin analysis of the farms affected by the 2009 floods

indicate that about 42 % of them would struggle to provide even their basic food needs. This is an increase

from 19 % of farmers had the floods not affected their crops, off-farm income, and other indirect costs.

This ‘with and without’ analysis reflects loss of income, including off-farm income earned by members of

the sugarcane household. This analysis excluded flood-related farm costs such as lost farming materials

and cleanup, and household-related flood costs such as health costs, housing & possessions, cleanup,

and evacuation. The analysis also does not include considerations of any debt which the farmers have.

In spite of this, the loss in income alone due to floods would mean 77% of the flood affected sugarcane

families will fall below the basic needs poverty line, as compared with 54% of the families, had they not

suffered from flooding. Labasa and Rarawai mill areas were worst affected (table 16). It is noted that

many sugarcane families would have had negative cash flow (table 17) because of the high costs of their

sugarcane farms (see (Lal 2008) for details).

Practically all of the surveyed households have debt recorded with FSC. Average debt per household is $5200.

Table 17: Percentage of Surveyed Farms That Fell Below the FPL and BNPL

Mill Area (farms surveyed)

Food Poverty Line (=$4,054)

Basic Needs Poverty Line (=$8,361)

Labasa (26)

Lautoka (148)

Penang (16)

Rarawai (190)

Industry (380)

Source: 2009 Flood Economic Survey

It is thus not surprising that many sugarcane farmers and others in the flood affected areas were forced

to make some difficult choices immediately following the floods. Many families had to choose whether,

for example, to send their kids to school or to meet their basic food requirements. Had it not been for the

humanitarian assistance provided by many national and international organizations, it is likely that many

children would have dropped out of school this year.

Table 18: Net Revenue of Surveyed Farms (With and Without Flooding)

‘Without’ Floods Household

Income

‘With’ Floods Household Income

Range

-$1002 to $25,110

-$3009 to $18,475

Average

$8263

$5345

rse

0.15

0.21

Source: 2009 Flood Economic Survey

6.5.1. Positive Effect of the Devaluation

Devaluation provided some cushioning effect for farmers. Had the Government not devalued the Fiji dollar,

the impact of the floods experienced by the sugarcane farmers would have been much more drastic.

Without devaluation, more than three quarter (71%) of the surveyed affected farms would be expected to

have fallen below the FPL, as compared to 42% with devaluation. On the other hand, almost all (98%) of

the surveyed sugarcane families affected by the 2009 floods would have been considered to live below the

BNPL, as compared with about 77% had the floods not occurred (table 18).

This is not surprising, since the cost of sugarcane farming in Fiji is very high and with the loss in preferential

prices from the EU, pre-devaluation cane price was projected to be $41.24 per tonne.

Without floods and

other changes, almost 60 % of farms were expected to have had a negative gross margin (Lal and Rita

2005b). The 2009 devaluation cushioned the effect of both the loss in preferential prices as well as the

flooding. The extent of this cushioning effect in the future is difficult to predict given the recent increase in

the fertilizer price and uncertainty in farmers’ behaviour in the light of increased input prices.

Household Net Revenue = Gross Margin Cane Income + Gross Non-Cane Farm Income + Off Farm Income.

Calculated using the EU contract price of Euro 301.68 per tonne CIF and standard industry deductions described in (Lal

and Rita 2005).

Table 19: Percent of 2009 Flood-Affected Sugarcane Families Expected to Fall Below FPL &BNPL

% of Farms Below FPL (=$4,054)

% of Farms Below BPNL

(=$8,361)

Post Devaluation
“Without” Floods

“With” Floods

Pre-Devaluation
“Without” Floods

“With” Floods

Source: 2009 Flood Economic Survey

6.5.2. Disaster Assistance

Farmers reported that several organizations, including the Sugarcane Growers Council, Fiji Farmers Union,

and the Fiji Sugar Corporation visited them. In some areas, the Department of Agriculture also visited the

cane farms, particularly those areas where non-cane crop is also grown in significant amounts. These

visits were mainly focused on undertaking assessments, without, it seems, any follow-up assistance. For

example, 70 % of the surveyed farms in Koronubu had different agencies visit the farms, but majority of

them reported that these visits were for ‘assessment only’. It seems that while many government and

statutory agencies visited cane farmers, less than 20 % of the farmers in the most seriously affected areas

received any form of assistance, humanitarian, or as part of disaster rehabilitation. Nor did it seem many

sugarcane farmers who lost their household possessions and crops received assistance in the form of

short duration crops’ planting material. Ministry of Agriculture’s agricultural support, with the assistance of

the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, targeted mainly non-cane farmers, and sugarcane farmers were

generally not included in the assistance scheme. Only about 4 % of the farmers received planting material.

In some areas, such as in Vunimoli and Labasa, farmers relied on planting seeds obtained from neighbours

‘on loan’ to recover from the effects of floods; the farmers were expected to ‘return’ the seeds when the

farmers harvested their crops.

The survey data suggests that, particularly with farmers living close to poverty line, their ability to respond

to disasters is limited, and a little helping hand in time of need could help them respond to and cope with

the aftermath of disasters. This is particularly critical for people who do not have much personal savings of

their own and have limited support from extended families living in Fiji or abroad.

6.6. Increased Vulnerability

For the industry and the nation, the January 2009 floods could not have come at a worse time than when

it did.

6.6.1. Increased Vulnerability Due to Poor State of the Industry

For the industry the January 2009 floods could not have come at a worse time than when it did. The

industry has been struggling to reform its operations, despite several attempts in the last decade. All

sectors of the industry, farm production, harvest and transport, and the milling and processing sectors have

been declining since at least the 1987 political coups (see (Lal 2008)).

The number of active and efficient growers has gradually decreased over the last two decades due to a

complex set of forces – the 1987 coups, the non-renewal of land leases, as well as regular mill breakdowns

and shortage of farm labourers. With increasing input prices and substitution of the family-worked farms

to farms reliant on hired labour also meant that farm costs have increased, and in many cases sugarcane

farming has become non-viable. In the last five years alone the number of active growers decreased from

17,363 to 14,503. Milling and processing efficiency had decreased from 89% sugar recovery to 81% in

2003, with some mills reporting a sugar recovery of as low as 79% (Lal 2006). The FSC’s financial situation

has gradually decreased from FJD$9.6 million in profit in 1974 to FJD$19.3 million in loss in 2008 financial

year. The 2009 floods without doubt further aggravate their cash flow, and the industry’s financial situation.

This will cause flow on effects on the national economy and households’ well being. The effects of the

floods on the growers and the miller will thus be adding to the already existing woes in the industry, and the

economy, which in itself is not doing too well.

6.6.2. Vulnerability and National Economy

Disasters, including floods, are known to have negative effects on national economic conditions, particularly

in those countries heavily reliant on the primary sector (Benson and Clay 2004). This relationship between

national level disaster outcome and the health of the national economy was also confirmed for Fiji, together

with other factors, such as coups (Lal et al 2009).

The total gross value of farm based output lost due to the 2009 floods is $10.9 million, plus another $3.4

million equivalent lost by the miller. That is, sugarcane farming related costs due to the floods is about

to 2.3 % of the 4-year average (2004-2008) industry gross revenue product of $FJ523 million. While Fiji

has had similar, if not higher, disaster related economic costs on the sugarcane farming sector (see table

17), the 2009 effects are likely to be much more serious, particularly given the recent downturn in the

economy, following the December 2006 political events. The flood outcomes will be further aggravated by

the retraction in the national economy, which has retracted by 6.4% since 2006 (Reserve Bank 2009) and

the loss of the full Euro120 million allocated to Fiji under the National Adaptation Strategy (unless of course

firm steps are taken to return the country to a democratically elected government). Secondly, in October

2009, Fiji will be losing its last set of price ‘subsidies’ from the EU, and thus its cash flow is expected to

decrease considerably. Such economic woes will have flow on effects throughout the country, and many of

the regional towns in the Western and Northern Divisions, where cane is the lifeline, are likely to become

ghost towns.

Table 20: Examples of Economic Impact of Cyclones and Floods (FJ$)

Item

Navua Floods

2004

Cyclone Ami

(& Flooding)

2003

Household

6.7 million

N/A

Business

3.0 million

12.3 million

Agriculture (Non-Cane)

0.8 million

39.3 million

Agriculture(Cane)

13.6 million

Government Losses:

Replacement, Rehabilitation and

Provision of Emergency Supplies

2.5 million

29.2 million

Other Costs, Such as of Humanitarian Assistance

Not known

Estimated Total (Not Including ‘Unknown’ Values)

ca. 13 million

104 million

Source: Adapted from Holland 2008 (Navua floods); and Mckenzie et al 2005 (Cyclone Ami)

6.7. Other Issues: Data Availability

The availability of robust data is a serious limitation in this type of economic impact assessment of natural

disasters. Historic data about economic costs of past flood events are limited to only a couple of studies. In

some cases, flooding accompanied cyclone events and thus the effects would have been magnified.

Past reported data on the sugar belt were based on industry projections, and as was discovered during

this study, they do not seem to have been based on consistent methodology. Cost estimates were based

on different concepts of value. At times, cane loss values were estimated in terms of rehabilitation costs

(such as the ones reported by the Sugar Research Institute of Fiji for the 2009 cane loss due to the floods),

whereas at other times, these were based on the value of loss in standing cane (such as the ones reported

by the FSC for the 2009 floods).

Furthermore, scientific ‘field based’, experimental, or historical information on the impact of floods on sugar

and sugarcane yield is not available for Fiji and it was difficult to validate projections provided by the

farmers. There is always an incentive on the part of the farmers to overestimate the projected outcome

particularly when there is an expectation of some compensation or assistance due to the effects of the

floods.

Fortunately, past production records of registered cane farmers were available for each surveyed

farm. These were used as the ‘without’ floods base measure. It is recognised though that this may have

led to an underestimate of the losses, particularly in those cases where farmers had participated in the

Accelerated Cane Replanting Programme program and had new plant cane, which has higher yield.

Similarly in the case of infrastructure costs, the researchers had to rely on the damage estimates provided by

the FSC field and engineering staff. Initially, the infrastructure estimates provided by the FSC staff captured

annual cost of the maintenance of key infrastructure, such as cane access roads, or tramlines. FSC impact

assessments did not reflect additional cost of infrastructure maintenance due to the effects of the floods. In

this study, the additional cost due to the floods is reported as the ‘with and without’ infrastructure cost.

6.7.1 General Data Issues

The above observations applies to other disasters as well, even though once an event is declared as a

national disaster, government agencies are required to provide the NDMO with information on immediate

losses and costs (damage to buildings, replacement costs for infrastructure, etc.). Such data are collected

to underpin immediate post-disaster humanitarian assistance and plan for rehabilitation. Accordingly, the

NDMO retains historical records of natural disaster events, yet that data are incomplete and, in some

cases, do not match the data reported by international agencies.

Time series data were limited because there is no agreed damage assessment method for use in Fiji. Neither

is there an agreed cost measure for determining a dollar value of losses. In some cases, rehabilitation cost

estimates are used; but for the agricultural sector, for example, the recorded cost of the standing crop

lost or the costs of rehabilitation, is used. Similarly, a formal definition of ‘number of people affected’ is

not available. That measure may, therefore, reflect variously the number of people whose livelihood was

affected, the number dead, the number hurt and/or those affected indirectly. As a result, it is difficult to

compare with the certainty the economic costs or the people affected by disasters.

The industry needs to develop a standardized definition of key terms, as well as methodology for estimating

economic costs of disasters, such as floods, for ease of comparison as well as to support disaster risk

reduction and disaster management decisions.

It is worth noting that the economic cost estimate arrived in this study is still lower than the $27 million

figure provided by the industry stakeholders. This is despite the industry stakeholders using the lower pre-

devaluation cane prices, and not including many other costs, such as non-cane crop losses, costs of house

and household losses and damages, drainage schemes, or humanitarian costs.

It should also be noted that many of the subcategories of costs estimated in this study are less than

those earlier provided by the industry stakeholders, including cane access and tramlines damages and

loss in cane crop. This may be as a result of differences in the assessment methodology used, and more

importantly perhaps the lack of capacity in the industry to undertake appropriate ‘with and without’ disaster

impact assessment.

This is what appeared to have happened in the survey completed by the Fiji Sugar Cane Growers Council, with flooding

impacts reported in areas that were known not to have been flooded.

Many growers asked the enumerators, whether this survey will lead to any assistance from the Government or the EU.

Despite strongly indicating that this survey is not about any compensation, there is still some possibility of overestimation.

7. Policy Recommendations

Given the relationship between factors that determine vulnerability to floods and disaster outcomes,

disaster risk management would need to adopt a targeted disaster risk reduction and disaster management

strategies.

One key point that needs to be emphasized is that flood-related disaster risk reduction and disaster risk

management strategies cannot be treated in isolation. Flood-related disaster management is part and

parcel of the institutional improvements needed to tackle all hazards. Disaster risk reduction and disaster

management of all hazards must become everyone’s business. For a more integrated approach to disaster

risk reduction and disaster management and Hyogo Framework of Action -based recommendations see

(Lal et al 2009).

Here only immediate policy issues that need to be tackled specifically in relation to the flooding in the sugar

belt are discussed. Two categories of recommendations are relevant in this context of flooding in the sugar

belt area: national level policy recommendations that go beyond the sugar industry and those that are of

direct relevance to Fiji sugar within its disaster risk management context.

7.1. National Level

As noted earlier, the probability of flooding is increased with changes in landscape for agriculture and

urban development. Such developments affect the regulatory ecosystem services provided by natural

systems, including the level of rainfall-runoff, and the amount of water that is not flushed out of the natural

waterways.

Recommendation 1: Invest in improving the health of the natural ecosystem for flood mitigation through

integrated river catchment management, including sustainable management of upstream forestry, good

farm husbandry, and management remnant natural freshwater wetlands.

Disaster risk reduction produces higher benefits, particularly for the poor, than disaster management does.

For every dollar invested in disaster risk reduction, between two and four dollars are returned in terms of

avoided or reduced disaster impacts. Poor people are more sensitive to disasters because they often live in

hazard-prone areas, live in poor conditions and have limited capacity to respond to/recover from disasters.

Disaster events also increase the poverty level thus increasing the vulnerability of people who live below

or near the poverty line.

Recommendation 2: Adopt a pro-poor development strategy that targets poor communities living in areas

prone to natural hazards.

In the past, the Fiji Government, together with the sugar industry regularly invested in drainage and flood

protection infrastructure, but the level of investment has decreased in recent years, particularly following the

1987 political coup. Poor maintenance of the drainage infrastructure affects not only the sugar cane farmers

and the industry but also causes externality costs on the urban and peri-urban residents downstream.

Recommendation 3: Investigate appropriate insurance and other financing schemes for risk reduction and

disaster management for the sugar belt.

The government needs to seriously consider establishing a disaster risk financing scheme that takes the

responsibility of maintaining all drainage infrastructures in the sugar belt area. Poor maintenance of the

drainage infrastructure affects not only the sugar cane farmers and the industry but also causes externality

costs on the urban and peri-urban residents downstream.

Recommendation 4: Increase investment in the maintenance of physical infrastructures including drainage

canals, drains, and infield farm drains to reduce probability of flooding.

Unplanned and ad hoc peri-urban development also increases rainfall-runoff, increasing the probability

of flooding beyond the natural systems regulatory capacity. Developments in hazard prone areas also

increase sensitivity of humans to flooding. Such impacts can be avoided through appropriate regulation of

developments.

Recommendation 5: Integrate disaster risk reduction considerations in all development initiatives,

including:

Integrate (in other words, ‘mainstream’) disaster risk considerations in national development

•

planning and budgeting processes at national, provincial, district, and village/settlement levels, and

in development design

Revise infrastructure development planning, maintenance, and funding to reflect requirements for

•

hazard and risk assessments

Revise development approval processes and guidelines to require hazard and risk assessments of

•

development initiatives, particularly in hazard-prone areas

Develop and enforce proper land-use planning and development as a flood mitigation strategy

•

Recommendation 6: Integrate disaster risk reduction considerations in all infrastructure construction

and maintenance initiatives and resource allocations that reflect considerations of disaster risk reduction,

particularly in flood prone areas.

7.2. Industry Level

Sugar industry covers a wide area, and thus has a significant impact on the dynamics of rainfall-runoff in

the sugar belt and associated riverine systems.

Recommendation 7: Establish a Fiji sugar industry disaster response strategy in partnership with the

National Disaster Management Office and the Divisional Commissioners, including coordination for post

disaster rapid assessment, disaster relief efforts, and post disaster rehabilitation.

Recommendation 8: To minimize the risk of regular floods the industry, as a minimum, needs to “go back

to the future” and:

Ensure farmers adopt appropriate farm management practices that minimise farm level soil erosion,

•

including the banning of agricultural development on slopes greater than 8

under the Soil Conservation

Act;

Re-establish maintenance of key infrastructure, main and arterial drains, and infield drains, as well as

•

tramline drains and cane access road drains if the risk of regular flooding is to be minimized;

Re-establish the old CSR drains, and reintroduce annual drainage gang system for maintaining key

•

drain infrastructure; and

Re-establish regular (annual) maintenance of drainage scheme infrastructure, including seawalls,

•

bridges, and culverts.

7.3. Information System

Good information is critical for disaster risk reduction and disaster management efforts. Fiji has limited quality

data on flood and climate related hazards, flood-prone areas and disaster impacts, including coverage

of disaster events and their effects on household welfare, sectoral activities and national economy. For

the sugar belt, a SUGAR-GIS information system is already available, that integrates various layers of

information including, sugarcane farms, land owners, and land tenure, mill catchment areas, rivers and

streams as well as cadastral maps. This can be extended to key infrastructure, such as cane access roads,

tramlines, and drainage schemes. Using flood inundation models for each river system, the database

can be extended to create flood hazard maps, as well as flood impact areas, to support future decision-

making.

Recommendation 9: Enhance its SUGAR-GIS information system and develop a flood hazard layer of

information, together with a robust system for collecting and analysing disaster impact assessments to

support disaster risk reduction and disaster management. As a minimum:

Establish a robust sugar industry-based rapid assessment methodology that takes advantage of the

•

field knowledge of FSC field and extension workers, and cane growers councillors;

Develop a layer hazard related information system as part of the SUGAR-GIS information system,

•

including maps of hazard and disaster-prone areas, the geographic distribution, and socioeconomic

characteristics of poor; and

using the Sugar-GIS based information system and the results of objective rapid disaster impact

•

assessment, assist with targeted humanitarian assistance as well as post disaster rehabilitation

in partnership with the Divisional DISMAC office, relevant government ministries, humanitarian

nongovernmental agencies, as well as development partners.

Recommendation 10: Improve the coverage and quality of data on floods and other climate-related

hazards, including flood maps, and on the impacts of floods and other disasters on human livelihood and

wellbeing at household, sectoral, and national levels.

Develop time series information on determinants of natural disasters to support the forecasting of

•

disaster events

Compile time series information on household income and expenditure, the human poverty index

•

and human development index, and their key determinants to inform both development policies

Link the enhanced SUGAR-GIS with the national GIS based disaster information system, including

•

maps of hazard and disaster-prone areas, the geographic distribution and socioeconomic

characteristics of poor, disaster records and disaster impact assessments, to help improve

DRR&DM

Recommendation 11: Strengthen capacity in appropriate ‘with and without’ disaster impact

assessments.

Recommendation 12: Investigate appropriate insurance and other financing schemes for risk reduction

and disaster management for the sugar belt.

There are no financial mechanisms, including insurance schemes, available particularly to the farmers. Even

where available, such as to the miller, they had recently opted not to insure their assets. The government

needs to seriously consider establishing a disaster risk financing scheme for disaster risk reduction and

disaster management. Recently, the World Bank had helped the Caribbean island countries to establish

a Catastrophic Insurance Scheme. The experiences of the Caribbean island countries with the insurance

scheme may have some relevance to Fiji (and other PICs).

8. Concluding Remarks

The severe rainfall pattern in January 2009 was considered to be a one-in-50 year event and the volume

of water in the rivers and creeks were beyond their normal discharge capacity. However, the nature and

duration of flooding of the low lying areas in the sugar belt is also a product of the changes in the regulatory

services provided by the landscape due to increased agricultural developments, particularly on the steep

lands and mangrove reclaimed lowlands. Some of the damage could have been avoided had the sugar

industry and the Government invested adequately in the maintaining the natural health of the ecosystems,

particularly by maintaining the drainage systems.

To minimise future flood-related costs, a multipronged disaster risk reduction and disaster management

approach is required at all levels – national, industry, and household levels. The government, the sugar

industry in partnership with the NDMO and other catchment-based stakeholders must invest in enhancing

regulating ecosystem services provided by the natural landscape, as well as in the maintenance of the

drainage systems. As a minimum, unless the industry ‘goes back to the future’ and invests in at least

maintaining the key drainage infrastructures - including the old CSR drains, main drains and infield drains

in the sugarcane farms, as well as the drainage schemes in the reclaimed mangrove and other coastal

areas - such floods will continue, and will get worse with extreme weather events associated with climate

change. Disaster risk management in the sugar belt area though must also go beyond what the sugar

industry should do. Economic wellbeing of rural households must also be improved to make them less

sensitive to disaster events, and better cope with the residual risks they may face. Without adopting a

multipronged approach to disaster risk reduction and disaster management, Fiji will continue to suffer the

effects of flooding, particularly the poor, and regular floods would force more people in the sugar belt to fall

below the basic needs poverty line.

9. References

Benson, C. and Clay, E. (2004).

Understanding the Economic and Financial Impacts of Natural Disasters. The World

Bank, Washington, DC.

Berning, C., Plessis, L.D. and Viljoen, M. (2001). Loss Functions for Structural Flood Mitigation Measures,

Water South

Africa 27: 35-38.

Berning, C., Viljoen, M. and Plessis, L.D. (2000). Loss Functions for Sugar-cane: Depth and Duration of Inundation as

Determinants of Extent of Flood Damage,

Water South Africa 26: 527-530.

ECLAC (2003). Handbook for establishing the socio-economic and environmental effects of natural disasters. United

Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank). Santiago, Chile.

European Commission (2008). Sugar Infrastructures’ Component- Feasibility Study. in Strategy, Sugar - National

Adaptation Strategy. Republic of Fiji, Suva, Fiji.

Fiji Government Office of the Prime Minister (2009). Consolidated Reports on Floods, 8-16th January 2009: Damage

sustained and necessary responses, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Prime Minister’s Office, Suva, pp 79.

Fiji Meteorological Service (2009a). Preliminary Report on Flooding in Fiji, 8-16th January. Fiji Meteorological Service,

Nadi.

Fiji Meteorological Service. (2009b). F

iji Islands Climate Summary, June 2009: Fiji Meteorological Service, Nadi.

Freeman, M.A. (1999).

The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values: Theory and Methods. Resources

for the Future, Washington, D.C.

France, P. (1969).

Charter of the Land: Custom and Colonisation in Fiji. Oxford University Press, Melbourne.

Holland, P. (2008).

An Economic Analysis of Flood Warning in Navua, Fiji EUEDF 8 - SOPAC Project Report 122:

Reducing Vulnerability of Pacific ACP States Flooding. SOPAC, Suva, Fiji. pp 85, pp annexes.

Kumar, P. and Prasad, B.C. (2004). Environmental impacts of the Lome Trade Agreement and Fiji’s Exports,

Fijian

Studies: A Journal of Contemporary Fiji 2: 75-108.

Lal, P.N. (2008).

Ganna: Portrait of the Fiji Sugar Industry. Sugar Commission of Fiji, Lautoka.

Lal, P. (2006). Performance Payment System - Empirical Estimates of Potential Efficiency Gains in the Fiji Sugar

Industry,

Pacific Economic Bulletin 21: 117-139.

Lal, P.N. and Rita, R. (2008).

Sugar Cane Production in Fiji: Farmer Profile and Farm Profitability. Sugar Commission

of Fiji, Lautoka.

Lal, P. and Rita, R. (2005a). Potential Impact of the EU Sugar Reform on the Fiji Sugar Industry,

Pacific Economic

Bulletin 20: 18-42.

Lal, P. and Rita, R. (2005b). Performance Payment Ssystem - Empirical Analysis of Potential Efficiency Gains in the

Fiji Sugar Industry,

Pacific Economic Bulletin 20: 18-42.

Lal, P.N., Singh, R. and Holland, P. (2009).

Relationship Between Natural Disasters and Poverty: A Fiji Case Study,

Report Prepared for 2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Reduction. SOPAC, Suva, Fiji.

MaCarthy, D. (2009).

The History of Floods in South Australia, South Australian Floods. Bureau of Meteorology,

Commonwealth of Australia.

McKenzie, E., Prasad, B. and Kaloumaira, A. (2005).

Economic Impact of Natural Disasters on Development in the

Pacific. SOPAC and USP, Suva, Fiji.

Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. (2005).

Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Current State and Trends: Finding of

the Conditions and Trends Working Group, Washington DC.

Narsey, W. (2008).

The Quantitative Analysis of Poverty in Fiji. Vanuavou Publications, Suva.

Plessis, L.D. (2001). The Generation and Use of Cumulative Probability Distributions in Flood Risk Assessment for the

Mfolozi Flood-Plain,

Water South Africa 27: 27-34.

Reserve Bank of Fiji (2009). Table 28, Statistical Annex as at June 2009. URL: http://www.reservebank.gov.fj/docs/

June%2009%20Statistical%20Tables.pdf.

Schroter, D. & ATEAM Consortium (2004). Global Change Vulnerability - Assessing the European Human-Environmental

System. Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research.

SOPAC and Fiji Meteorological Service (2009). Technical Assessment of the January 2009 Floods in Fiji. Unpublished

manuscript.

Vashist, K.K., Singh, H. and Singh, A. (2003). Intercropping Studies in Spring Planted Sugarcane Under Flood Plain

Conditions,

Sugar Technology 5: 70-80.

World Bank (2006).

Not if But When: Adapting to Natural Hazards in the Pacific Islands Region. World Bank, Sydney.

ANNEX 1: Survey Team

Labasa Mill

Lautoka Mill

Rarawai Mill

Penang Mill

FSC staff

SRIF staff

FSC staff

Bimlesh Kumar Lal

Abhinash Prasad

Ali Aiyaz

Ashish Chand

Jagdish Prasad

Dach Raj

Altaf Buksh

Arun Prakash

Rajnesh

Jimilai Temo

Makario Tabuakuru

Anare Sikoa

Asis Chand

Renil

Saula Sevakasiga

Mani Rudra

Anil Kumar

Atish Chand

Rizwan Haque

Umendran Dass

Sanjeev Prasad

Asaeli Tawake

Bimlesh Chand

Viliame Kidia

Sanjeev Prasad

Asis Chand

Bimlesh Nath

SCGC staff

Saula Senidamanu

Bala Krishna

Jagdish Prasad

Jain Kumar

Shiva Nandan

Chandar Singh

Manasa Takala

Sashi Kant

Subbarmani

Daniel Yankaiya

Parmen

Sunil Chaudhary

Jagdish Singh

Ronesh Prasad

Jitendra Lal

Sachin N Naidu

SCGC staff

Jitendra Prasad

Sailosi Navukoro

Rajendra Prasad

Josevata Rajale

Sailosi W

Uraia Waqa

Kanda Gounder

Sandeep Sharma

Osea Rile

Satish Chand

SRIF staff

Peni Vuevuelala

Satye Vijay Raj

Daven Sharma

Rajendra Kumar

Sekove Raikalevu

Shiva Ram

Rakeshwar Kant

Semisi Lane

Ramesh Reddy

Shiu Kumar

Ravendra Kumar

Umesh Prasad

Raymond Q

Waisea Lovolovo

Walter Pickering

ANNEX 2: Additional Relevant Key DRR&DM Policy

Recommendations for Flood Risk Reduction and Management

(Adapted from Lal et al 2009)

Mainstreaming of Disaster Risk to Policy Development

3.1.

Disaster risk reduction benefits the poor more than disaster management does. For every dollar invested in

disaster risk reduction, between two and four dollars are returned in terms of avoided or reduced disaster

impacts.

Recommendation 1: Adopt a pro-poor development strategy that targets poor communities living in areas

prone to natural hazards.

Recommendation 2: Increase investment in disaster risk reduction as an effective measure to reduce the

disaster vulnerability of the poor and thereby improve overall economic development.

In the past, the Fiji Government has regularly invested in drainage and flood protection infrastructure, but

the level of investment has decreased in recent years, particularly following the 1987 political coup.

The government has no dedicated strategy to ensure the development planning and budgeting processes

at national, provincial, district and village/settlement levels address hazard and risk considerations. Building

codes, where they exist, do not include considerations of increased risks from climate change-related

disasters, for example, and where codes and guidelines are available for certain hazards, these are not

enforced.

Recommendation 3: Investigate appropriate insurance and other financing schemes for risk reduction and

disaster management for the sugar belt.

The government needs to seriously consider establishing a disaster risk financing scheme that takes the

responsibility of maintaining all drainage infrastructures in the sugar belt area. Poor maintenance of the

drainage infrastructure affects not only the sugar cane farmers and the industry but also causes externality

costs on the urban and peri-urban residents downstream.

Recommendation 4: Integrate disaster risk reduction considerations in all development initiatives.

Integrate (in other words, ‘mainstream’) disaster risk considerations in national development

•

planning and budgeting processes at national, provincial, district, and village/settlement levels, and

in development design

Revise infrastructure development planning, maintenance, and funding to reflect requirements for

•

hazard and risk assessments

Revise development approval processes and guidelines to require hazard and risk assessments of

•

development initiatives, particularly in hazard-prone areas

Disaster Management

3.2.

Disaster management constitutes having emergency plans, equipment, and trained and knowledgeable

people to help monitor hazards, operate end-to-end early warning systems, and manage emergency

responses. The nature and frequency of awareness programs, the strength of the media in reaching every

part of the country, past experiences of the public, and cultural beliefs also determine the extent of a

community’s vulnerability.

A weak end-to-end early warning system increases the vulnerability of the poor, along with their ability to

make decisions and respond appropriately during an emergency. Although Fiji has sophisticated equipment

at the Fiji Meteorological Centre in Nadi, other parts of the country lag in having updated early warning

systems. In recent years, this discrepancy has severely affected efforts to distribute warnings in time to

different parts of the country.

Also constraining the early warning system are poor hazard monitoring capabilities due to limited

institutional capacity, difficulty in retaining qualified staff, and limited monitoring stations in key locations in

the hazard-prone areas. In addition, poor communication equipment, a lack of proper rescue equipment,

and insufficient personnel training in disaster management have resulted in the inefficient operation of the

Disaster Management Team in some parts of the country.

Recommendation 5: Review the disaster monitoring and early warning system.

Review monitoring capabilities for climate-related hazards, including the distribution of appropriate

•

monitoring stations and gaps in technical expertise in data analysis and forecasting. This review

may also cover gaps in the current network arrangements, with specialised international partners

monitoring and forecasting disaster events

Review the end-to-end warning system for floods and other climatic hazards to identify how to

•

strengthen monitoring, the generation of appropriate information, and the communication of early

warnings to communities. This review should cover the required equipment and personnel training

Develop appropriate training and communication material to improve community awareness of

•

disaster events, community preparedness, and practical household response strategies for each

type of disaster event

Under the Natural Disaster Management Act (NDMA) 1998, the NDMO focuses on post-disaster response,

recovery, and rehabilitation. The NDMA institutes a number of bodies and individuals responsible for

aspects of disaster management, including the National Disaster Management Council (NDMC), Fiji Red

Cross, the Emergency Committee, the National Disaster Controller, and the NDMO. Disaster management

efforts are constrained by organisational and operational issues, including (Rokovada 2006):

The absence of appropriate information to predict, assess, or respond to disaster events (for example,

•

hazard maps, the scale of inundation, and disaster impacts)

The institutional design of the decision-making and coordination process

•

The inadequate resources available to the NDMO

•

The inadequate equipment at emergency operations centres at the divisional and district levels

•

The fact that NDMO operations are not linked to/integrated with Fiji’s rural development/administrative

•

machinery make it difficult to directly engage with and coordinate disaster response initiatives at

divisional, provincial, district, and community levels

Recommendation 6: Review the authority of the NDMO and its organisational arrangements in relation to

the Ministry of Provincial Development and other government agencies, and information systems available

to the office for strengthening capacity for DRR&DM.

Clarify the appropriate authority of the NDMO in disaster management, including the coordination of

•

disaster assessments following disaster events to underpin appropriate domestic humanitarian and

rehabilitation responses

Review the coordination of disaster responses from national and international humanitarian

•

agencies, and improve the coordination of disaster assistance from government and nongovernment

agencies

Review the scope and depth of different GISs and databases available in the country that could

•

support disaster risk management

All levels of government and all communities should simultaneously pursue DRR&DM, including the

sugar industry stakeholders. The Fiji Government agreed, under a Pacific regional framework for action,

to establish appropriate mechanisms for developing and promoting DRR&DM, and to review regularly all

DRR&DM arrangements. The government has not fully acted on these commitments, although the National

Disaster Management Plan of 1995 and the NDMA have been under review for several years.

Recommendation 7: Urgently complete the review of the National Disaster Management Plan of 1995 and

the Natural Disaster Management Act 1998, and develop a national action plan for DRR&DM, reflecting the

regional framework of actions for disaster risk management and climate change.

Urgently develop and implement a DRR&DM national action plan linked to the national development

•

plan and budget processes, meeting the Fiji Government’s commitment to the Pacific Island Forum

Leaders to systematically implement the Pacific regional framework for DRR&DM (and the Pacific

Island Framework for Action on Climate Change).

Develop appropriate DRR&DM policies and legislation that set appropriate institutional arrangements

•

for ensuring the coordination of DRR initiatives across all sectors and across all levels of government,

as well as appropriate DRR&DM strategies, decision-making processes and initiatives

Develop a funding strategy for addressing a prioritised and appropriately sequenced set of actions,

•

which the national action plan will articulate, and which will reflect a programmatic approach explained

in both the Paris Principles of Aid Effectiveness and the Forums Principles of Aid Effectiveness

Strengthen the operating guidelines of the Budget and Aid Coordinating Committee and the

•

Development Sub-committee to include DRR&DM considerations in all development projects

Encourage development partners to help strengthen DRR efforts

•

Disaster Risk Management: Data

3.3.

To develop and implement targeted DRR&DM strategies, good quality data are critical. Fiji has limited quality

data on flood and climate related hazards, flood-prone areas, and disaster impacts, including coverage of

disaster events and their effects on household welfare, sectoral activities, and national economy.

Recommendation 8: Improve the coverage and quality of data on floods and other climate-related hazards,

including flood maps, and on the impacts of floods and other disasters on human livelihood and wellbeing

at household, sectoral, and national levels.

Develop time series information on determinants of natural disasters to support the forecasting of

•

disaster events

Compile time series information on household income and expenditure, the human poverty index

•

and human development index, and their key determinants to inform both development policies

Develop a GIS based disaster information system, including maps of hazard and disaster-prone

•

areas, the geographic distribution and socioeconomic characteristics of poor, disaster records, and
disaster impact assessments, to help improve DRR&DM.

ANNEX 3: Sample Questionnaire

IUCN and FLIS

In Partnership with the Sugar Commission of Fiji

2009 FIJI FLOOD ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

SUGARCANE FARM

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE

Section Contents and Purpose

PERSONAL BACKGROUND – get an understanding of the number of people affected by floods and their

social characteristics.

PERSONAL LOSSES – understand the scale of flooding, get an understanding of how much householders

lost as a result of the flood. This information can be used to predict future flood impacts in the future.

LOSS ON FARM – understand the scale of flooding, get an understanding of how much was lost on the

sugarcane farm and other agricultural activities as a result of the flood. This information can be used to

predict future flood impacts in the future, such as due to climate change.

FLOOD RELIEF ASSISTANCE – understand the nature of flood relief assistance that may have reached

the flood affected areas in the cane belt.

E. ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS – get an understanding of how the Government might be able to

advise people of an on-coming flood in the future.

FLOOD WARNING RECEIVED AND ACTIONS TAKEN – understand the SPEED OF flooding,

warning received and actions taken to reduce the impact of flooding to personal property, possession and

lives.

FLOOD PREVENTION OR MINIMISATION OF IMPACTS

– get an understanding of the types of

actions the Government, community and individuals can take to prevent or minimise flood impacts.

FINAL COMMENTS

Date

Interviewer’s name

Interviewer’s mobile no.

Sector Name : _____________ Sector No : ______ Cane Contract Number ___________

PERSONAL BACKGROUND

The purpose in this section is to get an understanding of the number of people affected by floods and their social

characteristics.

A1) Interviewee’s position in the household (head of household, wife of the head, son, daughter, daughter in law

etc.)

_______________________________________

A2) How many people normally live in this family? ________ .Of these:

How many are below school age? __________

(i)

How many go to school? ________

(ii)

How many

(iii)

work at home or on your own farm? ________

How many

(iv)

work away from home (as a labourer on other people’s farm, in town, driving taxi,

work in government)? ________

____________________________________________________________________________________________

B. PERSONAL LOSSES

The purpose in this section is to get an understanding of how much your family lost as a result of the recent flood.

Household Possessions

B1) Did your family lose any personal and household possessions? (Tick)

Yes No

If yes, go to B2 If no, go to B4

B2) If YES (please fill this table by asking the following questions)

a. What did you lose?

b. Number of each item?

c. How much will it cost to replace it today?

What did

you lose

(Tick if

yes)

Number

of items

lost.

What will

it cost to

replace/repair

them?

(Total Cost

FJ$)

Appliances

a) Television

b) Radio

c) DVD player

d) Washing machine

e) Refrigerator

f) Gas or electric stove

g) Telephone – land line

h) Mobile phone

i) Computer, printer, software

Furniture

j) Sofas

k) Chairs

l) Mats

m) Beds and mattresses

n) Tables

Vehicle (s)

o) Motor car

p) Carrier

q) Truck

r) Bicycles

s) Food

t) Clothing

u) Other _______________________________

_______________________________

B3) If you are going to replace the items lost, what will you use (or have used) to do so? (Tick one or more as

appropriate)

Private savings

(i)

Help from extended family in Fiji

(ii)

Help from extended family living abroad

(iii)

Charity donations

(iv)

Government assistance

(v)

Other (specify) __________________________________________________________

(vi)

Housing

B4) Was there any structural damage to your home? (Tick)

Yes No

If yes, go to B5 If no, go to B6

B5) If so, how much will it cost to repair $_______or replace? $ _______

Human health

B6) Did any member of the family get hurt during the floods? (Tick)

Yes No

If yes, please describe what happened

(i)
______________________________

________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________